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. . .  scientific method, like science itself, defies definition. It 
is made up of a number of operations, some mental, some 
manual. Each of these, in its time, has been found useful, 
first in the formulation of questions that seem urgent. . .  
and then in the finding, testing, and using the answers to 
them.
J. D. BERNAL
Tax Research in 
Perspective
This study is designed to provide a working knowledge of tax research 
methodology for the certified public accountant who is not already 
a tax specialist. It introduces its readers to the research process 
utilized in the tax-related work commonly performed by accountants 
in public practice, and it notes, in passing, the kind of research used 
to determine tax policy recommendations.1 After a careful reading of 
this study and many hours of experience in implementing the 
procedures suggested here, the reader should be capable of solving 
most of the tax problems encountered in a public accounting practice.
This study also introduces the reference volumes necessary for a 
tax library. It suggests both minimal library requirements and 
methods of utilizing the more important tax reference works. This 
study is not primarily intended to increase knowledge of specific 
substantive tax provisions per se, but, as a secondary benefit, it may
1 Accountants generally have not ventured far into the realm of tax policy. Because 
of their practical experience in tax matters, accountants could play an important 
role in improving our tax system. If they were to assume an active role in policy 
deliberations in the future, many of the research procedures simply noted in 
passing later in this chapter would have to be investigated at length.
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teach readers more than they previously knew about some tax 
provisions as they study the examples offered as problem-solving 
illustrations. When solving similar problems of their own, however, 
readers should not rely on the conclusions reached in these examples 
without updating them. Although some of the AICPA tax studies are 
periodically revised, they were never intended as substitutes for a 
current tax-reference service.
Meaning of Research in General
Ideally, a book devoted to tax research would begin with an unam­
biguous definition of the word research. Unfortunately, no such 
definition has come to the authors’ attention; therefore, we will have 
to be satisfied with a general description rather than a precise 
definition. This general description should adequately reveal the 
nature of the process envisioned within the phrase tax research as it 
is used here.
The word research is used to describe a wide variety of diverse 
activities. For example, at one extreme it can include the search for 
anything not presently known by the person making the search. In 
that context, looking up an unknown telephone number in a directory 
would constitute research. At the other extreme, a scientist might 
restrict his or her use of the word research to exhaustive experimen­
tation under tightly controlled conditions solely for the purpose of 
revising previously accepted conclusions in light of recently deter­
mined facts. Between the extremes lie infinite alternative definitions.
Thus, this tax study does not purport to deal with all forms of tax 
research; except for a few introductory comments in this chapter, 
this study is restricted to a description of the procedures commonly 
utilized by a diverse group of professionals—including certified public 
accountants, lawyers, enrolled agents, and Internal Revenue Service 
personnel—to determine a defensibly “correct’’ (and in some instances 
an optimal) conclusion to a tax question. Totally different kinds of 
work undertaken by these individuals or by other persons might be 
properly included within the meaning of the phrase tax research, but 
our objective is neither to define nor to reconcile conflicting defini­
tions. We desire only to place the general characteristics of the 
different types of tax research in perspective. Very few persons 
become expert in each of the research methodologies noted. Never­
theless, anyone deeply engaged in any facet of tax work should at 
least be generally aware of what other individuals working in the 
same general field are doing. With increasing frequency, those expert
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in one facet of taxation are asked to express an informed opinion on 
a wholly different aspect of taxation. In these circumstances it is 
especially desirable that the expert be aware of what others have 
done and thereby move with appropriate caution in dealing with tax 
matters with which he or she is not intimately familiar.
Perhaps the easiest and most desirable way to place the different 
types of tax research in meaningful perspective is to create a general 
classification system based on the purpose of the inquiry. Although 
other possible classification systems are evident—for example, one 
could easily construct a classification scheme based on the character 
of the methodology employed—one based upon the purpose behind 
the research effort seems to be most useful for this statement of 
perspective. At least three distinct purposes for tax research come 
immediately to mind: implementation of rules, policy determination, 
and advancement of knowledge.
Research for Implementation of Rules
Much tax research is undertaken to determine the applicability of 
general tax laws to specific fact situations. After a tax law is enacted, 
implementation of the law is the responsibility of the taxpayer. 
Although we have what purports to be a self-assessment tax system 
in this country, both tax rules and business practices have become 
so complex that many taxpayers seek the assistance of specially 
trained individuals to ensure not only their compliance with the tax 
rules, but also their achievement of that compliance at minimal tax 
cost.
  Five elementary steps constitute a total research effort: (1) estab­
lishing the facts, (2) from the facts, determining the question, (3) 
searching for an authoritative solution to that question, (4) determining 
the import of the frequently incomplete and sometimes conflicting 
tax authorities located, and (5) communicating the conclusion to the 
interested party. Although a thorough examination of what each of 
these five steps involves must be deferred to later chapters, we can 
briefly describe each step at this juncture.
Establishing the Facts Most tax laws and related administrative 
regulations are necessarily written in general terms. Effective rules 
must be stated in terms that adequately describe the vast majority 
of factual circumstances envisioned by those who determine the rules. 
Rules stated too broadly invite conflicting interpretation; those stated 
too narrowly often fail to achieve their intended objective. However, 
no matter how carefully the words of a statute are selected, general
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rules cannot possibly describe every conceivable factual variation that 
might be subject to the intended rules. Consequently, the first step 
in implementation-oriented research necessarily involves the process 
of obtaining all of the facts so that the researcher can determine 
which tax rule or rules might apply to those particular events. 
Determining the Question Questions arise when specific fact 
situations are examined in light of general rules or laws. Complex tax 
questions frequently evolve through several stages of development. 
Based on prior knowledge of tax rules, a researcher usually can state 
the pertinent questions in terms of very general rules. For example, 
the tax researcher may ask whether the facts necessitate the recog­
nition of gross income by the taxpayer, whether the facts permit the 
taxpayer to claim a deduction in the determination of taxable income, 
or whether a gain should be reported as ordinary income or as capital 
gain. After making an initial search of the authorities to answer the 
general question, the researcher often discovers that one or more 
specific technical questions of interpretation must be answered before 
the general question can be resolved. These secondary questions 
frequently involve the need to determine the exact meaning of certain 
words and/or phrases as they are used in particular tax rules. For 
example, the tax researcher may have to determine if the fact situation 
under consideration is “ordinary,” “necessary,” or “reasonable” as 
those words are used in various sections of the code. Alternatively 
he or she may have to determine the meaning of the word “primarily” 
or, perhaps, the meaning of the phrase “trade or business. ” Once the 
general question is restated in this more specific way, the researcher 
often must return briefly to the process of collecting more facts. From 
a study of the authorities, the researcher learns that facts initially not 
considered important may be critical to the resolution of the revised 
question. After obtaining all necessary facts and resolving the more 
technical questions, the tax researcher may discover that the general 
question is also resolved. If, however, the answer to the general 
question is negative, very often an answer to a related question must 
be resolved before the researcher can proceed to a conclusion. For 
example, even if a tax researcher determines that a particular 
expenditure is not tax deductible, he or she may have to determine 
whether or not the expenditure can be capitalized (that is, added to 
the tax basis of an asset) or whether it must simply be ignored in the 
tax determination procedure.2 In effect, raising collateral questions
2 In a tax-planning situation, of course, the tax adviser may recommend an alternative 
way of structuring the transaction to achieve the most desirable tax result.
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returns the researcher to the beginning of the second step in the 
research process. This procedure continues until all pertinent ques­
tions have been satisfactorily answered.
Searching for Authority Authority in tax matters is legion. It nearly 
always begins with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 
but it quickly expands to include Treasury regulations, judicial 
decisions, administrative pronouncements, and, sometimes, congres­
sional committee reports. Judicial decisions in federal tax disputes 
are rendered by U.S. district courts, the Tax Court, the Court of 
Claims, the several circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. 
Administrative pronouncements are issued as revenue rulings, rev­
enue procedures, technical information releases, and general counsel 
memoranda. Reports of the House Ways and Means Committee, the 
Senate Finance Committee, and the Joint Committee may be 
pertinent to the resolution of a tax question. Obviously the task of 
locating all of the potential authority before reaching a conclusion can 
be a very demanding and time-consuming task. As previously ex­
plained, the search for authority often raises additional questions that 
can only be answered after the determination of additional facts. Thus 
the research process often moves back from step three to step one 
before it proceeds to a resolution of the general question.
Resolving the Question After locating, reading, and interpreting all 
of the pertinent authority, a tax adviser must be prepared to resolve 
the many questions that have been raised. The taxpayer client must 
make the final decision about what course of action to take, but, in 
most circumstances, the taxpayer’s decision is guided by and often 
dependent on the conclusions reached by the adviser. The taxpayer 
looks to an adviser for guidance. Even when working with questions 
to which there appear to be no ready answers, a tax adviser must be 
prepared to say to a client, “If I were you, I would do this.’’ Thus, 
a tax adviser really must resolve the questions to his or her own 
satisfaction before recommending action to anyone else.
Communicating the Conclusion Having thoroughly researched the 
tax problem and having reached a conclusion, a tax adviser must 
communicate all pertinent factors to the interested parties. Drafting 
tax communications is unusually difficult. Very often, highly technical 
questions must be phrased in layman’s language. Positions sometimes 
must be carefully hedged without omitting or misstating any critical 
fact or any applicable rule. At the same time, tax advisers must take
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sufficient care to protect their own rights and professional integrity. 
These considerations sometimes are conflicting constraints in drafting 
an appropriate communication; therefore, great care must be exer­
cised in this final step of the implementation-oriented research 
procedure.
The arrangement of the material in this tax study follows the 
sequence of steps suggested above. That is, chapter 2 is concerned 
with the search for facts; chapter 3 is a discussion of the process by 
which a tax researcher prepares a statement of the pertinent questions. 
Chapter 4 explains how a researcher can systematically go about 
locating possible authority; chapter 5 suggests what to do if the 
authority is incomplete or conflicting. Chapter 6 describes the many 
factors that must be considered in drafting the communication that 
will convey the results of the research effort to the concerned persons. 
Finally, chapters 7 and 8 give detailed examples of this tax research 
process under two different circumstances: Chapter 7 illustrates the 
research process in a compliance setting, chapter 8, in a planning 
situation.
Research for Policy Determination
Our tax laws are enacted by Congress to produce federal revenues 
and to achieve designated economic and social objectives. For 
example, the general objectives of the investment credit and the 
rapid depreciation provisions include stimulating investment spend­
ing and economic growth. The domestic international sales corporation 
provisions are intended to stimulate foreign sales of domestically 
produced goods and thus to aid in the solution of U.S. balance of 
payments (currency) problems. These and many other tax provisions 
should be investigated thoroughly to determine whether they are 
efficiently achieving the intended objectives. The research method­
ology common to such investigations draws heavily from the discipline 
of economics. Econometric models must be constructed and much 
aggregate data obtained to formulate tax policy.
Similarly, our government representatives should have factual 
information about voter preferences. They should know, for example, 
whether a majority of the voters prefers to deal with problems of 
pollution through fines and penalty taxes, through incentive provisions 
in the tax laws, or through wholly nontax legislation. Similarly, those 
who enact laws should know how the voters feel about funding public 
medical care, employee retirement programs, mass transit systems, 
interstate highways, and a host of other government projects. The
6
research methodology common to determining voter preferences 
draws heavily on survey techniques best understood by sociologists, 
demographers, and other social scientists.
Every change in tax law has a direct impact on the federal budget 
and on monetary policies, the magnitude and direction of which 
should be determined as accurately as possible before the law is 
finalized. Operations research techniques and computer technology 
are most useful in making such determinations. Some of the research 
techniques used to make these predictions are similar to those used 
by the econometrician in building models that tell us whether or not 
a law can achieve its intended objectives; in other ways the techniques 
utilized are quite different. The point is simply that, even within the 
confines of the work that must be undertaken to provide tax policy 
prescriptions, the procedures that must be utilized to make those 
determinations vary substantially. Yet all of these diverse procedures 
are commonly referred to as tax research.
Research for Advancement of Knowledge
Another purpose for undertaking tax research is the advancement of 
knowledge in general. Research undertaken to determine a preferable 
tax policy, as well as that undertaken to implement tax rules, has a 
pragmatic objective. The researcher in each instance has a very 
practical reason for wanting to know the answer. Some research, on 
the other hand, is undertaken solely for the purpose of disseminating 
general knowledge. There is, however, no single common method­
ology for such research. Rather, the methodology selected depends 
entirely upon the nature of the investigation being undertaken. If it 
involves economic predictions, economic modeling is necessary. If 
it involves taxpayer attitudes and/or preferences, surveys based on 
carefully selected statistical samples are equally mandatory. And if 
it involves compliance considerations, a studied opinion of pertinent 
authority is just as essential.
Tax practitioners, as well as academicians, government employees, 
and foundation personnel, often engage in tax research work intended 
solely for the advancement of knowledge. The results are published 
in journals and presented in proceedings that appeal to two funda­
mentally different audiences. Policy-oriented journals and proceed­
ings primarily attract persons who are economists by education and 
training. Implementation-oriented journals and proceedings primarily 
attract those who are either accountants or lawyers by education and 
training. Academicians are found in both camps.
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Examples of Tax Research
Chapter 7 is an example of implementation-oriented tax research. 
The objective of chapter 7 is simply to illustrate how a tax researcher 
might determine the “correct” tax treatment of the act of incorporating 
a sole proprietorship under stated fact conditions. Chapter 8 dem­
onstrates how tax planning can be utilized to minimize the tax dangers 
and maximize the tax opportunities implicit in a different fact setting. 
Before we turn all of our attention to the details of this form of 
research in subsequent chapters, however, let us pause very briefly 
to note a few examples of policy-oriented tax research. Some knowl­
edge of this literature should be helpful to any certified public 
accountant undertaking a policy-oriented research project. Although 
individual CPA firms tend to do little of this work, a few accountants 
may be in for a new adventure because of the expansion of the 
AICPA’s role in tax policy, approved by the executive committee in 
the fall of 1969. Several task forces have been appointed, and research 
has begun. The first statement of tax policy was issued by the AICPA 
in 1974.3 Five additional statements of tax policy were issued in the 
next six years.
A relatively recent example of a policy-oriented tax study is entitled 
Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice?4 This book, by Charles E. 
McLure, Jr., is one of a long and distinguished series of studies in 
government finance. It is specifically concerned with the double 
taxation of corporate profits.
An example of a more theoretical study is found in the work of 
Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner entitled Who Bears the Tax 
Burden?5 It attempts to determine the distribution of all taxes 
combined by income classes. It demonstrates nicely the complexity 
of tax policy studies by presenting its results under eight different 
assumptions of tax incidence. Further, the authors do not express a 
preference for any one result, in recognition of the fact that no 
conclusive empirical evidence has been found to justify making a 
single selection.
A third example of policy-oriented research can be found in the 
published proceedings of The 19th Annual Institute o f Petroleum
3 See Taxation o f Capital Gains (New York: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 1974), 28 pages.
4 This 262-page book, published in 1979, is available from The Brookings Institution, 
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036, for $2.50
5 This 119-page booklet, published in 1974, is also available from The Brookings 
Institution.
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Exploration and Economics. There, on pages 323-47, Thomas R. 
Stauffer discusses the major current issues in the international taxation 
of oil production.6
A thorough review of an important segment of tax research was 
made by Carl Shoup in Quantitative Research in Taxation and 
Government Expenditure.7 In this work, Shoup appraises the need 
for further quantitative research and suggests outlets for such work. 
Literally hundreds of other excellent examples of tax research could 
be cited here, although to do so would lead far afield from the 
objectives of this study.
In summary, the phrase tax research is commonly used to refer 
to widely divergent processes. All are legitimate, socially productive 
endeavors that may be included in a definition of tax research. A 
broad outline of the different processes are mentioned in this 
perspectives chapter for two reasons: first, to give the reader some 
idea of what is and what is not to be described in the study, and 
second, to suggest to accountants and others, who by their own 
inclination are implementation-oriented, the kinds of efforts that 
should be included in policy-oriented projects they might undertake.
In closing this chapter, the authors join many others who have 
called for a broader participation of tax-interested persons in the 
determination of tax policy. In the past, the tax research efforts of 
theoreticians have all too often wholly ignored all practical conse­
quences, including the behavioral adaptation of those most directly 
affected by their recommendations. On the other hand, the policy 
prescriptions rendered by the implementation-oriented groups have 
often overlooked important empirical evidence accumulated in the 
more theoretical studies. Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law professor 
interested in taxation and a former assistant secretary of the treasury 
for tax policy, made these observations in 1966:
We must be aware that the apparent certitude offered by the mass of 
numbers computers can generate or the conclusions that the ranks of 
econometric equations can produce do not lull us into a false security. 
There is still room, as the computer technology develops, for a 
constructive two-way dialogue between the computer technologists 
and those whose insights come from experience and accumulated
6 These proceedings were published by The Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, 
Tex., in 1979.
7 Shoup’s paper was published as Public Expenditures and Taxation, Colloquium IV 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), 16 pages.
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wisdom. Working together they can offer great hope and promise for 
an improved tax system capable of fully bearing its share of respon­
sibility for achieving the Great Society we are seeking.8
An important first step in this hoped-for cooperation is the acquaint­
ance of each with the aims and the methodologies of the other. This 
volume should help to describe the tax research methodology com­
monly utilized by the more implementation-oriented group.
Stanley S. Surrey, “Computer Technology and Federal Tax Policy,” National Tax 
Journal (September 1966): 257-58.
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The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on; nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
OMAR KHAYYAM
The Critical Role 
of Facts
A tax result is dependent upon three variables: the pertinent facts, 
applicable law, and an administrative (and occasionally judicial) 
process. An accountant not trained in the practice of law is apt to 
underestimate the significance of facts to the resolution of a tax 
question. Most laypersons’ study of law, including the accountant’s 
study of business law, tends to concentrate on general rules. For the 
accountant turned tax adviser, however, general rules will not suffice. 
It is essential that every tax adviser understand why a thorough 
knowledge of all the facts is critical to the resolution of any tax 
question.
The Importance of Facts to Tax Questions
As used here, the word fact means an actual occurrence or an event, 
a thing having real existence; facts are the who, what, when, why, 
where, and how of daily existence. From the facts, questions arise. 
A tax adviser must be able to distinguish a conclusion from a  fact. For 
example, a statement that an individual is married really is a
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conclusion rather than a fact. The facts that support such a conclusion 
may include such real-world events as these:
• On June 9, 1956, that person appeared with a member of the 
opposite sex before a third person duly authorized to perform 
marriages.
• That person exchanged certain oral vows with the specified 
member of the opposite sex.
• The person authorized to perform marriages made certain 
declaratory statements to those present.
• The exchange of vows and the declaratory statements were made 
in the presence of a designated number of witnesses.
• Certain documents were signed by designated parties to this 
ceremony, and those documents were filed in a specified re­
pository.
• No events that might change this relationship have subsequently 
transpired.
Change any one of these facts, and the conclusion—that is, that a 
person is married—may no longer be valid. A statement of pertinent 
facts is virtually always much longer and clumsier than is a simple 
statement of the conclusion drawn from them. Consequently most of 
the time we tend to converse in words, sentences, and thoughts 
based on conclusions rather than on elementary facts.
In tax work it often is necessary to pursue facts at length to be 
certain of the validity of a particular tax conclusion. To continue the 
foregoing illustration, a person cannot file a joint income tax return” 
unless he or she is married. Obviously, most people know if they are 
married or not, and most tax advisers accept their client’s word on 
this important conclusion. If, in the course of a conversation or in an 
investigation related to the preparation of a tax return, it becomes 
apparent that there is reason to doubt the validity of the client’s 
conclusion, then a full-scale investigation of all of the facts is necessary. 
For example, a client may state that he has recently gotten a divorce. 
This simple statement should be sufficient to cause an alert tax adviser 
to make further investigations, because a person may be deemed to 
be married for tax purposes even after he believes that he once again 
is single. By the same token, the tax adviser must know that persons 
who never in their lives have exchanged marriage vows may be 
deemed to be married for tax and other purposes by virtue of their 
actions (that is, by virtue of “the facts”) and the law of the state in 
which they reside. The tax adviser also knows that persons married 
to nonresident aliens may not be eligible to file joint income tax
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returns, in unusual circumstances, even though they are obviously 
married.
Tax work is often made difficult and risky precisely because the 
taxpayer may not understand the significance of the pertinent facts, 
and a tax adviser often cannot spend the time to verify every alleged 
fact without charging an exorbitant fee. When a tax adviser is (or 
reasonably should be) alerted to the possibility that a further inves­
tigation of the facts may lead to a significantly different conclusion in 
a tax determination, however, it is the tax adviser’s professional 
obligation to investigate those facts in sufficient depth to permit a 
correct determination of a tax conclusion. In situations involving 
aspects of the law beyond the confines of taxation—as in the marriage 
example—the accountant may very well find it necessary for a client 
to engage legal counsel before proceeding with the client’s tax 
problem.
No one engaged in tax practice should ever underestimate the 
importance of factual detail. Virtually every authoritative reference 
on tax practice stresses this important conclusion. Bickford says, “It 
would be impossible . . .  to overemphasize the importance of knowing 
all the facts of a case, down to the last detail, figure and date. 
Freeman and Freeman put it this way: “Facts determine the law. 
Law is really facts. Shape the facts and you have planned the law. 
Facts have to be found. Be a detective. Find not some of the facts 
but all of the facts. ”2 Implied in the latter quotation is the important 
distinction between events that have already taken place and those 
that are yet to occur. Tax planning is based on this critical distinction. 
Facts— Established and Anticipated
Taxpayer compliance and tax planning constitute two major portions 
of any successful tax adviser’s work. The initial and critical difference 
between these two phases of tax practice is simply a difference in the 
state of the facts. In compliance work, all of the facts have already 
transpired and the tax adviser’s only task—assuming that he or she 
already knows what the facts are—is the determination of the tax 
result implicit in those facts. In planning work, the tax adviser 
researches alternative ways of achieving established goals and rec­
om m ends to a c lien t those actions th a t will— considering all opera-
1 Hugh C. Bickford, Successful Tax Practice, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 14.
2 Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman, The Tax Practice Deskbook (Boston: 
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1973), p. 2-1.
13
tional constraints, personal and financial objectives, and personal and 
business history—minimize the resulting tax liability. In other words, 
the tax planner must determine an optimal set of facts from the 
standpoint of tax results, given certain personal and financial con­
straints. The operational procedures applied in these two phases of 
tax practice are quite different.
After-the-Facts Compliance
The first step in taxpayer compliance work is a determination of the 
facts that have already taken place. The procedures used to determine 
facts differ significantly depending upon the relationship existing 
between the tax adviser and the taxpayer. The less personal the 
relationship, the greater the amount of time that must be devoted to 
a discovery of facts. In most instances, the fact discovery process can 
be divided into at least four distinct steps: initial inquiry, independent 
investigation, additional inquiry, and substantiation.
Initial Inquiry At one extreme, the tax adviser will not have known 
the taxpayer prior to the request for services. In that event, if the 
initial request is for tax return preparation services, it is common for 
the tax adviser to complete a predetermined checklist of facts during 
(or immediately following) an initial interview. Many firms have 
devised their own forms to facilitate this information-gathering 
process; others utilize standard forms prepared by tax return computer 
services or other agencies. If the initial request is for assistance in an 
administrative proceeding, a less structured interview is typically 
used. In every instance the objective of the inquiry is the same: to 
establish all of the facts essential to an accurate determination of the 
tax liability.
Tax advisers who are intimately familiar with their clients’ affairs 
often are able to extract sufficient factual information from existing 
files and personal knowledge to allow them to avoid extended personal 
contact with the taxpayer while making an investigation comparable 
to the initial inquiry. For example, the certified public accountant 
who regularly maintains and/or audits all of a client’s financial records 
will require only minimal additional contact with the client to establish 
the information necessary to determine the correct tax liability.
Independent Investigation Regardless of the extent of personal 
contact involved in the initial inquiry, all but the simplest taxpayer
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compliance engagements require some independent investigation on 
the part of the tax adviser. The specific reason for undertaking such 
an independent investigation varies from one situation to another, 
but all stem from the need for additional facts to determine a tax 
result. Sometimes the impetus for getting more facts comes from 
something the client said; at other times, from what he or she did not 
say. At still other times, the need for further facts becomes apparent 
when the tax adviser begins to examine the client’s financial records. 
For example, a canceled check made payable to an unknown Dr. 
Jones may or may not be tax deductible. The return preparer must 
determine what kind of doctor Jones is and what service was rendered 
to the taxpayer before deciding whether or not the payment can be 
deducted.
Whatever the cause, the tax adviser frequently engages in what 
might be described as detective work to determine necessary facts. 
An independent investigation may involve a detailed review of 
financial records, old files, correspondence, corporate minutes, sales 
agreements, bank statements, and so forth; it may involve interviews 
with friends, family, employees, business associates, or others; and, 
in some cases, that search may extend to reviews of general business 
conditions and practices. Because of the relatively high cost of some 
investigations, it is common to defer incurring those costs until they 
are absolutely necessary. Usually this means deferring them from the 
time of the initial act of taxpayer compliance to the time of a dispute, 
that is, from the time of filing the tax return to the time at which the 
Internal Revenue Service challenges a tax conclusion previously 
reported by the taxpayer on the basis of rather tenuous facts. Because 
less than 3 percent of all tax returns filed are challenged in an. average 
year, the reason for delaying a costly in-depth investigation is obvious. 
Nevertheless, the competent tax adviser should always be alert for 
situations that are apt to require further investigation later. Often it 
is easier and cheaper to obtain facts and to assemble related evidence 
at the time events transpire than it is to reconstruct them at a later 
date; occasionally facts may become impossible to determine if too 
much time has elapsed between the events and the inquiry. A tax 
adviser’s services are often more efficient and less costly if the client 
collects much of the necessary evidence to support the facts. Again, 
the probability of the client’s doing this successfully is much greater 
if facts relate to recent events. Deferring an investigation of pertinent 
facts nearly always increases the costs. The trade-off is clear: Incur 
a smaller cost now at the risk of its being unnecessary, or incur 
greater cost later in the unlikely event that it is needed.
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Additional Inquiry Even in those situations in which an in-depth 
investigation of the facts has been completed, the tax adviser 
frequently will need to make further factual inquiries after beginning 
a search of the law. A search for the tax law applicable to a given set 
of facts often uncovers the need for information not originally deemed 
relevant by the taxpayer or the tax adviser. By reading revenue 
rulings and judicial decisions in situations similar to that of the client, 
an adviser may become aware of the importance of facts not originally 
considered. Being alerted to their possible importance, the tax adviser 
must return to the fact determination process once again. In highly 
complex situations, this process of moving between fact finding and 
law determination may repeat itself several times before the tax 
question is finally resolved.
Substantiation of Facts Determining what the facts are and proving 
those facts are two entirely different things. The nature and quality 
of the proof that is required varies significantly, depending on who 
is receiving proof. In tax matters, the person who must be convinced 
of the authenticity of the facts can be anyone from an Internal 
Revenue Service agent to a Supreme Court justice. The methods 
used to substantiate facts vary tremendously. Generally, fact sub­
stantiation procedures are much less formal in dealings with an 
administrative agency such as the IRS than in dealings with a court, 
and even within the judicial system, the rules of evidence vary from 
one court to another. Obviously, the closer one moves to formal 
litigation the greater the need for the opinion and the assistance of 
a qualified trial attorney. Only such a professional can adequately 
assess the hazards of the litigation procedure, including the rules of 
evidence and the burden-of-proof problems.
The certified public accountant engaged in tax practice should not 
lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of all tax disputes are 
settled at the administrative level.3 Therefore it is necessary for the 
CPA to be fully prepared to determine, present, and substantiate all 
of the facts critical to the resolution of a tax dispute in any adminis­
trative proceeding . In  do ing this, th e  CPA m ust exercise d u e  caution 
to avoid stipulation of any fact that might prove to be detrimental to 
the client in the unlikely event that a dispute should move beyond
3 Government publications fail to provide precise data on the percentage of 
settlements at different levels. However, according to recent Annual Reports o f 
the Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, approximately 99 percent of all proposed 
adjustments are settled outside the courtroom.
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administrative hearings and into the courts. Because of this ever­
present danger, the CPA should consult with a trial attorney at the 
first sign of significant litigation potential.
Before-the-Facts Planning
If events have not yet transpired, the facts have not yet been 
established, and there is opportunity to plan anticipated facts carefully. 
As noted earlier, tax planning is nothing more than determining an 
optimal set of facts from the standpoint of tax results. The procedures 
followed in making such a determination differ significantly from the 
procedures utilized in taxpayer compliance work.
Determination of the Preferred Alternative The first step in the 
determination of the tax-preferred alternative involves a client inter­
view. In this instance, however, the purpose of the interview is not 
to determine exactly what has happened in the past but, rather, to 
determine (1) the future economic objectives of the client and (2) any 
operative constraints in achieving those objectives. If the tax planner 
is to perform successfully, all of the client’s hopes, dreams, ambitions, 
prejudices, present circumstances, and history must be fully under­
stood. That kind of information can seldom be obtained in a single 
interview. Ideally, it is derived through a long, open, and trusting 
relationship between client and tax adviser. When tax planning is 
based on such an on-going relationship, any particular client interview 
may be brief and directly to the point. Even relatively major plans 
can sometimes be developed, at least initially, with no more than a 
simple telephone conversation.
When the tax adviser fully understands a client’s objectives and 
constraints, he or she should spend a considerable amount of time 
simply thinking about alternative ways of achieving the objectives 
specified by the client before beginning the research. Generally there 
are diverse ways to achieve a single goal; failure to spend enough 
time and effort in creative thinking about that goal usually results in 
taking the most obvious route to the solution. In many instances the 
most obvious route is not the preferred alternative. A vivid imagination 
and creative ability have their greatest payoff in this “thinking step. ’’
Although in all probability no one can do much to increase his or 
her native imagination or creative ability, many people simply do not 
take advantage of that which they already possess. By far the most 
common cause of unimaginative tax planning is the failure of the 
adviser to spend sufficient time thinking about alternative ways to
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achieve a client’s objectives. A common tendency is to rush far too 
quickly from the initial inquiry to a search of the law for an answer. 
By rushing to a solution, we very often completely overlook the 
preferred alternative.
An example of creative imagination appears in John J . Sexton, 42 
T.C. 1094 (1964), where a taxpayer successfully defended the right 
to depreciate a hole in the ground. The facts of the case are both 
interesting and instructive. The taxpayer was an operator of refuse 
dumps. He acquired land with major excavations primarily to use in 
his dumping business, and he allocated a substantial portion of the 
purchase price of the land to the holes. As the holes were filled, he 
depreciated the value so allocated. Because the taxpayer carefully 
documented all the pertinent facts in this case, the court allowed the 
deduction. Many less imaginative persons might have totally over­
looked this major tax advantage simply because it is unusual and 
because they did not spend enough time just thinking about the facts 
of the case.
After a tax adviser has determined a client’s objectives, and after 
thinking about alternative ways of achieving those objectives, the tax 
adviser should systematically go about researching the tax rules and 
calculating the tax result of each viable alternative. The preparation 
of a “decision tree’’ is very often helpful in determining which of 
several alternatives is the tax-preferred one (see chapter 8, page 217). 
It forces the adviser to think through each alternative carefully, and 
it demonstrates vividly the dollar significance of the tax savings in the 
preferred set of facts. Obviously, however, it is up to the client to 
implement the plan successfully.
Substantiation of Subsequent Events The client and the tax adviser, 
working together, must take every precaution to accumulate and 
preserve sufficient documentation of the facts to support the tax plan 
selected. In relatively extreme circumstances, a court will not hesitate 
to apply any one of several judicial doctrines—most notably the 
doctrine of substance-over-form—to find that an overly ambitious tax 
plan is not a valid interpretation of the law. If, however, the tax 
adviser exercises reasonable caution against plans that lack substance, 
and if he or she takes sufficient care to document each step of the 
plans, the chance of succeeding is considerably improved. Of course, 
the process of substantiating carefully selected facts is primarily the 
responsibility of the taxpayer. The tax adviser, however, will often 
supervise the process of implementation to make certain that the 
intended events actually transpire in the sequence intended, and
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that the proof of these events will be available when and if it is 
needed.
Some Common Fact Questions
Most tax disputes involve questions of fact, not questions of law. In 
working with fact questions, a tax adviser’s job is to assemble, clarify, 
and present the facts in such a way that any reasonable person would 
conclude that they conform to the requirements outlined in the tax 
law. Demonstrating that degree of fact clarity is often next to 
impossible. Some fact questions are necessarily much more involved 
and difficult to prove than others. Following are brief examples of 
common but difficult questions of fact.
Fair Market Value The determination of the fair market value of 
a property is probably the most commonly encountered fact question 
in all of taxation. It arises in connection with income, estate, and gift 
taxes. The applicable law common to many of these situations is 
relatively simple if we could but determine the fair market value of 
the properties involved. For example, section 61 of the code provides 
that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived, ” 
and Treasury Regulations section 1.61-2(d)(1) goes on to state, “The 
fair market value of the property or services taken in payment (for 
services rendered) must be included in income.’’ Generally, the 
application of this law is simple enough once the valuation question 
is settled.
The legal definition of fair market value, stated concisely in Estate 
Tax Regulations section 20.2031-1(b), follows.
The fair market value is the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts.
Fact problems are involved in making that brief definition operational. 
What is a willing buyer? A willing seller? A compulsion to buy? A 
compulsion to sell? Reasonable knowledge? A relevant fact? Only in 
the case of comparatively small blocks of listed securities and in the 
case of selected commodities do we have access to an organized 
market that will supply us with ready answers to those questions. In 
all other instances we must look to all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances to find an answer.
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Books have been written in attempts to delineate the fact circum­
stances that must be considered in determining fair market value. 
Unfortunately, even a cursory review of those books must remain 
outside the scope of this tax study.4 Suffice it to observe here that 
valuation is a fact question and that, ordinarily, the party to any tax 
valuation dispute who does the best job of determining, clarifying, 
and presenting all of the pertinent facts is the party who wins that 
dispute.
Reasonable Salaries The determination of what constitutes a rea­
sonable salary has long been a troublesome tax problem. With the 
introduction of the maximum tax on earned income in 1971, that 
question became critical. As usual, the applicable law is relatively 
simple if we could but determine what is reasonable within a particular 
fact setting.
In determining reasonableness, both Internal Revenue Service 
agents and judges often look, for comparison, to such obvious facts 
as salaries paid to other employees performing similar tasks for other 
employers, any unique attributes of a particular employee, the 
employee’s education, the availability of other persons with similar 
skills, and prior compensation paid to the employee. In addition, tax 
authorities trying to determine the reasonableness of salaries also 
look to the dividend history of the employer corporation, the relation 
between salaries and equity ownership, the time and method of 
making the compensation decision, the state of the economy, and 
many other facts. Again, we cannot examine here all of the detailed 
facts that have been important to reasonable salary decisions in the 
past.5 We need only observe that the question of reasonableness is 
a fact question. The taxpayer who marshals all of the pertinent facts 
and presents them in a favorable light stands a better chance of
4 See G. D. McCarthy and R. E. Healy, Valuing a Company (New York: Ronald 
Press, 1971), and J. R. Krahmer and T. D. Henderer, Valuation o f Shares o f 
Closely Held Corporations, Tax Management Portfolio 221.
5 See C. C. Halsey and M. E. Peloubet, Federal Taxation and Unreasonable 
Compensation (New York: Ronald Press, 1964), for an excellent survey of nearly 
200 cases on this topic. See also H. Steutzer, Jr., “Reasonable Compensation,” 
N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 25 (New York: N.Y.U., 1967): 49-508; E. L. 
Kellett, “Reasonableness of Compensation Paid to Officers or Employees, so as to 
Warrant Reduction Thereof in Computing Employer’s Income Tax, ” 10 Ad.L. 3d 
125 (1966); and J. P. Holden and A. L. Suwalsky, “Reasonable Compensation,” Tax 
Management Portfolio 202-3d.
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winning an IRS challenge of unreasonable salaries than does the 
taxpayer who ignores any critical facts. The best reason for carefully 
studying regulations, rulings, and cases in such a circumstance is to 
make certain not to overlook the opportunity to determine and prove 
a fact that could be important to the desired conclusion.
Casualty and Theft Losses Noncorporate taxpayers frequently lose 
their right to claim a casualty or theft loss deduction for income tax 
purposes because they did not take sufficient care to establish the 
facts surrounding that loss. The law authorizes a tax deduction for 
losses sustained on property held for personal use only if the property 
is damaged or destroyed by a casualty or theft. Thus, the loss 
sustained because of the disappearance of a diamond ring will not 
give rise to a tax deduction unless the taxpayer can prove that the 
disappearance is attributable to a casualty or theft, rather than to 
carelessness on the part of the owner. If the taxpayer has photographs, 
newspaper accounts, police reports, testimony of impartial persons, 
and/or other evidence that a casualty or theft has occurred, he or she 
will have relatively little trouble in convincing a skeptical internal 
revenue agent or a judge of the right to claim that deduction. It is 
the facts that count, and the taxpayer generally has the burden of 
proving the facts in a tax dispute.
Gifts Section 102 provides that receipt of a gift does not constitute 
taxable income. In many situations, however, it is difficult to 
determine whether a particular property transfer really is a gift or 
compensation for either a past or a contemplated future service. Once 
again the facts surrounding the transfer are what will control that 
determination. Facts that demonstrate the intent of the transferor to 
make a gratuitous transfer—that is, one without any expectation of 
something in return—are necessary to the determination that the 
transfer was a gift. Relationships existing between the transferor and 
the transferee may be important; for example, it generally will be 
easier to establish the fact that a gift was made if the two involved 
persons are closely related individuals (for example, father and son). 
On the other hand, if the two are related in an employer-employee 
relationship, it will be especially difficult to establish the presence 
of a gift. Although the broad outline of many other abstract but 
common fact questions could be noted here, let us consider in 
somewhat greater detail a few examples of some real-world tax 
disputes that were based on fact questions.
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Illustrative Fact Cases
To better illustrate the critical role of facts in the resolution of tax 
questions, examinations of four previously litigated tax cases follow. 
The four cases can be divided into two sets of two cases each. One 
set deals with the question of distinguishing between a gift and 
income for services rendered; the other set deals with the propriety 
of deducting payments made by a taxpayer to his parent. None of the 
four cases is particularly important in its own right, but together they 
serve to illustrate several important conclusions common to tax 
research and fact questions. The court decisions in these cases are 
relatively brief, and the facts involved are easy to comprehend.
Gift or Income?
Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes include a rule 
providing that gifts do not constitute an element of taxable income. 
The present rule is stated in section 102 of the 1954 code as follows: 
“(a) General Rule.—Gross income does not include the value of 
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.” The first 
two cases to be examined consist largely of judicial review of the facts 
necessary to determine whether or not particular transfers or property 
constitute gifts or taxable income for services rendered.
The first case involves a taxpayer named Margaret D. Brizendine 
and her husband, Everett. The case was heard by the Tax Court in 
1957, and the decision, rendered by Judge Rice, reads in part as 
follows.
Everett W. Brizendine
Findings o f Fact
Petitioners were married in 1945 and throughout the years in issue 
were husband and wife and residents of Roanoke, Virginia. They filed 
no returns for the years 1945 through 1949, inclusive, but did file 
returns for 1950 and 1951 with the former collector of internal revenue 
in Richmond.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner, Margaret D. Brizendine, was 
convicted and fined on five separate occasions for operating a house 
of prostitution, or for working in such a house. Petitioner, Everett W. 
Brizendine, prior to the years in issue, had served a term in the 
penitentiary. During the years in issue, he was convicted and fined 
seven times for violation of the Roanoke City Gambling Code, for 
operating a gambling house, and for disorderly conduct.
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Prior to the years in issue, petitioner. Margaret D. Brizendine, met 
an individual in a Roanoke, Virginia, restaurant with whom she became 
friendly. The individual promised her that if she would discontinue 
her activities as a prostitute he would buy her a home and provide for 
her support. In 1945, the individual paid Margaret $2,000 with which 
sum she made the down payment on a house; he also arranged for her 
to secure a loan to pay the balance of the purchase price. From 1945 
and until the time of his death in March 1950, the individual provided 
money with which Margaret made payments on such loan. In addition, 
he paid her approximately $25 per week in cash and also paid her 
money to provide for utilities, insurance, furniture, and clothing. In 
1946, he paid her $500 which she used to buy a fur coat.
In determining the deficiencies herein, the respondent arrived at 
petitioners adjusted gross income by adding annual estimated living 
expenses in the amount of $2,000 to the known expenditures made by 
them. The amounts of adjusted gross income so determined were as
1945 .............................................$4,784.80
1946 ............................................  3,300.70
1947 ............................................  2,645.00
1948 ..........................................  2,978.62
1949 ..........................................  2,763.37
1950 ............................................  4,812.82
1951 ............................................  3,641.57
Petitioners’ living expenses did not exceed $1,200 in addition to the 
known personal expenditures made by them during each of the years
Petitioners' failure to file returns for the years 1945 through 1949 
inclusive, was not due to reasonable cause. The deficiencies in issue 
were due to petitioners’ negligence or intentional disregard of rules 
and regulations. The petitioners’ failure to file declarations of estimated 
tax was not due to reasonable cause and resulted in an underestimate 
of estimated tax.
Petitioners contended that the amount received by Margaret from 
the individual, with which she made a down payment on a house, as 
well as all other amounts received from him until the time of his death 
in 1950, were gifts to her and, therefore, did not constitute taxable 
income. The respondent, while accepting petitioner’s testimony as to 
the source of the sums, argues that she has not established that the 
amounts received from the individual were really gifts. He further
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points out that Margaret testified that the payments received from the 
individual were in consideration of her forbearance to refrain from 
engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, and 
argues that her promise constituted valid consideration for the pay­
ments which causes them to be taxable as ordinary income.
Both petitioners testified at the hearing in this case. Their demeanor 
on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves consid­
erable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual to 
Margaret were the only source of petitioner’s income during the years 
in question, or that such amounts as the individual paid to Margaret 
were gifts. Since petitioners thus failed to establish that those amounts 
were in fact gifts, we conclude that such amounts were correctly 
determined by respondent to be taxable income which petitioners 
received during the years in issue. We further think that there is 
considerable merit to the respondent’s argument that Margaret' s 
promise to the individual to forbear from engaging in prostitution, and 
to grant him her companionship, constituted sufficient consideration 
for the money received from him to make it taxable to her.
We think, on the basis of the whole record, that respondent’s 
estimate of personal living expenses in the amount of $2,000 was 
excessive. Many of the known expenditures which petitioners made 
during the years in issue were for living expenses, and pursuant to our 
findings we are satisfied that an additional $1,200 adequately covers 
all of their personal living expenses.
The second case involved a taxpayer named Greta Starks. The case 
was heard by the Tax Court in 1966, and the decision, rendered by 
Judge Mulroney, reads in part as follows.
Greta Starks, T.C.M. 1966-134
Findings o f Fact
Petitioner, who was unmarried during the years in question, lives 
at 16900 Parkside. Detroit, Michigan. She filed no Federal income tax 
returns for the years 1954 through 1958. She was 24 years old in 1954 
and during that year and throughout the years 1955, 1956, 1957 and 
1958 she received from one certain man, amounts of money for living 
expenses, and a house (he gave her the cash to buy it in her name), 
furniture, an automobile, jewelry, fur coats, and other clothing. This 
man was married and about 55 years old in 1954.
Respondent in his notice of deficiency stated that he determined
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that the property and money petitioner received each year constituted 
income received by petitioner “for services rendered” and in his 
computation he held her subject to self-employment tax. He explained 
his computation of the deficiency for each year by reference to Exhibit 
A which was attached to the notice of the deficiency. Page 13 of this 
Exhibit A is as follows:
Analysis of Living Expenses and Assets Received for Services 
Rendered
Year 1954
1955 Oldsmobile automobile 
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 20 weeks)
Total
Year 1955
16900 Parkside 
Roberts Furs 
Saks Fifth Avenue 
Piano and furniture
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 52 weeks)
Total
Year 1956
Roberts Furs 
Saks Fifth Avenue 
Miscellaneous household expense
Total
Year 1957
Furs by Roberts 
Saks Fifth Avenue 
Living expenses
Total
Year 1958
Furs by Roberts 
Saks Fifth Avenue 
Living expenses
$ 3.000.00 
3,000.00
$ 6,000.00
$22,211.08 
5,038.00 
828.18
6,000.00
7,800.00
$41,877.26
$ 1,570.00 
3,543.17 
1.500.00
$ 6,613.17
$ 121.00 
1,353.19 
4,000.00
$ 5,474.19
$ 35.00
978.79 
4,000.00
Total $ 5,013.79
The money and properly received by petitioner during the years 
in question were all gifts from the above described man with whom 
she had a very close personal relationship during all of the years here 
involved.
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Opinion
The question in this case is whether the advancements made by 
respondent’s witness were gifts under section 102. Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954. or in some manner payments that would constitute 
taxable income. The question is one of fact.
There were two witnesses in this ease. Petitioner took the stand 
and testified she was not gainfully employed during the years here 
involved except for an occasional modeling job in 1954 for which her 
total receipts did not exceed $600. She said she had no occupation and 
was not engaged in any business or practicing any profession and had 
no investments that yielded her income during the years in question. 
She in effect admitted the receipt of the items of money and property 
recited in respondent’s notice; of deficiency but said they were all gifts 
made to her by the man she identified as sitting in the front row in 
the courtroom. She testified that this man gave her money to defray 
her living expenses, and about $20,000 cash to buy the house at 16900 
Parkside in 1955. She testified that she mortgaged this house for about 
$9,000 and she and this man lived for a time off of the proceeds of this 
loan. She said that this man gave her the furniture, jewelry, and 
clothing but she never considered the money and property turned 
over to her by this man as earnings. She said she had during the years 
in question, love and affection for this man and a very personal 
relationship.
The only other witness in the case was the alleged donor who sat 
in the courtroom during all of petitioner’s testimony. He was called 
to the stand by respondent. He admitted on direct examination (there 
was no cross-examination) that he had advanced petitioner funds for 
the purchase of a house, clothes, fur coat, and furniture for the house. 
He was asked the purpose of the payments and he replied: “To insure 
the companionship of Greta Starks, more or less of a personal 
investment in the future on my part." The only other portion of his 
testimony that might be said to have any bearing on whether the 
advancements were gifts or not is the following:
Q. In advancing Greta Starks monies to purchase the properties I 
previously mentioned, what factors did you take into consideration 
pertaining to your wish or desire of securing the permanent compan­
ionship of Greta Starks?
A. The monies were advanced as I considered necessary. The 
purchase of a house was considered a permanent basis to last ten. 
twenty years not for a short while.
Respondent, of course, asks us to believe the testimony of his
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witness for respondent’s counsel stated he was not to be considered 
a hostile witness. The witness was only asked a few questions. He had 
heard all of petitioner’s testimony to the effect that the money, home, 
ear, furniture, clothing, etc. were gifts by him to her. It is somewhat 
significant that he was not asked the direct question as to whether the 
advancement of money and property, which he admits he made, were 
gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two statements he made 
that throw any light at all on the issue of whether the advancements 
were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers to the effect that 
he was making a “personal investment in the future” or the house 
purchase was “considered a permanent basis” are incomprehensive 
and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His testimony, in so far 
as it can be understood at all, tends to corroborate petitioner. He 
gives as his purpose for making the advancements “to insure the 
companionship” of petitioner. This can well be his purpose for making 
the gifts. It certainly serves no basis for the argument advanced by 
respondent on brief to the effect that her “companionship” was a 
service she rendered in return for the money and property she 
received. Evidently respondent would argue the man paid her over 
$41,000 for her companionship in 1955 and $5,000 or $6,000 for her 
companionship in the other years.
We are not called upon to determine the propriety of the relations 
that existed between petitioner and her admirer during the five years 
in question. He testified he had not seen her for five or six years. 
Petitioner was married in 1961 and is now living with her husband and 
mother. It is enough to say that all of the circumstances and the 
testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s witness support her 
statement that she received gifts of money and property during the 
five years in question and no taxable income.
A Comparison of Facts Even a cursory examination of these two 
Tax Court memorandum decisions reveals that the two cases have 
many facts in common. In both instances a female taxpayer received 
substantial sums of money and other valuable property each year for 
several years, from a specific male person, in exchange for the 
taxpayer’s companionship.
On the other hand, the two decisions also suggest several fact 
differences between the two cases. For example:
1. The names, dates, and places of residence of the principal 
parties differed in the two instances.
2. The woman involved in the one case was, throughout the years 
in question, married; the other woman was single.
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3. One of the male companion/transferors had died prior to the 
legal action; the other was alive and testified at the trial.
4. One of the taxpayer/transferees had a criminal record as a 
prostitute prior to the years in question; the other had no such 
record.
Because the pertinent tax issue is the same in both cases, the question 
is whether the facts common to the two cases are sufficiently alike to 
demand a common result or whether facts are sufficiently dissimilar 
to justify opposite results. Ms. Brizendine had to report taxable 
income; Ms. Starks was found to have received only gifts and, 
therefore, had no taxable income to report. The law was the same in 
both instances; therefore, the different results must be explained 
either by the differences in the facts or by differences in the judicial 
process. Theoretically, the judicial process should work equally well 
in every case; if so, the different results can only be explained by 
different facts.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results The published decision 
rendered by any court is, quite obviously, much less than a complete 
transcript of judicial proceeding. It is, at best, a brief synopsis of 
those elements of the case deemed to be most important to the judge 
who has the responsibility of explaining why and how the court 
reached its decision. A review of the two judicial decisions under 
consideration here suggests at least two hypotheses that might explain 
adequately the divergent results reached in these two cases.
On the one hand, the fact that Margaret Brizendine was found to 
have received taxable income rather than gifts may be attributable 
primarily to the fact that she had a record of prior prostitution. The 
fact that during the years 1945 through 1951 she elected to “discon­
tinue her activities as a prostitute” may suggest that the taxable status 
of her receipts really had not changed all that significantly. Prior to 
1945 her receipts apparently were derived from numerous parties; 
thereafter, from one individual. If the same explanation for the 
receipts is common to bo th  tim e periods, the  tax resu lts should  not 
differ simply because of the number of transferors involved. If, 
however, the explanation for those transfers differed materially during 
the two time periods, a history of prostitution should have no material 
impact on the present decision.
An alternative hypothesis that might also adequately explain the 
divergent results in these two cases would emphasize the differences 
in the judicial process rather than the differences in the facts. In
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most tax litigation the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the tax 
liability determined by the commissioner of internal revenue is 
incorrect. If the taxpayer fails to present such proof, the contentions 
of the IRS are deemed to be correct. Perhaps the attorney for Ms. 
Brizendine simply failed to prove the client’s case.
Two adjacent statements in Brizendine support each of the above 
hypotheses. Judge Rice first says, “Since petitioners thus failed to 
establish that those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that such 
amounts were correctly determined by respondent to be taxable 
income which petitioners received during the years in issue.’’ This 
sentence clearly suggests that Ms. Brizendine’s primary problem was 
one of inadequate proof. In the next sentence, however, the judge 
suggests the alternative hypothesis in the following words: “We 
further think that there is considerable merit to the respondents’ 
argument that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forebear from 
engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, 
constituted sufficient consideration for the money received from him 
to make it taxable to her. ’’
The ultimate basis for a judicial decision often is not known with 
much certainty. Any impartial reading of Brizendine could not pass 
lightly over the judge’s observation that the taxpayers’ “demeanor on 
the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves consid­
erable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual to 
Margaret . . . were gifts.’’ Although initially it may be difficult to 
understand how courtroom behavior or criminal records relate to the 
presence or absence of a gift, those facts may help to establish the 
credibility of any statements made by a witness. The process of 
taxation is, after all, not a laboratory procedure but a very human 
process from beginning to end. Any attempt to minimize the 
significance of the human element at any level of the taxing process 
runs the risk of missing a critical ingredient.
Starks may be viewed as further evidence of the importance of the 
human element in the taxing process. This time, however, the record 
suggests that human sympathies were running with the taxpayer and 
against the IRS. Judge Mulroney seems to have been less than 
pleased with the performance of the government’s attorney. The 
judge, commenting on the government’s interrogation of the male 
transferor, observes, “He was not asked the direct question as to 
whether the advancements of money and property, which he admits 
he made, were gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two 
statements he made that throw any light at all on the issue of whether 
the advancements were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers
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to the effect that he was making a ‘personal investment in the future’ 
or the house purchase was ‘considered a permanent basis’ are 
incomprehensive and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His 
testimony, in so far as it can be understood at all, tends to corroborate 
petitioner.’’ In summary, even though the taxpayer technically once 
again had the burden of proving the IRS wrong, the failure of the 
government’s attorney to ask the obvious question and to pursue 
related questions when a witness gave “incomprehensive’’ answers 
seems to have influenced the judge in this instance. In any event, 
the court did conclude that “all of the circumstances and the testimony 
of petitioner and even of respondent’s witness support her statement 
that she received gifts of money and property during the five years 
in question and no taxable income.’’
Lessons for Tax Research Even though the specific technical tax 
content of these two cases is trivial, a tax adviser can learn several 
things from these two cases. History—that is, facts that took place 
well before the events deemed to be critical in a given tax dispute— 
may significantly influence the outcome of the decision. Therefore, 
in gathering the facts in a tax problem, the tax adviser can never be 
too thorough in getting all of the facts of a case.
A study of these two cases also reveals the intricate balance 
between facts and conclusions. If the trier of facts—IRS agent, 
conferee, or judge—can be convinced of the authenticity or even the 
reasonableness of the facts presented for consideration, he or she has 
ample opportunity to reach the conclusion desired by the taxpayer. 
If those facts are not presented or are presented inadequately, the 
decision-maker cannot be blamed for failing to give them full 
consideration. Disputes are often lost by the party who fails to 
capitalize on the opportunity to know and present all pertinent facts 
in the best light.
Finally, some further reflections on these two cases are instructive 
for tax planning generally. If the parties to this litigation had correctly 
anticipated their subsequent tax problems, what might they have 
done to reduce the probabilities of an unfavorable result? For 
example, would the results have differed if neither party had included 
a “weekly allowance’’ in their financial arrangements? Or if all 
transfers had been made on such special occasions as a birthday, an 
anniversary, Christmas, Yom Kippur, Saint Valentine’s Day, or some 
other holiday? If gift cards had accompanied each transfer and those 
cards saved and “treasured” in a scrapbook? If gift tax returns had 
been filed by the transferor? Obviously, each of the additional facts
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suggested here would lend credence to the conclusion that the 
transfers were indeed gifts. At some point the evidence—perhaps 
the filing of the gift tax return—would be so overwhelming that no 
one would question the conclusion in anything but the most unusual 
circumstances.
The important point of this review is, of course, that the tax adviser 
often plays a critical role in settings very remote from the courtroom. 
If the tax adviser correctly anticipates potential problems, it may be 
easy to recommend the accumulation of supporting proof that will 
almost ensure the conclusion a client is interested in reaching, 
without going to court. Even when the tax adviser has been consulted 
only after all of the facts are “carved in stone, ” the thoroughness with 
which those facts are presented is often critical to the resolution of 
the tax question. And no one can make a good presentation of the 
facts until all of the facts are known, down to the very last detail. A 
study of two more cases can yield additional insight into the critical 
role that facts play in tax questions.
Deductible or Not?
In general, we know that income earned from the rendering of a 
service must be reported by the person who rendered the service 
and that income from property must be reported by the person who 
owns the property. If a taxpayer arranges for someone else to pay to 
one of his parents a part of the value that was originally owed to him 
for services rendered, generally that payment would still be taxed to 
the individual rendering the service, and the payment would not 
ordinarily be deductible by him. Payments made to parents, like 
payments made to anyone else, would be deductible for income tax 
purposes only if the parent had rendered a business-related service 
to the child and the payment made for such a service were reasonable 
in amount. But what exactly do those words mean?
The third case to be reviewed here involves a professional baseball 
player named Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. The case was heard by 
the Tax Court in 1967, and the decision, rendered by Judge Hoyt, 
reads in part as follows.
Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. 48 T.C. 339 (1967)
Findings o f Fact
The stipulated facts are found accordingly and adopted as our
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Cecil Randolph Hundley. Jr. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner), 
filed his 1960 income tax return with the district director ol internal 
revenue, Richmond, Va. Martinsville, Va., was his legal resilience at 
the time petitioner filed the petition herein. Petitioner is a professional 
baseball player and at the time of trial was a catcher for the Chicago 
Cu bs of the National League.
Petitioner's father, Cecil Randolph Hundley, Sr. (hereinafter re­
ferred to as Cecil), is a former semiprofessional baseball player, and 
he has also been a baseball coach. Cecil played as a catcher throughout 
his baseball career, and received numerous injuries to his throwing 
hand while using the traditional two-handed method of catching. This 
is a common problem of catchers. A few years before Cecil retired 
from active participation in baseball as a player, he developed a one- 
handed method of catching which was unique and unorthodox. This 
technique was beneficial because injuries to the catcher's throwing 
hand were avoided. Cecil became actively engaged in the construction 
and excavation business in 1947 and was still engaged in that business 
at time of trial.
Petitioner attended Bassett High School near Martinsville. Va., 
from which he graduated in June of 1960. During 1958 petitioner was 
a member of his high school baseball team and the local American 
Legion team. He played catcher for both teams and was an outstanding 
player. In the spring of 1958, while a sophomore in high school, 
petitioner decided that he wanted to become a good major league 
professional ball player. Petitioner believed that Cecil was best 
qualified to coach and train him for the attainment of this goal. After 
discussing his ambition with Cecil, an oral agreement was reached 
between petitioner and Cecil. Cecil agreed to devote his efforts to a 
program of intensive training of petitioner in the skills of baseball, to 
act as petitioner’s coach, business agent, manager, publicity director, 
and sales agent in negotiating with professional baseball teams for a 
contract. His role may best be described in petitioner s own words 
when he first asked Cecil to handle things for him in 1958. “Daddy, 
do the business part and let me play the ball.”
As compensation for Cecil s services, it was agreed that Cecil would 
receive 50 percent of any bonus that might be received under the 
terms of a professional baseball contract if one should later be signed. 
This contingent payment agreement was thought to be fair and 
reasonable by the parties since it was unknown at that time whether 
petitioner would ever develop into a player with major league potential 
or sign a professional baseball contract or receive a bonus for signing. 
Moreover, petitioner could not sign a baseball contract while still a 
minor without his parent’s consent or until he graduated from high
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school. The size of baseball bonuses obtainable at some unknown time, 
years in the future, was extremely conjectural. A rule limiting bonuses 
to $4,000 for signing baseball contracts had been suspended in 1958 
and its reinstatement was a definite possibility before 1960. It was not 
expected by petitioner or Cecil at that time that an exceptionally large 
bonus would ever be received. Later on they estimated that at most 
$25,000 might be paid to petitioner as a bonus.
Between the spring of 1958 and petitioner’s graduation from high 
school in 1960. Cecil devoted a great deal of time to petitioner’s 
development into the best baseball player possible. Cecil became 
petitioner’s coach and taught petitioner the skill of being a one-handed 
catcher. While this method is advantageous, it is difficult to master 
because it is contrary to natural instincts. The perfection of this 
unorthodox technique therefore required an inordinate amount of time 
and effort by the teacher and the pupil. Cecil also taught petitioner 
to be a power hitter in order to enhance petitioner's appeal to 
professional baseball teams. Petitioner weighted only 155 pounds during 
his high school days which was a decided handicap for him both as a 
hitter and a catcher hoping to break into the big leagues.
Cecil attended every baseball practice session and every home and 
away game in which petitioner participated between 1958 and 1960. 
On many of these occasions he met with scouts for big league teams. 
By mutual agreement, Cecil relieved petitioner’s high school and 
American Legion coach from any duties with respect to petitioner. It 
was agreed between the coach and Ce cil that it would be in the 
petitioner's interest for Cecil to be in complete charge of the training 
program. Cecil supplied petitioner with baseball equipment at his own 
expense during this period.
In order to obtain the best possible professional baseball contract 
for petitioner. Cecil had many meetings with members of the press 
during the 2-year period from the spring of 1958 to June 16, 1960, to 
publicize petitioner’s skill as a baseball player. Cecil handled all the 
negotiations with representatives of the many professional baseball 
teams that became interested in petitioner. This undertaking involved 
numerous meetings at home and out of town. Cecil left Sundays open 
for such negotiations for the entire 2-year period but negotiations often 
occurred on other days of the week. Cecil was never paid anything for 
the considerable expenses he incurred over the 2-year period.
The amount of compensation to be received by Cecil was contingent 
on the obtainment and size of a bonus to be paid petitioner for signing 
a professional baseball contract. In determining the percentage of the 
possible bonus to be received by Cecil, the parties also gave consid­
eration to Cecil's increased expenses and the anticipated loss of time
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and income from his construction business, Cecil had to neglect his 
business and he lost several substantial contracts during the period of 
petitioner’s intensive training. The amount of time he devoted to bis 
grading and excavating business was substantially reduced during 
1958, 1959, and I960 with corresponding loss of business income.
Petitioner developed into an outstanding high school baseball player 
under Cecil's tutorage and by 1960 many major league clubs bad 
become interested in signing him. Due to the rule requiring high 
school graduation before signing a baseball contract, extensive final 
negotiation sessions with representatives of the various major league 
baseball teams did not begin until after petitioner’s graduation in 1960.
The final negotiation sessions were held at Cecil's home and after 
2 weeks resulted in a professional baseball contract signed by petitioner 
on June 16, 1960. All of the negotiations with the many major league 
clubs bidding for petitioner’s contract were handled by Cecil in such 
a way that the bidding for petitioner's signature was extremely 
competitive. Representatives of the various baseball teams were 
allowed to make as many offers as they wanted during the 2-week 
period, but the terms of any offer were not revealed to representatives 
of other teams. Cecil' s expert and shrewd handling of the negotiations 
was instrumental in obtaining a most favorable contract and an 
extraordinarily large bonus for the petitioner.
The baseball contract finally signed by petitioner was with a minor 
league affiliate of the San Francisco Giants of the National League. 
The contract provided for a bonus of $110,000 to be paid over a 5-year 
period at the rate of $22,009 per year. $11,000 to petitioner and 
$11,000 to Cecil, and a guaranteed salary to petitioner of not less than 
$1,000 per month during the baseball playing season for a period of 
5 years. Cecil bargained for and insisted upon the minimum salary 
provision in addition to the large bonus because of his expectation that 
petitioner would be playing in the relatively low paying minor leagues 
for at least 5 years. Cecil also signed the contract because under the 
rules of professional baseball the signature of a minor was not accepted 
without the signature of his parent.
The baseball contract contained the following pertinent provisions:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the Player 
agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in connection 
with all games of the (dub during the year 1960, including the Club s 
training season, the Club's exhibition games, the Club's playing season, 
any official series in which the Club may participate, and in any game 
or games in the receipts of which the Player may be entitled to share. 
The Player covenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not 
under contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other
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than the one party to this contract and that he is capable of and will 
perforin with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service stated and 
such other duties as may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the 
Club will pay the Player at the rate of one thousand dollars ($1,000) 
per month . . . after the commencement of the playing season . . . 
and end with the termination of the Club’s scheduled playing season 
and any official league playoff series in which the Club participates.
14. Player is to receive cash bonus of one hundred and ten thousand 
dollars ($110,000) payable as follows:
Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) upon approval of this contract by 
the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven 
thousand dollars ($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept. 15, 1962; Sept. 15, 
1963; Sept. 15, 1964.
The father, Cecil R. Hundley, is to receive eleven thousand dollars 
($11,000) upon approval of contract by the National Association of 
Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) 
on Sept. 15. 1961; Sept. 15, 1962; Sept. 15, 1963; and Sept. 15, 1964.
The designation of $11,000 to be paid annually to Cecil for 5 years 
was a consequence of the agreement between Cecil and petitioner to 
divide equally any bonus received by petitioner for signing a profes­
sional baseball contract. The scout for the San Francisco Giants who 
negotiated the contract was aware of the aforementioned agreement 
before the contract was written, and the terms of the contract reflected 
the prior understanding of the contracting parties with respect to the 
division of the bonus payments. Petitioner’s high school coach also 
knew of the 50-50 bonus agreement between petitioner and Cecil and 
had been aware of it since its inception in 1958.
During the 1960 taxable year which is in issue, petitioner and Cecil 
each received $11,000 of the bonus from the National Exhibition Co. 
pursuant to the terms of the contract. Petitioner did not include the 
811,000 payment received by Cecil in his gross income reported in his 
income tax return for 1960. Cecil duly reported it in his income tax 
return for that year.
The notice of deficiency received by petitioner stated that income 
reported as received from the National Exhibition Co. was understated 
by the amount of $11,000. The parties are apparently in agreement 
that petitioner understated his income for 1960 in the determined 
amount, but petitioner contends that an offsetting expense deduction 
of $11,000 should have been allowed for the payment received by 
Cecil as partial compensation for services rendered under the 1958
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agreement between petitioner and Cecil. Respondent s position on 
brief is that only a $2,200 expense deduction, 10 percent of the total 
bonus payment in 1960, is allowable to petitioner in 1960 as the 
reasonable value of services performed by Cecil.
The contract between Cecil and petitioner was made in 1958: it was 
bona fide and at arm’s length, reasonable in light of the circumstances 
existing when made and in the taxable year before us. The payment 
of 50 percent of petitioner's bonus thereunder to Cecil in 1960 was 
compensation to him for services actually rendered to petitioner. He 
received and kept the $11,000 of the bonus paid directly to him by the
Respondent’s determination that an additional $11,000 should have 
been included in petitioner's income for 1960 is based upon section 
61(a) which provides that gross income includes compensation for 
services and section 73(a) which provides that amounts received in 
respect of the services of a child shall be included in the child’s gross 
income even though such amounts are not received by the child.
It is beyond question and on brief the parties agree that the $11,000 
received by Cecil actually represented an amount paid in consideration 
of obtaining petitioner s services as a professional baseball player. 
Petitioner, while agreeing with the foregoing conclusion, argues that 
a deduction in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed for 1960 under 
section 162 or 212. Respondent has conceded that such a deduction 
should be allowed but only in the amount of $2,200.
Section 162 provides that a deduction shall be allowed for an ordinary 
and necessary expense paid during the taxable year in carrying on any 
trade or business including a reasonable allowance for compensation 
for personal services actually rendered. Section 212 provides that an 
individual may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of 
income.
Respondent argues there is insufficient evidence to establish an 
agreement in 1958 to share any bonus equally and that even if there 
were such an agreement no portion paid for Cecil's services to 
petitioner prior to 1960 is deductible because prior to his graduation, 
petitioner was not in the trade or business of being a baseball player. 
He contends that the only service performed by Cecil for which 
petitioner is entitled to a deduction was the actual negotiation of the 
June 16, 1960, contract. He concedes on brief that a reasonable value 
for the services rendered by Cecil during the 2-week period from 
graduation to signing the contract is $2,200, 10 percent of the total 
bonus paid in 1960.
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Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that 
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we have 
so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position that a 
deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction 
in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed in 1960. He argues that 
a contingent right to 50 percent of any bonus obtained was a reasonable 
value for services rendered by Cecil between the spring of 1958 and 
the signing of the contract in 1960, and that payment for such services 
was therefore an ordinary and necessary expense associated with his 
business of professional baseball.
We agree that the 50 percent contingent compensation agreement 
was reasonable in amount. Section 1.162-7(b)(2) of the regulations sets 
forth a test for the deductibility of contingent compensation which we 
have accepted as correct in Roy Marilyn Stone Trust, 44 T.C. 349 
(1965). We apply the test here.
The primary elements considered by petitioner and Cecil in deter­
mining Cecil' s contingent compensation were the amount of time that 
would be spent in coaching, training, and representing petitioner 
during the uncertain period between 1958 and an eventual contract. 
Cecil's exclusive handling of all publicity and contract negotiations and 
the income that would probably be lost due to less time spent on 
Cecil’s construction business were also important factors. In addition 
to the foregoing considerations, emphasis should be placed on the fact 
that the ultimate receipt of a bonus of any kind was uncertain and 
indefinite. The amount was indeterminable and in 1958 neither 
petitioner, Cecil, nor the high school coach who was aware of the 
agreement had any notion that an exceptionally large bonus would be 
paid 2 years hence. Petitioner might well never have become a 
professional ballplayer, nor was it at all certain that he would be paid 
a bonus in the future. Viewing the circumstances at the time the 
agreement was made in the light of all of the evidence before us we 
conclude and hold that the test of reasonableness has been met even 
though the contingent compensation may be greater than the amount 
which might be ordinarily paid.
While it is true that an agreement of this sort between a father and 
his minor son cannot possess the arm’s-length character of transactions 
between independent, knowledgeable businessmen and must be most 
carefully scrutinized, the agreement here stands every searching test. 
Independent and trustworthy witnesses verified its existence since 
1958. It was in our judgment and in the opinion of both petitioner 
and Cecil, then and at trial, fair to both parties. See Olivia de Havilland 
Goodrich. 20 T.C. 323 (1953).
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Respondent contends further, however, that even if the bonus 
splitting agreement arose in 1958 and was intended to ultimately result 
in a reasonable amount of compensation for services rendered through­
out the 2-vear period, the full amount received by Cecil is still not 
deductible because petitioner was not engaged in a trade or business 
or any other income-producing activity until graduation from high 
school when he became eligible to sign a professional baseball contract. 
In order for an expenditure to qualify for deductibility under section 
162 or 212, it must have been paid or incurred in carrying on any 
trade or business or for any other income producing or collecting
The contingent compensation agreement was so closely bound up 
with the existence of the petitioner s business activity of professional 
baseball that payments made thereunder must be considered as paid 
in carrying on a trade or business. If petitioner had never entered the 
business of professional baseball or had not been paid a bonus therefor, 
no payments would have been made to or received by Cecil. The 
whole basis of the agreement was the ultimate existence and estab­
lishment of the contemplated business activity and the collection of a 
bonus. We therefore conclude that payments made under the terms 
of the agreement were paid for services actually rendered in carrying 
on a business. The obligation to make the payments to Cecil was an 
obligation of the business since there would be no obligation without 
the business. If the business were entered without payment of a bonus 
there also would be no obligation to share it with Cecil. The unique 
relationship of Cecil' s compensation to the professional baseball con­
tract and petitioner’s income derived therefrom in I960 is most 
persuasive of the deductible nature of the compensation payment 
made that year.
Respondent’s final argument, raised herein for the first time on 
brief, is based on the premise that the service's rendered prior to high 
school graduation were basically educational in nature, and that 
educational expenditures are personal and nondeductible if undertaken 
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantia] 
advancement in position. See sec. 1.162-5(b), Income Tax Regs. We 
have previously held that claimed deductions for educational expend­
itures of the foregoing type are not allowable. Mary O . Furner, 47 
T.C. 165 (1966); Joseph T. Booth III, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961); and Arnold 
Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff’d. 288 F.2d 648 (C.A. 4. 1961).
However, petitioner is not claiming a deduction in the amount of 
$11,000 for educational expenditures, and indeed he could not. It is 
clear that a significant portion of Cecil's compensation was not for 
coaching and training petitioner in the skills of baseball, if that be
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deemed education, but for other services rendered throughout the 2- 
year period.
We hold, therefore, that whereas respondent acted correctly in 
including the entire $22,000 bonus in petitioner s taxable income, 
petitioner should be nevertheless allowed a deduction in the amount 
of $11,000 in 1960 as a business expense for the portion of the bonus 
paid directly to Cecil for his personal services actually rendered with 
such rewarding financial results for both petitioner and his father.
The last case to be reviewed in this chapter involves another 
professional baseball player named Richard A. Allen. His case was 
heard by the Tax Court in 1968, and the decision, rendered by Judge 
Raum, reads in part as follows:
Richard A. Allen, 50 T.C. 466 (1968)
Findings o f Fact
Some of the facts have been stipulated and, as stipulated, are 
incorporated herein by this reference along with accompanying ex­
hibits.
Petitioners Richard A. and Barbara Allen are husband and wife, 
who at the time of the filing of the petitions and amended petitions 
herein resided in Philadelphia, Pa. Richard A. Allen filed his individual 
returns for the calendar years 1960, 1961, and 1962, and a joint return 
with his wife Barbara Allen for 1963, on the cash receipts and 
disbursements method of accounting, with the district director of 
internal revenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. Barbara Allen is a party to this 
proceeding solely by virtue of the joint return filed for 1963, and the 
term ‘petitioner’ will hereinafter refer solely to Richard A. Allen.
Petitioner was born on March 8, 1942. In the spring of 1960 
petitioner, then age 18, was living with his mother. Mrs. Era Allen, 
in Wampum, Pa., and was a senior at a local high school. Mrs. Allen 
had been separated from her husband since 1957. She had eight 
children, of whom three, including petitioner, were dependent upon 
her for support during 1960. She received no funds from her husband, 
and supported her family by doing housework, sewing, or laundry 
work.
In the course of his high school years, petitioner acquired a 
reputation as an outstanding baseball and basketball player. He was 
anxious to play professional baseball, and had even expressed a desire 
to leave high school for that purpose before graduation, but was not
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permitted to do so by his mother. During the petitioner’s junior year 
in high school, word of his athletic talents reached John Ogden 
(hereinafter “Ogden”), a baseball “scout for the Philadelphia National 
League Club, commonly known and hereinafter referred to as the 
Phillies. Ogden's attention was drawn to petitioner through a news­
paper article about petitioner which, while primarily describing him 
as a great basketball player, also mentioned that he had hit 22 “home 
runs” playing with a men’s semiprofessional baseball team the summer 
before his junior year in high school, and that the player who had 
come closest to his total on this team, which otherwise comprised only 
grown men, had hit only 15 home runs. Ogden’s function as a scout 
for the Phillies was to select baseball talent capable of playing in the 
major leagues, i.e., with the Phillies, and after reading this article he 
made up his mind to see petitioner.
Ogden had himself played baseball for around 16 to 18 years, was 
general manager of one baseball club and owner of another for 7 or 8 
years, and at the time of the trial herein had been a baseball scout for 
the preceding 28 years—a total of about 52 years in professional 
baseball. After interviewing petitioner and watching him play basketball 
and baseball, Ogden determined that petitioner was the greatest 
prospect he had ever seen. He conveyed this impression to John 
Joseph Quinn (hereinafter “Quinn" ), vice president and general 
manager of the Phillies, and told Quinn that petitioner was worth 
"whatever it takes to get him. Quinn thereupon gave Ogden authority 
to “go and get” petitioner, i.e., to sign him to a contract to play 
baseball for the Phillies.
From this point on. Ogden became very friendly with petitioner's 
family. He hired Coy Allen, petitioner's older brother of about 36 or 
37 who had played some semiprofessional baseball in the past, as a 
scout for the Phillies. He also signed Harold Allen, another brother 
of petitioner to a contract to play baseball in the Phillies organization. 
He visited the Allen home often, and talked to petitioner about playing 
baseball. He did not, however, attempt immediately to sign petitioner 
to a contract because of a rule adhered to by the Phillies and other 
baseball teams prohibiting the signing of any boy attending high school 
to a baseball contract until after his graduation.
Ogden, as well as representatives of a dozen or more other baseball 
teams that also desired petitioner s services, discussed petitioner's 
prospects with his mother. Era Allen. She was the head of the family, 
and she made all the family decisions. Although petitioner discussed 
baseball with the various scouts, he referred them to his mother in 
connection with any proposed financial arrangements, and he felt 
"bound” to play for whichever club his mother might select.
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Era Allen conducted all negotiations with Ogden in respect of the 
financial arrangements that might he made for petitioner if it should 
be determined that he would play for the Phillies. However, she knew 
nothing about baseball, particularly the financial aspects of baseball, 
and she relied almost entirely upon advice from her son Coy Allen. 
After petitioner had entered into a contract to play for the Phillies 
organization, as hereinafter more fully set forth. Era Allen paid Coy 
$2,000 in 1960 for his services out of the funds which she received 
under that contract, and she deducted that amount from her gross 
income on her 1960 individual income tax return.
One of the principal items of negotiation with Ogden was the amount 
of “bonus” to be paid for petitioner’s agreement to play for the Phillies 
organization. Such bonus was in addition to the monthly or periodic 
compensation to be paid petitioner for services actually rendered as 
a ballplayer. The purpose of the bonus was to assure the Phillies of the 
right to the player s services, if he were to play at all, and to prevent 
him from playing for any other club except with permission of the 
Phillies. Scouts for other teams had made offers of a bonus of at least 
$20,000 or $25,000. During the course of the negotiations Ogden made 
successive offers of a bonus in the amounts of $35,000, $50,000, and 
finally $70,000. The $70,000 offer was satisfactory to petitioner's 
mother, but she wanted $40,000 of that amount paid to her and 
$30,000 to petitioner. She thought that she was entitled to a portion 
of the bonus because she was responsible for his coming into baseball 
by her hard work, perseverance, taking care of petitioner, and seeing 
that he “did the right thing."  Although it had been informally agreed 
prior to petitioner’s graduation that he would go with the Phillies, the 
contract was presented to and signed by petitioner some 30 or 40 
minutes after he had received his high school diploma on June 2, 
1960.
The contract was formally between petitioner anti the Williamsport 
Baseball Club, one of six or seven minor league teams affiliated with 
the Phillies through a contractual arrangement known as a “working 
agreement ” whereby, in general, the Phillies were entitled, in exchange 
for a stated consideration, to "select" the contracts of any of the players 
on the Williamsport Club for their own purposes and under which the 
Phillies further agreed, among other things, to reimburse the Williams­
port Club for any bonus paid to a player for signing a contract with 
that club. The Williamsport (dub was under the substantial control of 
the Phillies, and the contract between petitioner and the Williamsport 
Club was signed on behalf of the latter by an official of the Phillies, 
who was in charge of all the Phillies’ minor league clubs, or what was 
called their “farm system," and who was authorized to sign on behalf
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of the Williamsport Club. The contract was on the standard form 
prescribed by the National Association of Professional Baseball 
Leagues. Since petitioner was a minor, his mother gave her consent 
to his execution of the contract by signing her name under a printed 
paragraph at the end of the form contract entitled “Consent of Parent 
or Guardian.” Such consent was given explicity [sic] “to the execution 
of this contract by the minor player party hereto, ” and was stated to 
be effective as to any assignment or renewal of the contract as therein 
specified. She was not a party to the contract. The Phillies, in 
accordance with their usual practice, would not have entered into any 
such contract, through the Williamsport Club or otherwise, without 
having obtained the consent of a parent or guardian of the minor 
player.
In addition to providing for a salary of $850 per month for petitioner’s 
services as a ballplayer, the contract provided for the $70,000 bonus 
payable over a 5-year period, of which $40,000 was to be paid directly 
to petitioner’s mother and $30,000 to petitioner. The contract provided 
in part as follows:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the Player 
agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in connection 
with all games of the Club during the year I960. . . . The Player 
covenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not under 
contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other than the 
one party to this contract and that he is capable of and will perform 
with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service stated and such 
other duties as may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the 
Club will pay the Player at the rate of eight hundred fifty dollars per 
month.
5. (a) The Player agrees that, while under contract and prior to 
expiration of the Club’s right to renew the contract, and until he 
reports to his club for spring training, if this contract is renewed, for 
the purpose of avoiding injuries he will not play baseball otherwise 
than for the Club except that he may participate in postseason games 
as prescribed in the National Association Agreement.
(b) The Player and the Club recognize and agree that the Player’s 
participation in other sports may impair or destroy his ability and skill 
as a baseball player. Accordingly, the Player agrees he will not engage 
in professional boxing or wrestling and that, except with the written 
consent of the Club, he will not play professional football, basketball, 
hockey or other contact sport.
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Player is to receive bonus of $6,000 payable June 2, 1960
Do ..............................$8,000 . . do . . June 1, 1961
Do ..............................$8,000 . . do . . June 1, 1962
Do .............. ..............$4,000 . . do . . June 1, 1963
Do ..............................$4,000 . . do . . June 1, 1964
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $16,000 payable
June 2, 1960
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $10,000 payable
June 1, 1961
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $6,000 payable
June 2, 1962
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 pavable
June 2, 1963
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 pay able
June 2, 1964
Total bonus seventy thousand dollars guaranteed.
It was generally the practice in baseball to have the signature of a 
parent or guardian when signing a player under the age of 21 to a 
contract, and a contract lacking such signature would probably not 
have been approved by the president of the National Association of 
Professional Baseball Leagues.
The installments of the $70,000 bonus agreed to by the Williamsport 
Baseball Club in its contract with petitioner were actually paid by the 
Phillies under their "working agreement” with the Williamsport Club. 
The Phillies viewed such bonus arrangements as consideration to 
induce a player to sign a contract which thus tied him to the Phillies 
and prevented his playing baseball for any other club without the 
consent of the Phillies. These bonus arrangements represented a 
gamble on the part of the Phillies, for a player might not actually have 
the ability to play in the major leagues, or might decide on his own 
that he no longer wanted to play baseball. The Phillies could not 
recover bonus money already paid, and as a matter of baseball practice 
felt obligated to pay a bonus, once agreed to, in all events, even if 
some part of the bonus still remained unpaid when the player left or 
was given his unconditional release by the club. Nevertheless, in light 
of petitioner’s future potential and ability, Ogden, who negotiated 
petitioner’s bonus, and Quinn, who had the final say in these matters, 
felt that $70,000 was a fair price to pay to “get" the right to petitioner's 
services as a professional baseball player. It was a matter of indifference 
to them as to whom the bonus was paid or what division was made of 
the money. The previous year, in 1959, the Phillies had paid a bonus 
of approximately $100,000 to one Ted Kazanski and in 1960, at about
43
the same time they signed petitioner, the Phillies paid a bonus of 
approximately $40,000 to one Bruce Gruber.
Following the execution of the foregoing contract in June 1960 with 
the Williamsport Club, petitioner performed services as a professional 
baseball player under annual contracts for various minor league teams 
affiliated with the Phillies until sometime in 1963. From that time, he 
has performed his services directly for the Phillies, and in 1967 his 
annual salary as a baseball player was approximately $65,000.
Petitioner (and his wife Barbara Allen in the taxable year 1963) 
reported as taxable ordinary income in his (their) Federal income tax 
returns for the taxable years 1960. 1961, 1962, and 1963 the bonus 
payments received by petitioner in each of said years, as follows:
1960 ......................................  8 6.000
1961 ......................................  8,000
1962 ......................................  8,000
1963 ......................................  4.000
Petitioner’s mother. Era Allen, reported as taxable ordinary income 
in her Federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1960, 1961, 
1962, and 1963 the payments received by her in each of said years, 
as follows:
1960 ......................................  $16,000
1961 ......................................  10,000
1962 ......................................  6,000
1963 ......................................  4,000
In his notice of deficiency to petitioner in respect of the taxable 
years 1961 and 1962, and his notice of deficiency to petitioner Richard 
and his wife Barbara Allen in respect of the taxable year 1963. the 
Commissioner determined that the bonus payments received by 
petitioner’s mother in 1961, 1962. and 1963 represented amounts 
received in respect of a minor child and were taxable to petitioner 
under sections 61 and 73 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; he 
increased petitioner's taxable income in each of those years accordingly.
1. Inclusion o f Bonus in Petitioner's Gross Income. (a) Petitioner 
was only 18 years old when the events giving rise to the bonus 
payments in controversy took place. Accordingly, if the payments 
made during the years in issue (1961-63) by the Phillies to Era Allen, 
petitioner’s mother, constitute “amounts received in respect of the 
services’ of petitioner within the meaning of section 73(a). I.R.C. 
1954, then plainly they must be included in petitioner's gross income
44
rather than in that of his mother. Although petitioner contends that 
the statute does not cover the present situation, we hold that the 
payments made to his mother during the years in issue were received 
solely in respect of petitioner’s services, and that all such amounts 
were therefore includable in his income.
Petitioner argues that the payments received by his mother, totaling 
$40,000 over a 5-year period, were not part of his bonus for signing 
a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but rather 
represented compensation for services performed by her, paid by the 
Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign the contract 
and giving her written consent thereto. But there was no evidence of 
any written or oral agreement between the Phillies and Era Allen in 
which she agreed to further the Phillies' interests in this manner, and 
we shall not lightly infer the existence of an agreement by a mother 
dealing on behalf of her minor child which would or could have the 
effect of consigning her child’s interests to a secondary position so that 
she might act for her own profit. Moreover, we think the evidence in 
the record consistently points to the conclusion that the payments 
received from the Phillies by Era Allen were considered and treated 
by the parties as part of petitioner's total bonus of $70,000. This sum 
was paid by the Phillies solely to obtain the exclusive right to 
petitioner's services as a professional baseball player: no portion thereof 
was in fact paid for his mother s consent.
We note, first of all. that there was no separate written agreement 
between the Phillies and Era Allen concerning the payment of $40,000 
to her, and that in fact the sole provision of which we are aware for 
the payment of this sum appears in the contract between petitioner 
and the Williamsport Baseball Club, a minor league baseball club 
affiliated with the Phillies under a “working agreement which entitled 
the Phillies to claim the contract and the services of any player on the 
club at any time. Petitioner’s contract, a uniform player’s contract 
standard in professional baseball, contained a paragraph requiring the 
parties to set forth any “additional compensation" (aside from the 
regular payment of salary) received or to be received from the club 
“in connection with this contract” and it is in the space provided for 
such “additional compensation” that all the annual installments of 
petitioner’s bonus, both those payable to petitioner and those payable 
to his mother, are set forth. After a description of all such installments, 
identifying the payee (petitioner or his mother), the amount and the 
date due, appear the words: “Total bonus seventy thousand dollars 
guaranteed.” Moreover, if further proof be needed that the Phillies 
did not consider any part of the $70,000 bonus as compensation for 
Era Allen s services it is provided by the testimony of John Ogden, the
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baseball scout responsible for petitioner's signing a contract with the 
Phillies organization. Although Ogden resisted being pinned down, 
the clear import of his testimony was that the total bonus paid was 
determined solely by petitioner’s ability to play baseball and his future 
prospects as a player, that the Phillies considered $70,000 a fair price 
to pay for the right to petitioner’s services, and that it made little 
difference to them whether petitioner’s mother received any part of 
the bonus so determined.
Era Allen herself did not claim to be entitled to $40,000 by virtue 
of any services performed for or on behalf of the Phillies, and in fact 
made clear in her testimony that she bargained, as one would expect, 
“for whatever was best for my son." Rather, she insisted upon a large 
portion of petitioner’s bonus because she felt that petitioner would 
never have reached the point at which he was able to sign a lucrative 
contract with a professional baseball team had it not been for her hard 
work and perseverance in supporting him. And indeed, as the mother 
of a minor child, one who by the fruits of her own labor had contributed 
to the support of her minor child without the help of the child's father, 
she appears to have been entitled to all petitioner’s earnings under 
Pennsylvania law. Pa. Slat. lit. 48, sec. 91 (1965).
Prior to 1944, the Commissioner’s rulings and regulations “required 
a parent to report in his (or her) return the earnings of a minor child, 
if under the laws of the state where they resided the parent had a right 
to such earnings,” even if none or only part of the child's earnings 
were actually appropriated by the parent. . . . Because parents were 
not entitled to the earnings of their minor children in all States, and 
because even in those States following this common-law doctrine the 
parents' right to the earnings of a minor child could be lost if it was 
found that the child had been emancipated, the result of the Com­
missioner s policy was that:
for Federal income tax purposes, opposite results obtain(ed) 
under the same set of facts depending upon the applicable State 
law. In addition, such variations in the facts as make applicable 
the exceptions to the general rule in each jurisdiction tend(ed) 
to produce additional uncertainty with respect to the tax treat­
ment of the earnings of minor children.
H. Rept. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1944); S. Rept. No. 
885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22. To remedy these defects. Congress 
in 1944 enacted the substantially identical predecessor of section 73 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. providing the easily determin­
able and uniform rule that all amounts received “in respect of the 
services of a child” shall be included in bis income. “Thus, even though
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the contract of employment is made directly by the parent and the 
parent receives the compensation for the services, for the purpose of 
the Federal income tax the amounts would be considered to be taxable 
to the child because earned by him.” H. Rept. No. 885, 78th Cong., 
2d Sess., p. 22, 23. We think section 73 reverses what would have 
been the likely result in this ease under pre-1944 law wholly apart 
from the contract, and that the $70,000 bonus is taxable in full to 
petitioner.
Petitioner stresses the fact that the $70,000 bonus paid by the 
Phillies did not constitute a direct payment for his "services as a 
professional baseball player, which were to be compensated at an 
agreed salary of $850 per month, for the $70,000 was to be paid in all 
events, whether or not petitioner ever performed any services for the 
Phillies organization. Therefore, it is argued, the bonus payments 
could not have constituted compensation for services which alone are 
taxed to a minor child under section 73. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-145, 1958- 
1 C.B. 360. This argument misreads the statute, which speaks in terms 
of “amounts received in respect o f  the services of a child,” and not 
merely of compensation for services performed. True, petitioner 
performed no services in the usual sense for his $70,000 bonus, unless 
his act of signing the contract be considered such, but the bonus 
payments here were paid by the Phillies as an inducement to obtain 
his services as a professional baseball player and to preclude him from 
rendering those services to other professional baseball teams; they 
thus certainly constituted amounts received “in respect o f" his services.
(b) Even if amounts in issue were not received “in respect of the 
services of a child under section 73, we think that the bonus 
installments paid to petitioner’s mother during the tax years 1961-63 
are nevertheless chargeable to him under the general provisions of 
section 61. It has long been established that one who becomes entitled 
to receive income may not avoid tax thereon by causing it to be paid 
to another through “anticipatory arrangements however skillfully 
devised. Lucas v. Earl. 281 U.S. 111, 114-115; Helvering v. Horst, 
311 U.S. 112: Helvering v. Eubank. 311 U.S. 122: Harrison v. 
Schaffner. 312 U.S. 579.
As indicated above, the entire $70,000 bonus was paid as consid­
eration for petitioner’s agreement to play baseball for the Phillies or 
any team designated by the Phillies. We reject as contrary to fact the 
argument that part of that amount was paid to his mother for her 
consent to the contract. It was petitioner, and petitioner alone who 
was the source of the income and it is a matter of no consequence that 
his mother thought that she was entitled to some of that income 
because of her conscientious upbringing of petitioner. . . .
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2. Petitioner's Alternative Contention— Deduction o f Bonus Pay­
ments Prom His Gross Income. Finally petitioner argues alternatively 
that if his entire $70,000 bonus is includable in his income, he should 
be allowed to deduct the bonus payments received by his mother as 
an “ordinary and necessary expense incurred in carrying on his trade 
or business as a professional baseball player. He places great reliance 
in this argument upon Cecil Randolph Hundley, J r ., 48 T.C. 339. acq. 
19(57-2 C.B. 2, a ease recently decided by this Court in which a 
professional baseball player was allowed to deduct that portion of his 
bonus for signing a baseball contract which was paid directly to his 
father, the result of an agreement entered into some 2 years before 
the contract was signed as a means of compensating the father for his 
services as a baseball coach and business agent. However, the special 
facts in Hundley, which supported a finding of reasonableness for the 
amount of the deduction claimed and warranted the conclusion that 
the amounts paid there in fact represented a bona fide expense 
incurred in carrying on the taxpayer’s trade or business of being a 
professional baseball player, are almost entirely absent here.
It is unnecessary to determine the exact sum which would have 
constituted a reasonable payment to Era Allen for her services, though 
we note that only $2,000 was paid to her son Coy Allen for the advice 
she so greatly relied on, for we are certain that in any ease it could 
not have exceeded the $16,000 received by her in 1960. Although the 
year 1960 is not before us in these proceedings, we can and do take 
into account the payment made to her in that year in determining 
whether the deductions now claimed by petitioner for payments made 
to her in the years 1961, 1962, and 1963 are reasonable in amount and 
deductible as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses. We think 
they clearly are not, and hold that petitioner is not entitled to 
deductions in any amount for payments made to his mother in those 
years.
A Comparison of the Facts Once again even a cursory examination 
of these two Tax Court decisions reveals that the cases have several 
facts in common. In both instances
1. A professional baseball player arranged to have a portion of a 
sizable bonus paid to one of his parents.
2. Both the parent and the ball-playing minor child signed the 
professional contract.
3. The bonus payments actually were made by the ball club to the 
parent over several years.
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4. The parent reported the amount received as ordinary taxable 
income and paid the tax liability thereon.
The two cases also differ in several factual respects.
1. The names, dates, amounts, and places of residence of the 
principal parties differed in the two cases.
2. The parent involved in one case was the baseball player’s father; 
the other case involved his mother.
3. One parent was knowledgeable about, and deeply involved in, 
training the child in the skill of ball playing; the other parent 
knew relatively little about baseball.
4. One parent-child pair had a prior oral agreement about how 
they would divide any bonus that might eventually be received; 
the other parent-child pair had no such prior agreement.
Once again, it is pertinent to inquire whether or not the common 
facts are sufficient to require a common result or whether the different 
facts justify different results. The decisions of the court again were 
very different. Cecil Hundley, Jr., was allowed to deduct the portion 
of the bonus paid to his father; Richard Allen was denied the right 
to deduct the portion of the bonus paid to his mother. Because the 
law was the same in both cases, and because there is little basis in 
the reported decisions to conclude that differences in the judicial 
process had much influence on these results, we must conclude that 
the different facts adequately explain the divergent results.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results Judge Hoyt makes it clear 
that the decision in Hundley is critically dependent on the existence 
of the oral agreement between the father and the son. He states, 
“Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that 
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we have 
so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position. . . .” Judge 
Raum makes it equally clear in Allen that he could find no contractual 
agreement in that case. He states, “Petitioner argues that the 
payments received by his mother . . . were not part of his bonus for 
signing a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but 
rather represented compensation for services performed by her, paid 
by the Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign the 
contract and giving her written consent thereto. But there was no 
evidence of any written or oral agreement between the Phillies and 
Era Allen in which she agreed to further the Phillies’ interests in this 
manner, and we shall not lightly infer the existence of an agreement 
by a mother dealing on behalf of her minor child. . . . ”
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One cannot help but wonder exactly how it is possible for a person 
to present convincing evidence of an oral agreement made between 
a father and his tenth-grade son some nine years prior to the litigation. 
Two brief statements in the reported decision provide the only clues. 
One statement notes that the high school coach knew of the oral 
agreement since its inception; the other statement suggests that the 
scout for the San Francisco Giants, who negotiated the Hundley 
contract, also knew of the oral agreement since its inception. We can 
only conclude, therefore, that these statements are either based on 
an oral examination of witnesses at the trial or that written depositions 
were obtained from these persons and submitted as evidence at the 
trial to substantiate the existence of the oral contract.
Lessons for Tax Research For the student of tax research, perhaps 
the most instructive aspect of the last two cases is their demonstration 
of the importance of favorable testimony by impartial witnesses. 
Proper preparation of a tax file sometimes may include the need to 
provide supporting evidence available only from disinterested third 
parties. The longer one waits to locate such a party, the greater the 
difficulty in finding one capable of giving the testimony needed. To 
the maximum extent possible, considering economic constraints, the 
tax adviser should anticipate the importance of all supporting docu­
ments, including sworn statements from third parties. If strong 
evidence of one or two critical facts can be provided to an IRS agent 
or to a conferee, the probability of litigation may be significantly 
reduced.
A careful reading of these two decisions also reveals that very 
similar fact situations may sometimes be argued on radically different 
grounds. In other words, even though the facts are similar, the 
questions raised may be different. Although this observation really 
is more pertinent to the next chapter of this tax study than it is to the 
present chapter, and even though the more unusual argument did 
not prove to be fruitful in this instance, we observe in passing that 
Allen argues for a favorable result in the alternative. First, the 
taxpayer contends that the payments made to his mother were not 
for his services as a ballplayer. Only later, should the first argument 
fail, does he argue that the payments to his mother are deductible 
business expenses. In Hundley, on the other hand, the taxpayer 
never raised the former issue. The fact that both questions deserve 
consideration stems directly from a careful review of the facts and the 
law.
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In Allen the argument is made that a bonus payment really is not 
a payment for services rendered. At least in part, that payment really 
is to compensate the ballplayer for not rendering services (to a 
competitor club).
The pertinent statutory provisions refer to “amounts received in 
respect o f the services o f a child” (emphasis added). The question 
raised, then, deals with whether a ballplayer’s bonus properly falls 
within the meaning of the “in respect o f" clause. After reviewing the 
congressional intent behind those words, the court determined that 
it did and thus rejected the taxpayer’s first line of argument. 
Nevertheless, this observation should remind the tax adviser to 
consider the facts of a case in every possible way before selecting a 
single line of argument. The next chapter examines in greater detail 
the subtle relationship between the facts and a statement of the 
pertinent questions.
For the tax adviser, a knowledge of the statutes alone is insufficient. 
An adviser must carefully delineate facts important to the tax question 
and recognize the need to document significant facts in the event 
that they must be retrieved and substantiated during a later audit. 
The next chapter addresses the task of extracting or anticipating tax 
questions from the fact situation.
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. . .  there is frequently more to be team’d from the 
unexpected Questions of a Child, than the Discourses of 
Men, who talk in a Road, according to the Notions they 
have borrowed, and the Prejudices of their Education.
JOHN LOCKE
The Elusive Nature of 
Tax Questions
Tax questions arise when a unique set of facts is examined in light of 
general rules of tax law. Learning to identify and phrase the critical 
tax questions implicit in any set of facts is no small accomplishment 
for, in many instances, the most important questions are by no means 
obvious. The more experienced the tax adviser, the easier it is to 
identify and ask the right questions. For the beginner, asking the 
right question is often the most difficult part of tax research. Even 
the most seasoned tax veteran can easily overlook a very important 
question, and for this reason successful tax practitioners make it a 
general practice to require an internal review of all tax research 
before stating an opinion to anyone outside the firm. This precaution 
sometimes is extended to include even the preparation of a written 
record of all oral responses made to informal inquiries received. The 
probability of overlooking either an important tax question or a part 
of the law is simply too great to permit any less thorough procedure.
The difficulty experienced in properly identifying and stating the 
pertinent tax questions is largely attributable to the high degree of 
interdependence that exists between the facts, questions, and law. 
If the tax adviser fails to determine all of the pertinent facts, the 
chance of overlooking a critical question is greatly increased. Similarly,
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even if the tax adviser has determined all of the critical facts, the 
failure to consider a critical part of the law may also lead to the 
overlooking of a critical question. Finally, even if the tax adviser 
knows all of the facts and all of the law pertinent to a case, he or she 
still may overlook an obvious question simply because of human 
error.
Errors in stating questions are often related to either (1) failure to 
think originally or creatively about tax problems or (2) failure to pay 
sufficient attention to detail. A veteran tax adviser will seldom fail to 
heed detail; on the other hand, precisely because of long years of 
experience, a tax adviser may be prone to overlook new and different 
ways of viewing recurrent problems.1 In some instances, therefore, 
it is desirable to have the most complex tax situations reviewed by 
inexperienced as well as experienced personnel. The former individ­
uals might ask the obvious question that otherwise would be over­
looked, but only the latter individuals can fully appreciate the 
significance of even the obvious question once it has been asked. 
Frequently, one good tax question raises two or more related 
questions, and before long the tax result depends on a network of 
closely related but separate questions.
Initial Statement of the Question
The resolution of a tax problem often evolves through several stages 
of development. In many instances the initial statement of the 
question may be only remotely related to the questions that turn out 
to be critical to its solution. The greater the technical competence of 
the researcher, the fewer steps in the evolution of an answer. The 
technical competence of tax researchers is, in all likelihood, normally 
distributed on a continuum ranging from little or no competence to 
very great expertise. Any attempt to separate these individuals into 
discrete groups is obviously unrealistic. Nevertheless, for purposes 
of discussion of the difficulties encountered in identifying tax ques­
tions, tax advisers could be categorized as falling into one of three 
groups, namely, those with “minimal” technical competence, those 
with “intermediate” technical competence, and those with “extensive” 
technical competence relative to the subject at hand. Technical
1 For example, in Allen (see chapter 2) it would have been very easy to overlook the 
first of the two alternative arguments considered, i.e., what exactly was Allen 
being paid for in the bonus? If it was for not rendering a service, a different result 
might apply. Admittedly, that argument was not successful in that particular case, 
but it was pertinent and could have been important.
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competence in one area of taxation does not guarantee equal com­
petence in other areas. Individuals who have an extensive technical 
knowledge in one aspect of taxation must move with a beginner’s 
caution when approaching another area of the law; although the 
problems are often similar, the applicable rules are sometimes quite 
different. As was stated earlier, a final tax result depends upon three 
variables: facts, law, and an administrative (and/or judicial) process. 
Just as the facts of one case may differ from another, so also may the 
law.
Minimal Technical Competence
A tax adviser with minimal technical competence usually can state 
tax questions in only the broadest of terms. After reviewing the facts, 
the neophyte typically is prepared to ask such general questions as 
the following:
1. Must gross income be recognized “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much income must be recognized?
b. If so, in which year should that income be reported?
2. Can a deduction be claimed “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much can be deducted?
b. If so, in which year can the deduction be claimed?
c. If not, can something be added to the tax basis of an asset?
3. If income must be recognized, is that income ordinary income 
or capital gain?
a. If capital gain, is it long- or short-term?
b. If ordinary income, is it earned income?
4. What is the tax basis of a specific asset?
In any real situation, of course, the actual facts of the case must be 
substituted for the phrase “in these circumstances” in the hypothetical 
questions posed above. For example, in the first question suggested 
above, the facts might justify this question: “Must gross income be 
recognized if a taxpayer transfers appreciated property to his ex-wife 
in settlement of any claims that she might have against him arising 
from a divorce?” Or, in the second hypothetical question, the facts 
might justify a question like this: “Can an accrual basis corporate 
taxpayer claim an income tax deduction in the current year for an 
unpaid note given as a bonus to a cash basis employee who is also the 
corporate employer’s sole stockholder?” Observe that even the initial 
statement of a tax question should be very carefully phrased to 
include what appear to be all of the important facts of the situation.
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Because beginning staff members typically enter the tax depart­
ments of accounting firms with minimal technical competence, they 
usually are prepared to ask only broad, general questions. If properly 
phrased, however, the broad questions posed by the new staffperson 
are ultimately the same questions that the more knowledgeable tax 
adviser seeks to answer. The more senior adviser tends, however, to 
phrase initial questions in somewhat different terms.
Intermediate Technical Competence
The tax adviser with an intermediate level of technical competence 
often can review a situation and state the pertinent questions in terms 
of specific statutory authority. For example, the first question already 
considered for the beginning adviser might be verbalized by a person 
with more experience in words like this: “Has any gross income been 
realized within the meaning of section 61 or 1001 if a taxpayer 
transfers appreciated property to his former spouse as part of a 
divorce settlement in the state of Maryland?” Or, in the second 
question previously considered, a journeyman adviser may ask, “Does 
section 267 disallow the current deduction for a bonus, otherwise 
deductible under sections 162 and 461, which is payable by a 
corporation to a cash basis employee who is the corporate employer’s 
sole stockholder, if the corporate obligation is evidenced by a note 
due six months following the end of the employer’s tax year?”
A comparison of the same two hypothetical questions, as phrased 
by the person with minimal competence versus that phrased by the 
person with an intermediate level of competence, reveals several 
interesting differences.
First, the more experienced person generally understands the 
statutory basis of authority applicable to the tax questions. Or, to put 
this same difference in another way, the more experienced person 
(1) knows that most tax questions have a statutory base and (2) knows 
which code sections are applicable to the facts under consideration. 
In still other words, the experienced person knows that correct tax 
results do not stem from secondary reference books, which all too 
frequently state “rules” ad infinitum without revealing the source of 
authority for their conclusions.
Second, the tax adviser with intermediate technical competence 
often phrases questions in such a way that they imply the answer to 
a more general question, subject only to the determination of the 
applicability of one or more “special provisions” to the facts under 
consideration. For example, the phrasing of the first question sug­
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gested earlier for the person with intermediate-level skills may really 
imply something like this: “The stated facts will result in the 
recognition of income under the general rules of section 61 and/or 
1001, unless some other authority can be found to support a contrary 
conclusion.” Note that questions phrased by the person with greater 
technical competence frequently suggest where the answers can be 
located. If a researcher knows which code sections are applicable to 
a given fact situation, the task of locating pertinent authority is greatly 
simplified.
Third, the more competent tax adviser is apt to include more facts 
in any statement of the question than is the beginning adviser. Thus, 
for example, the adviser may imply the importance of state law to a 
federal income tax result by adding a phrase such as “in the state of 
Maryland. ” This tendency to add more facts to the statement of the 
question is the result of experience. The more experienced person 
often recognizes, in a statement of the question, some of the 
apparently innocent facts that can so critically modify a tax result.
In daily tax practice, a person with minimal technical tax compe­
tence acquires a great deal of knowledge by seeking answers to the 
specific questions posed by more competent colleagues. This saves 
valuable and expensive time by directing the neophyte to look in the 
right places. Without this assistance, the beginner must spend many 
hours just locating the general authority that is pertinent to a question. 
(The various methods of locating authority are described in chapter 
4.) We might note, however, that the beginner typically prepares 
working papers detailing the research steps undertaken to answer 
the questions posed by supervisors. These working papers both 
permit the supervisor to review the adequacy of the staffperson’s 
conclusions and leave a permanent record of the facts and the 
authorities that were considered in solving any given tax problem. 
These records may prove to be invaluable should the IRS later 
question the way the tax adviser handled a particular tax problem.
Extensive Technical Competence
The tax adviser with an extensive level of technical competence in 
a given area can often review a situation and state the pertinent 
question in a still more refined manner. For example, the tax expert 
may ask a question like this: “Is there any reason why Davis would 
not apply ‘to this situation ?” Or, “Are all of the conditions stipulated 
in Revenue Ruling 55-608 satisfied ‘in this case ?” By stating a 
question in this way, the expert implies not only the general statutory
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authority for an answer, but also specific interpretative authority that 
would in all likelihood apply to the facts under consideration. The 
expert often needs only to determine the most recent events to 
resolve a tax question. Unless something new has happened, this 
phrasing of the question suggests that a very specific answer can be 
found to the general but unstated question. Thus, the expert’s 
question—“Is there any reason why Davis would not apply?”—may 
in reality be the same question that the beginner phrased this way: 
“Must gross income be recognized if an ex-husband transfers appre­
ciated property to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims she might 
have against him arising from a divorce?” The former question implies 
that the answer to the latter question can be found in the Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
Similarly, the bonus question may imply that the answer to the 
current deduction may be found in Revenue Ruling 55-608, 1955-2 
C.B. 546. The phrasing of the expert’s question recognizes, however, 
that there may be ample reason why specific interpretative authority 
would not apply. For example, the facts of the two cases may differ 
in some material way—perhaps the taxpayer in the divorce case lived 
in a community property state, whereas the Davis decision involved 
a taxpayer in a non-community-property state—or the Davis decision 
may have been otherwise modified by a regulation, ruling, or judicial 
decision issued after 1962. If one knows his way around a tax library, 
it obviously will require even less time to answer the question posed 
by the expert than it will to answer the question posed by the adviser 
with intermediate competency. Unfortunately, however, not all tax 
questions are so easily stated or resolved, even by the expert.
Restatement of the Initial Question
After Some Research
In some circumstances even an expert must move cautiously from 
facts to questions to authority and thence back to more facts, more 
questions, and more authority before resolving a tax problem. The 
search for authority to resolve an initial question sometimes leads to 
the realization that facts previously deemed unimportant are critical 
to the resolution of the problem. In that event the tax adviser returns 
to the fact determination procedure before looking any further for 
answers. At other times the initial search suggests considering other 
tax rules rather than isolating more facts. Sometimes it suggests the 
need to determine both additional facts as well as the need to consider 
additional rules. Before reaching the administrative or judicial proc-
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Figure 3.1
EVALUATION
PROCESS
ess, the tax adviser has only two raw materials with which to work: 
facts and rules. Therefore, the tax adviser must learn how to identify 
and phrase pertinent questions by examining facts in light of rules. 
That microscopic examination is what reveals the need for further 
facts and/or rules. The tax research process is not complete until all 
of the facts have been fully examined in light of all of the rules and 
all pertinent questions have been resolved to the extent possible.
This “research procedure” is illustrated conceptually in figure 3.1. 
The spiral line shows how the researcher proceeds from an initial 
statement of the facts (F1), to an initial statement of the questions 
(Q1), to an initial search for authority (A1). If the initial authority 
suggests new and different questions (Q2), as it often does, the 
researcher continues by making additional fact determinations (F2) 
and/or by considering additional authority (A2). This procedure 
continues over and over until all the facts are known, all the authorities 
are considered, and all the questions are answered—at least tenta­
tively. At this juncture the tax adviser evaluates the facts and 
authorities just unearthed and reaches a conclusion.
Dangers Inherent in Statements of Questions
The danger of overlooking pertinent alternatives is greatly increased 
if tax questions are stated too narrowly. This danger is particularly 
acute for the more experienced tax adviser because, as noted earlier, 
he or she generally knows where to begin looking. Once the search 
for pertinent authority is restricted to a particular segment of the 
code, for all practical purposes all other alternatives are eliminated.
This danger has been vividly demonstrated to the authors time 
and time again. While teaching a university course in tax research 
methodology, it is, of course, necessary to design sample cases that 
will lead students to make important discoveries of their own. A large 
number of the sample cases are drawn from “live” problems suggested 
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by various tax practitioners. In more cases than we care to admit, the 
very best solutions have been those never considered by either the 
authors or by those who initially suggested the problems to us. 
Beginning students, unhampered by predilection and blessed by 
natural curiosity and intelligence, have managed on more than one 
occasion to view the problem in an entirely different light. This is 
mentioned in order to stress the importance of imagination and 
creativity in tax research and planning. As was noted in chapter 2, 
the “thinking step,” the point at which the practitioner spends time 
considering facts, alternatives, and options, is an indispensible seg­
ment of the research process.
A second danger inherent in the statement of the question is the 
tendency to phrase the question using conclusions rather than 
elementary facts. The important distinction between conclusions and 
facts was noted in the prior chapter. The use of conclusions in stating 
questions is hazardous because conclusions tend to prejudice the 
result by subtly influencing the way one searches for pertinent 
authority. If, for example, one begins to search for authority on the 
proper way to handle a particular expenditure for tax purposes, the 
question might ask, Should the expenditure of funds for “this-and- 
that” be capitalized? The answer probably will be affirmative. On the 
other hand, if the same question is rephrased in terms something 
like this—Can the expenditure of funds for “this-and-that” be de­
ducted?—the answer, once again, will probably be affirmative. Ob­
viously, if the facts are the same (that is, if the “this-and-that” in the 
two questions are identical), both answers cannot be correct. The 
explanation for the conflicting results probably can be traced to the 
place where the researcher looked for authority. The prior question 
would tend to lead the researcher to decisions in which section 263 
was held to be of primary importance, whereas the latter question 
would lead to decisions in which section 162 was found to be of 
greater importance.2 Ideally, the index of reference volumes would 
include citations to both decisions in both places, but the cost of 
duplication quickly becomes prohibitive, and the human element in 
any classification system is less than perfect. Consequently, the
2 Section 263 reads in part as follows: “No deduction shall be allowed for—(1) Any 
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments 
made to increase the value of any property or estate.” Section 162 reads in part 
as follows: “There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business. . . . ” Obviously, reasonable men can and do differ in their application 
of these rules to specific fact situations.
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statement of the question may assume unusual importance in asking 
a leading question of a witness. To the maximum extent possible, tax 
questions should be phrased neutrally and without conclusions to 
permit the researcher greater freedom in finding the best possible 
authority for resolving the question.
A Comprehensive Example
The remainder of this chapter is a detailed review of a relatively 
simple, yet comprehensive, example that demonstrates the elusive 
nature of tax questions. In the process of developing this example, 
we shall attempt to illustrate the way in which facts, rules, and 
questions are inextricably entwined, one with the other, in tax 
problems. In following this example, the reader should not be 
concerned with the problem of locating pertinent authority. The next 
chapter will explain how the reader might have found that same 
authority had he or she been working alone on this problem. To 
begin, let us assume the following statement of facts.
On February 10, 1981, Ima Hitchcock, a long-time client of 
your CPA firm, sold one-half of her equity interest in General 
Paper Corporation (hereafter, GPC) for $325,000 cash. Ms. 
Hitchcock had owned 60,000 shares (or 20 percent) of the 
outstanding common stock of GPC since its inception in 1951. 
During the past twenty years, she had been active in GPC 
management. Following this sale of stock, however, she planned 
to retire from active business life. Her records clearly reveal 
that her tax basis in the 30,000 shares sold was only $25,000 
(one-half of her original purchase price).
Given no additional facts, both the beginner and the seasoned tax 
adviser would be likely to conclude that Ms. Hitchcock should report 
a $300,000 long-term capital gain in 1980 because of her sale of the 
GPC stock. The case appears to be wholly straightforward and without 
complication, as long as no one asks any questions or volunteers any 
additional information. Although few persons would ask for it in this 
case, the statutory authority for the suggested conclusion would rest 
upon sections 1001, 1012, 1221, 1222, and 1223. Section 1221 would 
establish that the stock is a capital asset; sections 1222 and 1223 would 
determine the long-term status of the capital gain realized; section 
1012 would specify the cost basis of the shares sold; section 1001 
would define the gain realized as the difference between the $325,000
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received and the $25,000 cost basis surrendered and would require 
that the entire $300,000 realized gain be recognized. If, however, 
someone happened to ask who purchased Ms. Hitchcock’s shares, 
problems could arise quickly.
Diagraming the Facts
Before this example is considered in more detail, a simple stick figure 
diagram may be made of the transaction just described. In the 
authors’ opinion, every tax adviser should become accustomed to 
preparing such simple diagrams of the essential facts of any case 
before beginning to ask any questions or to search for any authority. 
In addition to diagraming the critical transaction itself, the practitioner 
should diagram a simple portrayal of the fact situation as it existed 
both before and after the transaction under examination. Each person 
can create his own set of symbols for any problem; this illustration, 
however, uses only a stick figure to represent an individual taxpayer 
(Ima Hitchcock) and a square to represent a corporate taxpayer 
Figure 3.2
BEFORE
THE TRANSACTION
AFTER
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(General Paper Corporation). These simple symbols are used to 
diagram the before- and after-fact situations, as well as the transactions 
under analysis, as follows.
The diagram of this deceptively simple tax problem is the first 
critical step toward asking the necessary questions.
First Questions Call for Additional Facts
As is evident in the diagram, the first two critical questions appear 
to be: (1) Who owns the other 80 percent of GPS stock? and (2) Who 
purchased the shares from Ms. Hitchcock? The answers to these two 
questions obviously call for the determination of more facts, not for 
additional authority.
Suppose the CPA knew from prior work with this client that GPC 
is a closely owned corporation; that is, it has been equally owned by 
five local residents (including Ms. Hitchcock) since its inception in 
1951. Knowing these facts, one of the two questions has already been 
answered. However, the CPA might be curious about who purchased
the stock, how the value of $325,000 was determined, and so on. 
Under these circumstances, we can easily imagine a conversation 
between Ms. Hitchcock and her CPA as follows:
CPA: Who purchased your stock in GPC, Ms. Hitch­
cock?
Ms. H: Ghost Publishing, Incorporated.
CPA: That is a name that I have not heard before. Is 
it a local firm?
Ms. H: Yes, it is my grandson’s corporation.
From there this conversation would proceed to establish the facts 
that Ghost Publishing, Incorporated (hereafter, GPI) was indeed a 
small but very profitable corporation whose stock was entirely owned 
by Ms. Hitchcock’s favorite grandson, Alvred Hitchcock. GPI decided 
to purchase the GPC stock both to guarantee its own supply of paper 
and because Alvred was convinced that GPC was a sound financial 
investment.
The discovery of these additional facts would begin to separate the 
beginner from the more experienced tax adviser. In all probability, 
the beginner quite possibly would not modify the prior conclusion 
concerning Ms. Hitchcock’s need to report a $300,000 long-term 
capital gain in 1981. The more seasoned tax adviser would know at
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least that sales between related parties are often subject to special 
scrutiny and would begin to search for possible authority that might 
modify the prior conclusion.
Before we proceed to examine possible authority, we should stop 
and observe two apparently innocent facts that have vital importance 
to the resolution of this tax problem: (1) The GPC shares were 
purchased from Ms. Hitchcock by GPI, and (2) GPI is owned by Ms. 
Hitchcock’s grandson. Unless these two facts are discovered, and 
their importance fully appreciated, this problem simply could not 
proceed any further. We might also pause briefly to rediagram both 
our transaction and the after-the-transaction situation to accommodate 
the new facts that we have just determined. The new diagrams might 
look as follows.
Figure 3.3
THE TRANSACTION
10% of GPC stock
GPI
 $325,000 cash  
Once again this diagram should serve to highlight the potential 
problems that lie ahead of us.
An experienced  re search er w ould realize th e  danger im plicit in 
sales between related parties and would begin to look for some 
authority that might modify his conclusion. The tax adviser with 
extensive technical competence in the taxation of corporations and 
corporate shareholder relations might be able to turn directly to 
section 304 to determine the next appropriate question—that is, 
Does section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of 
GPC stock to GPI?
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The Authority
Understanding section 304 may be difficult. It reads as follows.
SEC. 304. REDEMPTION THROUGH USE OF RELATED COR­
PORATIONS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Stock Purchases.—
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary).— 
For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two 
corporations, and
(B) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires 
stock in the other corporation from the person (or persons) so 
in control, then (unless paragraph (2) applies) such property 
shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock of 
the corporation acquiring such stock. In any such case, the 
stock so acquired shall be treated as having been transferred 
by the person from whom acquired, and as having been 
received by the corporation acquiring it, as a contribution to 
the capital of such corporation.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and 
303, if—
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from a 
shareholder of another corporation stock in such other corpo­
ration, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation, 
then such property shall be treated as a distribution in 
redemption of the stock of the issuing corporation.
(b) Special Rules for Application of Subsection (a).—
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302(b).—In the case of 
any acquisition of stock to which subsection (a) of this section 
applies, determinations as to whether the acquisition is, by reason 
of section 302(b), to be treated as a distribution in part or full 
payment in exchange for the stock shall be made by reference to 
the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying section 318(a) 
(relating to constructive ownership of stock) with respect to section 
302(b) for purposes of this paragraph, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and 
318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent 
limitation contained therein.
(2) Amount constituting dividend.—
(A) Where subsection (a)(1) applies.—In the case of any ac­
quisition of stock to which paragraph (1) (and not paragraph 
(2)) of subsection (a) of this section applies, the determination
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of the amount which is a dividend shall be made solely by 
reference to the earnings and profits of the acquiring corpo­
ration.
(B) Where subsection (a)(2) applies.—In the case of any ac­
quisition of stock to which subsection (a)(2) of this section 
applies, the determination of the amount which is a dividend 
shall be made as if the property were distributed by the 
acquiring corporation to the issuing corporation and immedi­
ately thereafter distributed by the issuing corporation.
(c) Control—
(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, control means the 
ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total 
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or 
at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock.
If a person (or persons) is in control (within the meaning of the 
preceding sentence) of a corporation which in turn owns at least 
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all stock entitled 
to vote of another corporation, or owns at least 50 percent of the 
total value of shares of all classes of stock of another corporation, 
then such person (or persons) shall be treated as in control of such 
other corporation.
(2) Constructive ownership.—Section 318(a) (relating to the con­
structive ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of determining 
control under paragraph (1). For purposes of the preceding 
sentence, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and 318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied 
without regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.
Although the beginner might require assistance in interpreting and 
applying this code section to the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale, every 
beginner must learn how to read and understand the language of the 
code if he or she is ever to succeed as a tax adviser. Certainly the 
beginner might take comfort in knowing that even such a distinguished 
jurist as Learned Hand found this to be a formidable assignment. He 
once said
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for 
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: 
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched 
in abstract terms that offer no handles to seize hold of—leave in my 
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully 
concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within 
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.3
3 Learned Hand, “Thomas Walter Swan,” Yale Law Journal 57 (December 1947):
169.
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Perhaps the final line of the quotation is the most telling. Learning 
how to understand the code is most certainly a time-consuming 
process. Even a beginner will realize, after any careful reading of 
section 304, that certain words and phrases deserve special attention. 
For example, understanding section 304 necessarily requires (1) an 
understanding of sections 302 and 303, (2) the ability to distinguish 
between an acquisition by a “related corporation that is not a 
subsidiary” and an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation, and (3) an 
understanding of the way in which the constructive ownership rules 
of section 318 are applied to determine control. For both the beginner 
and the person with an intermediate level of tax skills, these 
determinations may well constitute the next pertinent set of questions.
The Third Set of Questions
Although this conclusion is not obvious at the outset, the last of the 
determinations suggested in the preceding paragraph is the one that 
must be solved first. In reverse order, then, those determinations 
can be stated as questions like this:
1. After the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC common stock to GPI, 
what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own, directly or indirectly, for 
purposes of section 304, giving full consideration to the con­
structive ownership rules of section 318?
2. Can the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to GPI by Ms. 
Hitchcock be considered, for purposes of section 304, as either 
(a) an acquisition by a related (but not subsidiary) corporation 
or (b) an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation?
3. If the answer to either question in (2), above, is affirmative, 
what is the tax effect of section 302 and/or 303 on this disposition 
of stock?
To solve these three questions we must turn to more authority. Our 
first stop will be at section 318, the constructive ownership rules, 
which apply to section 304 according to paragraph (2) of subsec­
tion (c).
More Authority
Fortunately, section 318 does not, at least at the outset, appear to be 
as confusing as section 304. Section 318 reads in part as follows.
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SEC. 318. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter 
to which the rules contained in this section are expressly made 
applicable—
(1) Members of family.—
(A) In general.—An individual shall be considered as owning 
the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for—
(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated 
from the individual under a decree of divorce or separate 
maintenance), and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents.
(B) Effect of adoption.—For purposes of subparagraph (a)(ii), 
a legally adopted child of an individual shall be treated as a 
child of such individual by blood.
(2) Attribution from partnership, estates, trusts, and corpora­
tions.—
• • • •
(C) From corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the 
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by or 
for any person, such person shall be considered as owning the 
stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such corporation, 
in that proportion which the value of the stock which such 
person so owns bears to the value of all the stock in such 
corporation.
(3) Attribution to partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—
• • • •
(C) To corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the 
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by or 
for any person, such corporation shall be considered as owning 
the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such person.
• • • •
(5) Operating rules.—
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and
(C), stock constructively owned by a person by reason of the 
application of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), shall, for purposes 
of applying paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4), be considered as 
actually owned by such person.
(B) Members of family.—Stock constructively owned by an 
individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1) shall 
not be considered as owned by him for purposes of again 
applying paragraph (1) in order to make another the constructive 
owner of such stock.
(C) Partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—Stock 
constructively owned by a partnership, estate, trust, or cor-
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poration by reason of the application of paragraph (3) shall not 
be considered as owned by it for purposes of applying paragraph
(2) in order to make another the constructive owner of such 
stock.
A reexamination of the facts already known about GPC in light of the 
rules of section 318 suggests the need to determine some additional 
facts before proceeding toward a solution.
More Questions and More Facts
A careful reading of section 318 suggests that we must make absolutely 
certain who it is that owns the other 80 percent of GPC. Earlier it 
was stated that GPC was “equally owned by five local residents.” 
After reading the quoted portion of section 318, it should be obvious 
that we must ask if any of the other four GPC owners are related to 
Ms. Hitchcock within any of the family relationships described in 
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of section 318. At the same time, we 
probably should make certain that none of the other four original 
owners has sold any of their original stock in GPC. If they have, we 
would also have to determine who purchased those shares and 
determine the relationship, if any, between those purchasers and 
Ms. Hitchcock. To simplify the remaining task just a little, let us 
assume that we can quickly determine that none of the other four 
owners of GPC are in any way related to Ms. Hitchcock and that all 
of the other four original owners continue to own all of their shares 
in GPC. Having determined this, we can now reach our first tentative 
conclusions.
First Tentative Conclusions
Specifically, we are now prepared to answer the first of the three 
questions suggested on page 67: After the sale of 30,000 shares of 
GPC common stock to GPI, what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own, 
directly or indirectly, for purposes of section 304, giving full consid­
eration to the constructive ownership rules of section 318? By 
operation of section 318(a)(l)(A)(ii), Ms. Ima Hitchcock constructively 
owns any shares of stock owned by her grandson, Alvred. Conse­
quently, Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100 percent of GPI, the 
corporation that purchased the 30,000 shares of GPC stock from her. 
Furthermore, by operation of section 318(a)(2)(C), Ms. Hitchcock’s 
grandson Alvred is indirectly deemed to own any stock owned by 
GPI, and section 318(a)(1) says that effectively Ms. Hitchcock must 
pretend that she owns not only what her grandson owns directly but
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also that which he owns indirectly.4 This means, of course, that Ms. 
Hitchcock is, for purposes of section 304, deemed to own that which 
she just sold.
Having made this determination, we can now also answer the 
second of the three questions posed earlier: Does section 304 apply 
to this sale of stock? Obviously that question really is two questions, 
and we can separate them for purposes of further investigation. First, 
we must determine if the acquisition of the 30,000 shares by GPI can 
be considered to be an acquisition by a related, but nonsubsidiary, 
corporation; second, we must determine if that acquisition can be 
considered to be an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation. These 
questions might lead us to ask another tentative question: What is 
meant by a related but nonsubsidiary corporation? Section 304(a)(1)(A) 
apparently is intended to provide the rules for stock acquisitions 
where the seller of the stock (that is, the “one or more persons” 
clause) is “in control o f" both the corporation whose stock is sold and 
the corporation making the purchase. The more experienced tax 
adviser will immediately recognize this as a brother-sister corporate 
relationship. That relationship can be diagramed as follows.
Figure 3.4
Owner
In this ownership arrangement, corporations B and S are deemed to 
be related to one another as brother and sister corporations. (The 
degree of control required to establish this relationship is stated in 
section 304(c)(1) as either 50 percent of the voting power or 50 
percent of the value of the shares.)
4 The only exception to this is stated in the operating rules of sec. 318(a)(5)(B), which 
reads as follows: “Stock constructively owned by an individual by reason of the 
application of paragraph (1) [that is, by family attribution] shall not be considered 
as owned by him for purposes of again applying paragraph (1) in order to make 
another the constructive owner of such stock. ” Since Alvred’s indirect ownership 
of GPC shares comes about by application of paragraph (2)(C) of sec. 318 and not 
by application of paragraph (1), sec. 318(a)(l)(A)(ii) requires that Ms. Ima Hitchcock 
also include in her indirect ownership any shares that GPI owns.
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Even giving full consideration to all indirect ownership as well as 
all direct ownership, Ms. Ima Hitchcock can be said to own only 20 
percent of GPC. She owns 10 percent directly and another 10 percent 
indirectly.5 Thus, even though Ms. Hitchcock owns 100 percent of 
GPI (the acquiring corporation) indirectly, she owns only 20 percent 
of GPC, and therefore the rules of section 304(a)(1) do not apply to 
her disposition. In other words, Ms. Hitchcock’s sale would not be 
deemed to be an acquisition by a related nonsubsidiary corporation.
We must return then to the second part of our last question: Can 
the sale of GPC stock by Ms. Hitchcock to GPI be considered as an 
acquisition made by a subsidiary corporation? Once again a com­
monsense answer would seem to be a negative one. The acquirer 
(GPI) is in no way the subsidiary of GPC (the corporation whose 
stock Ms. Hitchcock sold). Be careful, however, and look again at the 
simple diagram in figure 3.3. If one can impute shares one way 
around an ownership circle, is it possible that the process might work 
in the reverse direction as well? The answer, of course, must be 
found in the wording of the code.
Ordinarily, section 318(a)(3)(C) attributes ownership from a stock­
holder to a corporation only i f  the stockholder owns 50 percent or 
more of the value of that corporation’s outstanding stock. The last 
sentence of section 304(c)(2), however, says, “Sections 318(a)(2)(C) 
and 318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent 
limitation contained therein.” This seems to say, then, that for 
purposes of section 304 any acquiring corporation will be deemed to 
own any stock owned (indirectly or directly) by any of its stockholders. 
Returning to the facts of the problem, this means that GPC owns any 
stock that Ms. Hitchcock owns and, you will remember, we just 
determined that Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100 percent of 
GPI. In effect, then, GPC owns 100 percent of GPI, making GPI 
(the acquirer) a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation whose 
stock Ms. Hitchcock sold. It appears, therefore, that section 304(a)(2) 
does apply to this disposition. Perhaps it would now be useful to 
paraphrase that paragraph of the code, substituting the facts of our 
specific situation for the exact words of the code. If we do that, the 
pertinent paragraph would read something like this:
5 Incidentally, the revised diagram of the facts pictured in figure 3.3 really suggests 
this conclusion with much less confusion than do all of the words of the code. 
Perhaps one picture can be worth a thousand words. Note that simply following 
the dotted lines of that diagram back from Alvred to Ms. Hitchcock shows that the 
conclusion just reached is not really so farfetched after all.
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Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) in return for $325,000, GPI acquired from Ms. Hitchcock stock 
in GPC, and
(B) GPC controls GPI,
then the $325,000 shall be treated as a distribution in redemption o f 
the stock o f GPC.
The careful reader will have observed that even at this point we have 
not yet determined the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s stock 
disposition. Before we can make that determination, we must ask 
still more questions.
More Questions, More Authority
Code section 304(a)(2) simply provides that Ms. Hitchcock’s sale 
should be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock, and it 
suggests that we look to two additional code sections to see what that 
means. Our next question, then, must be this: If Ms. Hitchcock’s 
disposition of GPC stock is to be treated as a stock redemption under 
section 302 and/or 303, what, if anything, do those sections say about 
the tax treatment of amounts received?
On further searching we could quickly discover that section 303 
deals only with distributions in redemption of stock to pay death 
taxes. Clearly, the facts of our problem do not suggest anything about 
Ms. Hitchcock’s making this disposition to pay death taxes; thus we 
may safely conclude that section 303 is not applicable to our solution. 
We turn, therefore, to section 302, which reads in pertinent part as 
follows.
SEC. 302. DISTRIBUTIONS IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—If a corporation redeems its stock (within the 
meaning of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of 
subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution 
in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) R e d e m p tio n s  T re a te d  as E x c h a n g e s .—
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.—Subsection (a) shall 
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.—
(A) In general.—Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution 
is substantially disproportionate with respect to the share­
holder.
(B) Limitation.—This paragraph shall not apply unless im-
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mediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of 
stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph, the distri­
bution is substantially disproportionate if—
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned 
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears 
to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of—
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned 
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears 
to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated 
as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder’s own­
ership of the common stock of the corporation (whether voting 
or nonvoting) after and before redemption also meets the 80 
percent requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, if there is more than one class of 
common stock, the determinations shall be made by reference 
to fair market value.
(D) Series of redemptions.—This paragraph shall not apply to 
any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect 
of which is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution 
which (in the aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate 
with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder’s interest.—Subsection (a) shall 
apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the 
stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) Stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganiza­
tion.— • • • •
(5) Application of paragraphs.—In determining whether a re­
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact that 
such redemption fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (2),
(3), or (4) shall not be taken into account. If a redemption meets 
the requirements of paragraph (3) and also the requirements of 
paragraph (1), (2), or (4), then so much of subsection (c)(2) as would 
(but for this sentence) apply in respect of the acquisition of an 
interest in the corporation within the 10-year period beginning on 
the date of the distribution shall not apply.
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock.—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership 
of stock for purposes of this section.
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(d) Redemptions Treated as Distributions of Property.—Except as 
otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a corporation redeems its 
stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)), and if subsection (a) of 
this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated as a 
distribution of property to which section 301 applies.
Obviously, this new and relatively lengthy code section simply 
brings more new questions to mind. The careful reader should 
observe that section 302(a) provides a general rule that any redemption 
will be treated as “a distribution in part or full payment in exchange 
for the stock” if the conditions of any one of four paragraphs are 
satisfied (emphasis added). This means that i f  the conditions of any 
one of the four subsections can be satisfied, a taxpayer from whom 
stock is redeemed can treat the disposition as a sale. In most instances 
this would result in capital gain treatment. The general rules of 
subsection (a) say absolutely nothing, however, about the proper tax 
treatment of the redemption proceeds if those conditions cannot be 
satisfied. That possibility is treated in subsection (d), which says, 
“Such redemption shall be treated as a distribution o f property to 
which section 301 applies” (emphasis added). On further investigation 
we could discover that section 301 generally provides a dividend 
treatment for properties distributed by a corporation to its share­
holder. This would mean, of course, that the redeemed shareholder 
would have to report an ordinary income rather than a capital gain.
If we continued to examine the facts of our illustrative problem in 
detail against all of the rules of section 302, we would have to proceed 
through another relatively complex set of code provisions not unlike 
those we have just examined in some detail. Because this procedure 
is no longer new, and because we really are interested only in 
demonstrating the complex relationship that exists between facts, 
authorities, and tax questions, we shall discontinue our detailed step- 
by-step approach and state the remainder of this analysis in more 
general terms. We can begin such a summary treatment of our 
problem as follows:
1. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition a redemption within 
the meaning of section 317(b), as required by section 302(a)? 
Authority: Section 317(b) reads as follows:
Redemption of stock.—For purposes of this part, stock shall 
be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation 
acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, 
whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or 
held as treasury stock.
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Conclusion: The intended meaning of this section is not obvious; 
it seems to suggest only that what the acquiring corporation 
does with shares it acquires from its shareholders will in no way 
effect the classification of the stock acquisition as a stock 
redemption. The section seems initially not to apply to our case 
because it refers to a corporation acquiring its stock from a 
shareholder. A more general reflection on how this section is 
made applicable to related corporations through section 304 
suggests, however, that these words must be stretched to 
include the stock of a related corporation if the obvious meaning 
of section 304 is not to be emasculated. Hence, we would likely 
conclude that Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition probably is a re­
demption within the meaning of section 317(b).
2. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale (redemption) of 30,000 shares 
of GPC stock to GPI a redemption that falls within the meaning 
of any one of the exceptions of section 302(b)(1) through (b)(4)?
Authority: Read again section 302(b)(1) through (b)(4) as quoted 
previously.
Conclusions (in reverse order):
a. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(4) is not applicable; 
that is, GPC is not a railroad corporation.
b. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(3) is not applicable; 
that is, Ms. Hitchcock continues to own directly 30,000 
shares of GPC stock even after her sale of 30,000 shares to 
GPI.
c. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(2) is not applicable; 
that is, considering her indirect ownership as well as her 
direct ownership, Ms. Hitchcock owns after the sale exactly 
what she owned before the sale, namely, 20 percent of GPC. 
(Note that section 302(c) requires that the attribution rules 
of section 318 be applied to stock redemptions.)
The Final Question
Without having carefully examined each of the intermediate questions 
and authorities suggested above, the reader might have some trouble 
in stating the final question. If you took the time to do so, however, 
it would seem that Ms. Hitchcock’s final question might be stated 
thus: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of GPC to GPI properly 
treated as a “redemption not essentially equivalent to a dividend” as
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that phrase is used in section 302(b)(1)? The implied conclusion stems 
importantly from (1) the requirement in section 304 (with assistance 
from section 318) that Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent sale be treated not 
as a sale at all but as a redemption of a parent corporation’s stock 
when that stock is purchased by its subsidiary corporation and (2) the 
requirement in section 302 that a stock redemption be treated as a 
dividend unless one of the four exceptions in section 302(b) is satisfied.
Any detailed assessment of the authority that is pertinent to an 
interpretation of section 302(b)(1) would lead us well into the objective 
of chapter 5 of this tax study. Consequently, we shall not undertake 
that assessment here. We shall note, in passing, some general 
observations that would become pertinent to a resolution of the 
problem were we actually to undertake a detailed assessment. First, 
“the legislative history of Section 302(b)(1) . . . suggests that it is to 
play a modest role in the scheme of things. ”6 Second, in the Treasury 
regulations the only example of a stock redemption qualifying for 
exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1) is stated in regs. section 
1.302-2(a), which reads, in part, as follows: “For example, if a 
shareholder owns only nonvoting stock of a corporation which is not 
section 306 stock and which is limited and preferred as to dividends 
and in liquidation, and one-half of such stock is redeemed, the 
distribution will ordinarily meet the requirements of paragraph (1) 
of section 302(b) but will not meet the requirements of paragraphs 
(2), (3), or (4) of such section.’’ This example obviously lends no 
support to the case at hand since the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s 
ownership are radically different from those described in this regu­
lation. Third, in U.S. v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), the Supreme 
Court held “that neither the absence of a tax-avoidance motive nor 
the presence of a business purpose for the redemption would protect 
it against dividend treatment. ”7 In summary, the authority for granting 
Ms. Hitchcock exchange (that is, capital gain) treatment by operation 
of the exception stated in section 302(b)(1) appears to be relatively 
weak. And if the exception of section 302(b)(1) cannot be made to 
apply, Ms. Hitchcock must report a $325,000 dividend income by 
operation of section 302(d).8
6 Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, Federal Taxation o f Corporations and 
Shareholders, 4th ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1979), pp. 9-29.
7 Ibid, pp. 9-30.
8 Our conclusion simply assumes a sufficiency of earnings and profits as required by 
sec. 316, which defines the word “dividend.” In actual practice, of course, this 
would constitute another critical fact determination.
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Do We Begin Again?
At this point the difference between the tax adviser with limited 
technical competence and the more experienced tax adviser is once 
again likely to become apparent. If the beginner actually had 
discovered and understood all of the facts and all of the rules 
considered thus far in our example, he or she would be very likely 
to conclude that the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent 
sale is, after all, dividend treatment rather than capital gain. The 
more experienced tax adviser is more likely to ask one last searching 
question: Does this conclusion make any common sense? If the 
answer to this one last question is negative, as it is likely to be in this 
case, the expert sets off once more on yet another search for authority 
to justify an apparently more reasonable conclusion.
By rethinking the facts of this illustration, a tax adviser should 
observe that the tentative conclusion rests largely on the presumption 
that GPI is a subsidiary of GPC when, in fact, GPC does not directly 
own a single share of GPI stock. In fact, no “first generation share­
holder” of GPC even owns such stock. The adviser might go on to 
observe, then, that the literal application of the rules just studied 
could clearly lead to potentially absurd results in some circumstances. 
For example, if a stockholder who owned only a few shares of General 
Motors Corporation common stock happened to sell some of these 
shares to a grandson’s wholly owned corporation, the tax result would, 
for the same reasons as those determined here, be held to constitute 
a dividend. The grandson’s little corporation would, by some wild 
stretch of the imagination and the law of the land, be made into a 
subsidiary of General Motors. This observation might lead the 
experienced tax adviser to look into the history of section 304, where 
one would discover that it was intended to close an unintended 
opportunity for owners of closely related corporations to bail out the 
earnings and profits of their corporation as a capital gain rather than 
the payment of dividends. Still further reflection on the intended 
purpose of section 304 would suggest clearly that the section was 
never intended to cover the isolated sale of a few shares of General 
Motors to a very distantly related corporation and that, in all 
probability, it was never intended to cover a situation like Ms. 
Hitchcock’s either. A careful study of the constructive ownership 
provisions required by section 304 would also yield some obvious 
ambiguities in statutory construction. For example, given the literal 
application of the constructive ownership rules of section 318, every 
brother-sister pair of corporations is automatically a parent-subsidiary
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pair as well, although both the code and the Treasury regulations 
imply that the two situations are separate and must be treated 
differently. Finally, the experienced tax adviser might locate judicial 
support that would suggest that courts on rare occasions refuse to 
apply the code literally if the result is clearly absurd and inconsistent 
with the intent of Congress.9 And last but not least, the tax adviser 
may locate some secondary reference work that points up the very 
problem encountered.10 All of these authorities give the experienced 
tax adviser some comfort but, at the same time, leave something of 
a dilemma.
A Moral Dilemma?
Any tax adviser who painstakingly has found the way through the 
facts and the law of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale might be trapped in a moral 
dilemma. That adviser would understand that, in all likelihood, Ms. 
Hitchcock could just report the “sale’’ of stock in part II, schedule 
D, Form 1040, as a routine sale and that it would not be questioned 
further. After all, what is the statistical probability of an audit that 
would discover who purchased the shares and reveal who it was that 
owned the purchasing corporation? Beyond that, what is the chance 
that an auditor would fully understand all the intricacies of sections 
301, 302, 304, 317, and 318? Furthermore, there is some authority 
(admittedly weak) for treating the sale-redemption as an exchange 
under section 302(b)(1) anyway. If that authority is applicable, the 
correct tax result is a $300,000 long-term capital gain. The tax adviser 
strongly suspects that capital gain treatment really is the treatment 
intended by Congress (even though no one ever really considered it) 
but knows equally well that the Internal Revenue Service might 
reach a contrary conclusion were it fully aware of all the facts. 
Certainly, the tax adviser knows that the client intended to enter 
into a sale that would produce capital gain rather than ordinary 
dividend income. The real dilemma, then, may concern not the
9 For example, note the following words from the U.S. Supreme Court: “When 
. . . [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, this Court has looked 
beyond the words to the purpose of the Act. Frequently, . . . even when the plain 
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one plainly 
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this court has followed that 
purpose, rather than the literal whole.” [U.S. v. American Trucking Association, 
310 U.S. 534 (1940)]
10 Relative to the parent-subsidiary relation derived solely from constructive ownership 
rules, see Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 
pp. 9-51/52. See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law of Federal Income Taxation (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Co.), vol. 1, ¶19.106, pp. 368-69.
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conclusion but the proper method of reporting all the facts that have 
transpired. If the tax adviser reveals all he or she knows on the tax 
return, the probability of an audit and the possibility of costly 
litigation are substantially increased. If the adviser remains silent 
and reports the disposition as a simple sale, and all the facts are 
subsequently discovered and the dispute is litigated, the professional 
reputation of the adviser is in jeopardy, and a risk of perjury (for 
filing a false return) is even conceivable.
Under the circumstances described here, the tax adviser might 
seek the opinion of Ms. Hitchcock’s legal counsel to obtain another 
opinion about the correct treatment of the proceeds from the 
disposition of the GPC stock and about the proper method of reporting 
that event. The latter conclusion is particularly important if legal 
counsel should state that, in his opinion, the correct treatment of the 
proceeds is as a capital gain. Although an opinion of legal counsel 
would not absolve the tax adviser from personal professional respon­
sibility, it would lend credence to the tax treatment finally reported 
and, to some extent, demonstrate a desire to perform in a profes­
sionally responsible manner.
The foregoing example demonstrates the critical role of facts, the 
interdependency of facts and rules, and the elusive nature of pertinent 
tax questions. If all the facts are discovered and all the rules are 
known and understood, apparently simple transactions have a way of 
creating relatively complex tax problems in all too many situations. 
The tax adviser must ask the right questions, not because he or she 
desires to convert a simple situation into a complex problem and a 
larger fee, but because the correct reporting of a tax result depends 
so directly upon asking those questions. Questions often evolve from 
fact determination to rule application. For example, in our illustration 
the first critical questions were (1) Who purchased the shares? and 
(2) Who owned the purchaser? Certainly those are fact questions. 
Nevertheless, unless a person has some appreciation of the applicable 
rules, it would be highly unlikely for a beginner to continue to ask 
the right questions. After the facts were determined, the critical 
questions concerned the application of rules to known facts; for 
example, (1) Does section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 
shares of GPC to GPI? (2) Does section 318 apply to make GPI a 
subsidiary corporation of GPC? and (3) Does the exception of section 
302 (b)(1) apply to this same disposition? Each question appears to 
be more esoteric than the preceding one. Yet every question depends 
to an important degree upon the tax adviser’s knowledge of the 
authority that is applicable to the given fact situation.
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. . .  reasons are as two graines of wheate,
hid in two bushels of chaffe;
you shall seeke all day ere you finde them . . .
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
Locating Appropriate 
Authority
In chapters 2 and 3 we discussed the importance of facts and the 
methodology employed to delineate questions that must be answered 
to solve tax problems successfully. To determine a technically correct 
answer to a tax question, the tax adviser may consult statutory, 
administrative, judicial, and, in some instances, editorial authority. 
This process consists of two distinct phasers: (1) The tax adviser must 
locate the appropriate authority, and (2) he must assess the importance 
of that authority, augment it if it is found to be incomplete, and, on 
occasion, choose between conflicting authorities. The following pages 
will identify the various kinds of tax authorities and ways to locate 
them, and chapter 5 will concentrate on the assessment of authorities.
The Tax-Legislation Process
Our present income taxing system began with the Tariff Act of 
October 3, 1913. Since then numerous revenue acts have been 
enacted into law. Due to their number and increasing complexity, 
existing revenue acts were codified in 1939 into a single document 
called the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Code of 
1939 was revised and simplified again in the Internal Revenue Code
81
of 1954. All revenue acts enacted into law after 1939 have been 
integrated into the extant Internal Revenue Code.
By virtue of Article I, section 7, of the Constitution, all revenue 
bills must originate in the House and cannot be sent to the Senate 
until the House has completed action on the bill. After introduction, 
most of the actual work on a revenue bill takes place in the  House 
Ways and Means Committee. In the case of major bills, public 
hearings are scheduled. The first and most prominent witness during 
these hearings usually is the secretary of the Treasury, representing 
the executive branch of the government. Upon conclusion of the 
hearings, the committee goes into executive session and, after 
tentative conclusions have been reached, prepares the House Ways 
 and Means Committee report, which includes the proposed bill 
drafted in legislative language, an assessment of its effect on revenue, 
and a general explanation of the provisions in the bill. The report 
represents the only written document that details the reasons for the 
committee’s actions, and, therefore, it constitutes an important 
reference source for the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and 
practitioners in determining legislative intent in connection with each 
section of the code. Upon completion of the committee report, the 
bill is reported to the floor of the House for action. Prior to 1975, 
revenue legislation usually was considered “privileged” business and, 
as such, had priority over other matters on the floor. In the past, the 
approval of the Rules Committee usually was sought before a bill was 
placed on the floor. This procedure was followed so that a tax bill 
could be debated under the “closed rule”; thus, amendments from 
the floor were forbidden unless the Ways and Means Committee 
approved them. This procedure appears to be changing, and it is 
anticipated that future revenue legislation will be subject to amend­
ments on the floor of the House.
After approval by the House, a tax bill is sent to the Senate, where 
it is immediately referred to the Finance Committee. If it is a major 
bill, the Senate Finance Committee schedules its own hearings and 
prepares its own committee report. Debate on the floor of the Senate 
proceeds with few restraints; consequently, Senate amendments to 
a revenue bill are commonplace. Obviously, the Senate Finance 
Committee report will not disclose the intent of Congress on the 
amended portion of a bill. For those portions it becomes necessary 
to consult the Congressional Record to understand the reasons for 
the amendment.
If the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill, 
further congressional action is necessary. After the House adopts a
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motion to disagree with the Senate version of a revenue bill, a 
conference committee is appointed to iron out the differences. Like 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee, the conference committee may prepare its own com­
mittee report, concentrating on the areas of disagreement. Their 
report usually is rather technical and does not explain how the two 
bills were reconciled. However, statements made on the floor of 
either chamber prior to the final vote on the conference report are 
entered in the Congressional Record. These statements often shed 
light on congressional intent for the amended sections. After approval 
of the conference bill by both the House and the Senate, the bill is 
sent to the President to be signed.1
To illustrate how a tax adviser might utilize his or her knowledge 
of the foregoing process, let us refer to the Foreign Earned Income 
Act, which was signed by the President as Public Law 95-615 on 
November 8, 1978, amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
The act was passed in conjunction with the Revenue Act of 1978 and 
the Energy Tax Act. The acts made significant changes in the tax law 
and introduced a number of new provisions. Among the new 
provisions is section 913, which allows a deduction for excess living 
costs incurred by U.S. citizens who are residents of a foreign country 
or by U.S. citizens, as well as resident aliens, who are present in a 
foreign country during 510 full days out of any consecutive eighteen- 
month period. The excess living costs that may qualify as a deduction 
under section 913 include cost-of-living differential, housing ex­
penses, schooling expenses, home leave travel expenses, and hardship 
area deductions. Section 913(g) permits a deduction for home leave 
by the taxpayer and his or her dependents. The section limits the 
deduction to “reasonable amounts” paid or incurred for round-trip 
transportation once every continuous twelve-month period from the 
taxpayer’s tax home outside the United States to the taxpayer’s 
residence in the United States or, if the taxpayer has no U.S. 
residence, to the nearest port of entry in the continental United 
States (excluding Alaska).
The tax adviser who is faced with the question of what constitutes 
“reasonable amounts” might, in the absence of other authoritative 
pronouncements (such as Treasury regulations or revenue rulings), 
consult the committee reports. Following the legislative process of 
a tax bill, the first step is to examine the House Ways and Means
1 For a more complete discussion of the legislative process, see Joseph A. Peckman, 
Federal Tax Policy, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971).
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Committee report for the Foreign Earned Income Act. The report 
reveals that the House committee intended that “reasonable amounts” 
for transportation should be limited to “coach fare when available.”2 
A perusal of the Senate Finance Committee report and the conference 
committee reports sheds no further light on the subject.
At this writing Treasury regulations have been issued that have 
adopted the “coach fare” definition of the House Ways and Means 
Committee report. However, the foregoing example demonstrates 
how helpful committee reports can be when Treasury regulations are 
not issued soon after the passage of a tax bill, which, incidentally, is 
a rather common occurrence.
Accessing Public Documents
Committee reports can be obtained in a number of ways. The official 
report of each committee (House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, 
and conference) is published by the Government Printing Office 
(GPO). These reports are available in the government documents 
section of any library that has been designated as an official depository. 
Committee reports are also reprinted in the weekly Internal Revenue 
Bulletin and consequently appear in the Cumulative Bulletin; they 
can also be found in the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative 
News (USCCAN), published by West Publishing Company. In 
addition, major revenue acts—such as the Tax Reform Act of 1976 or 
the Revenue Act of 1978—are published with partial or full texts of 
the accompanying committee reports by Commerce Clearing House, 
Inc., and Prentice-Hall, Inc. The editors of the Rabkin and Johnson 
tax service (Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation) also typically 
extract important segments of committee reports and intersperse 
them among the code sections contained in the four “Code” volumes 
of the service.
At times it becomes necessary to trace the history of a particular 
1954 code section to the 1939 code or to previous revenue acts. 
Barton’s Federal Tax Laws Correlated (FTLC), a six-volume reference 
service, is an extremely useful tool to guide the researcher from the 
1954 code to the 1939 code and prior acts. Barton’s FTLC gives the 
researcher citations to the official committee reports, the USCCAN, 
and Cumulative Bulletin where applicable segments of committee 
reports can be found. A second source for references to committee
2 U.S., Congress, House, Ways and Means Committee, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, 
H. Rept. 1798, p. 15.
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reports is Seidman's Legislative History o f Federal Income Tax and 
Excess Profits Tax Laws. This three-volume work contains the 
legislative history of tax statutes enacted from 1861 to 1953, including 
the original text of revenue acts and 1939 code sections, with excerpts 
from applicable committee reports. Another source of recent leg­
islative history of the code is Tax Management’s Primary Sources, 
consisting of three series. Series I is a ten-volume legislative history 
of the Internal Revenue Code beginning with the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 and ending with 1975. Series II presents the legislative history 
relating to changes and additions to the code from 1976 through 1977 
in five volumes. Series III begins with the changes made after 1977 
and also includes a comprehensive monthly legislation and regulation 
reporting service designed to inform the reader quickly of proposed 
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.3
Well-informed tax advisers should stay abreast of congressional 
activities involving tax statutes in order to determine the potential 
positive and negative tax effects such developments may harbor with 
respect to their clients. One effective means of keeping in touch with 
such daily congressional tax activities is through Tax Notes, a weekly 
newsletter published by Tax Analysts and Advocates, Washington, 
D.C. For a more comprehensive listing of tax newsletters, see page 
130 of this chapter.
The Internal Revenue Code
All federal statutes passed by Congress are compiled and published 
in the United States Code. Title 26 of the United States Code contains 
the statutes that authorize the Treasury Department, specifically the 
Internal Revenue Service, to collect taxes for the federal government. 
The present code, commonly known as the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, applies to taxable years beginning after 1953. Prior to 1954, 
statutory authority for the collection of taxes rested with the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939. Although the Internal Revenue Code is 
amended almost annually, the designation 1954 remains fixed with 
the present Internal Revenue Code.
3 Walter E. Barton and Carroll W. Browning, Federal Tax Laws Correlated (Boston: 
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1969); J. S. Seidman, Seidman's Legislative 
History o f Federal Income Tax Laws, 1938-1861 and Excess Profits Tax Laws 1953- 
1939 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall); Tax Management, Primary Sources 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs).
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is divided into the following 
segments:
Subtitles Chapters
A. Income Taxes 1-6
B. Estate and Gift Taxes 11-13
C. Employment Taxes 21-25
D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 31-45
E. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes 51-53
F. Procedure and Administration 61-80
G. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 91-92
H. Financing the Presidential Election Campaigns 95-96
The bulk of the income tax provisions is found in chapter 1 of subtitle 
A. Chapter 1 is divided into twenty-one subchapters, A through U. 
(Effectively, however, chapter 1 currently consists of only twenty 
subchapters, since subchapter Rhas been repealed.) These subchapter 
designations are often used by tax practitioners as part of their 
everyday vocabulary to identify general areas of income taxation. The 
most frequently used designations are these:
Subchapter
C Corporate distributions and adjustments 
F Exempt organizations
J Estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents
K Partners and partnerships
N Taxation of multinational corporations
S Tax status election of small business operations
Section numbers are additional subdivisions of the Internal Rev­
enue Code and run consecutively through the entire code. For 
example, subchapter A, which deals with the determination of an 
entity’s tax liability, includes section numbers 1 through 59. To the 
extent that section numbers are unassigned, the arrangement is 
suitable for future expansion of the code. The reader should also note 
th a t section n u m b ers  give a clue to w hich general incom e tax topic 
is involved. For example, code section numbers in the 300 series 
indicate that the section will deal with the topic of corporate 
distributions and adjustments. Each section is further broken down 
into categories (see exhibit 4.1, opposite).
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Exhibit 4.1
S E C . 117. S C H O L A R S H IP S  A N D  F E L L O W S H IP  G R A N T S .
(a) General Rule.— In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—
(1) any amount received—
(A ) as a scholarship at an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A )(ii), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for—
(A ) travel,
(B) research.
(C) clerical help, or
(D ) equipment.
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to 
the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
- —  (b) Limitations.—
(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.— In the case of an individual 
who is a candidate for a degree at an educational organization described in section 
170(b) (1) ( A )(ii). subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount re­
ceived which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services in the na­
ture of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship 
or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are required of all 
candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a 
particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, 
or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the mean­
ing of this paragraph
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.— In the case of an individ­
ual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational organization described in 
section 170(b)(1)(A )(ii), subsection (a) shall apply only if the condition in subpara­
graph (A ) is satisfied and then only within the limitations provided in subpara­
graph (B).
(A ) Conditions for exclusion.— The grantor of the scholarship or fellowship 
grant is—
(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt from 
tax under section 501(a).
( i i ) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multinational educa­
tional and cultural foundation or commission created or continued pursuant 
to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or any instrumentality or agency thereof, or a 
State, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision 
thereof, or the District of Columbia.
(B) Extent of exclusion.— The amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant 
excluded under subsection (a)(1) in any taxable year shall be limited to an 
amount equal to $300 times the number of months for which the recipient re­
ceived amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant during such taxable 
year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under subsection (a) after the 
recipient has been entitled to exclude under this section for a period of 36 
months (whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fel­
lowship grant while not a candidate for a degree at an educational organization 
described in section 170(b) 1 ( A )(ii).
Section 117
■ Subsection (b)
Paragraph (2)
• Subparagraph (A)
Sub-subparagraph (ii)
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The Internal Revenue Code is published annually in paperback 
editions by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (CCH), Prentice-Hall, 
Inc. (P-H), and Research Institute of America (RIA). The code is also 
published in most multivolume tax services, either separately in a 
loose-leaf volume or serially in several volumes. In the latter case, 
the volume includes editorial comments arranged on a topical and/or 
section number basis.
Administrative interpretations
Within the executive branch, the Treasury Department has the 
responsibility of implementing the tax statutes passed by Congress. 
This function is specifically carried out by the Internal Revenue 
Service division of the Treasury Department. The duties of the 
Internal Revenue Service are two-fold: First, the statutes must be 
interpreted according to the intent of Congress, and, second, the 
statutes must be enforced.
The interpretive duties of the Treasury and the IRS range from 
the general to the specific. Treasury regulations are written in broad, 
general terms to explain the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Revenue rulings, on the other hand, interpret the code only with 
respect to specific facts and are inapplicable to fact situations that 
deviate from those stated in a particular revenue ruling.
Treasury Regulations
Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the secretary of the 
Treasury or his delegate a general power to prescribe necessary rules 
and regulations to administer the tax laws as passed by Congress. In 
addition to section 7805, specific reference is made throughout the 
code to the effect that the secretary or his delegate shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of a 
specific chapter or section.
Treasury regulations may be divided into regulations that are 
almost statutory and those that are interpretive. Examples of 
“statutory regulations” are those promulgated under section 1502 
(formerly section 141(b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939) dealing with 
consolidated tax returns. Because of the complexity of the subject, 
Congress failed to legislate in detail in the area of consolidated tax 
returns and delegated this responsibility to the secretary of the 
Treasury or his delegate. Apparently, in 1954, Congress had second 
thoughts concerning the delegation of legislative power to the
88
secretary. Had the 1954 code been enacted in the form in which it 
passed the House of Representatives, the consolidated return regu­
lations actually would have been written into the statute. The Senate 
Finance Committee disagreed, however, and in the conference 
committee the view of the Senate prevailed.4 Due to the complexity 
and detail involved in the consolidated return regulations, Congress 
apparently felt that revisions and amendments should be left under 
the purview of the Treasury.
Taxpayers electing to file consolidated returns must execute a 
consent form in which they agree to be bound by the provisions of 
the regulations.5 Presumably, such an agreement leaves almost no 
appeal from the provisions of the consolidated return regulations and, 
in that sense, gives them a position more nearly “statutory” than the 
interpretive regulations.
  The purpose of the interpretive regulations is to clarify the language 
of the code as passed by Congress. Although the wording of the 
regulations is sometimes almost identical to the language of the code 
and of little assistance, in recent years the Treasury has made frequent 
attempts to add helpful examples to the regulations.
In effect, even the interpretive regulations may come to have the 
force of law; however, technically, if they contradict the intent of 
Congress, they can be overturned by the courts.6 Nevertheless, the 
odds are very much against the taxpayer or his or her representative 
who tries to win a case against the Internal Revenue Service solely 
by attempting to declare a specific Treasury regulation to be in 
conflict with the code or the intent of Congress. For a more complete 
discussion on the status of Treasury regulations, see chapter 5.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, regulations must 
be issued in proposed form before they are published in final form. 
Proposed regulations for a new or existing part of the code may begin 
with the formation of a special task force that may include represen­
tatives of the Internal Revenue Service, the American Bar Association, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and other 
knowledgeable individuals, as was the case with the regulations under 
section 1502. Usually, however, regulations are prepared solely by 
members of the Treasury Department. Interested parties generally 
are given thirty days from the date the proposed regulations appear
4 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, S. 
Rept. 1622, p. 120.
5 Treas. regs. sec. 1.1502-75(h)(2) (1966).
6 See, for example, W. W. Marett, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
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in the Federal Register to submit objections or suggestions. De­
pending upon the controversy surrounding a proposed regulation, it 
will, after the given time period, be either withdrawn and issued in 
permanent form or amended and reissued as a new proposed 
regulation.
Permanent regulations are initially published as official Treasury 
Decisions (T.D.) and appear in the Federal Register. They subse­
quently are reprinted by the Government Printing Office in codified 
form and are officially cited as Title 26 of the Code o f Federal 
Regulations (26 C.F.R. . . .). Commerce Clearing House and Pren­
tice-Hall publish paperback editions of the Treasury regulations 
periodically.
The identifying number of a specific part of the regulations can be 
divided into three segments, as follows:
Treas. regs. sec. 1.1245-2 (a)(3)(h)
Segment I II III
Segment I indicates that the regulation deals either with a specific 
tax or with a procedural rule. Title 26 of the Code o f Federal 
Regulations uses the following designations as the identification 
numbers for what we call “segment I” of a correct citation of a 
Treasury regulation:
Part 1 
Part 20 
Part 25 
Part 31
Parts 48 and 49 
Part 301 
Part 601
Income Tax
Estate Tax
Gift Tax
Employment Tax
Excise Taxes
Administrative and Procedural 
Statement of Procedural Rules
Segment II simply coincides with the specific code section that the 
regulation interprets. Thus, in the above example, one can determine 
that the regulation cited (1) deals with the income tax (because of the 
prefix 1) and (2) refers specifically to section 1245 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Segment III represents the sequence of the regulation 
and a breakdown of its content. Thus, segment III in the example 
refers to section 1245, second section, paragraph (a), subparagraph 
(3), subdivision (ii). Generally, there is no direct correlation between 
the sequence designation of the Internal Revenue Code and the 
organization of a Treasury regulation. For instance, code section
90
1245(c) discusses “Adjustment to Basis,’’ while the interpretive 
discussion of the same topic is found in Treasury regulations section 
1.1245-5.
Frequently, there is a considerable delay between the time a 
particular section is added to the code and the time when the 
Treasury issues proposed or permanent regulations. A case in point 
is found in connection with section 385, which was added by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969. Proposed regulations were not issued until 
March 24, 1980. The proposed regulations have created some protests 
among taxpayers and their representatives. It will, therefore, be 
interesting to observe when final regulations are adopted.
Occasionally, when a major change of a particular code section has 
been enacted and the commissioner of internal revenue subsequently 
issues new regulations, two sets of regulations will appear covering 
the same code section for a time. The regulations currently published 
under section 170, on charitable contributions, are a case in point. 
Due to the major revisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, new 
regulations were issued in 1972 to govern section 170. New regulations 
are distinguishable from those applicable to tax years prior to 1970 
through addition of a capital letter A . That is, Treasury regulations 
section 1.170A-1 applies to years after 1969, Treasury regulations 
section 1.170-1, to years before 1970. To identify current and 
noncurrent regulations, the researcher must be aware of this proce­
dure.
Revenue Rulings
Another interpretive tool used by the Internal Revenue Service to 
apply tax laws to specific situations is the letter ruling. Letter rulings 
generally are official replies given by the IRS to inquiries from 
taxpayers concerning the tax consequences of a proposed transaction. 
If, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, the issue is of 
significant general application, the essence of the reply will be 
published in the form of a revenue ruling. Care is taken to protect 
the identity of the actual taxpayer making the initial request to comply 
with statutory provisions prohibiting the disclosure of information 
obtained from the public.
Initially revenue rulings are published in the weekly Internal 
Revenue Bulletin. The same rulings later appear in the permanently 
bound Cumulative Bulletin, a semiannual publication of the Govern­
ment Printing Office. A typical citation for a revenue ruling would 
appear in the following forms:
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Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-26 I.R.B. 13 
or
Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145
The first citation refers to the 194th revenue ruling published in 1979 
in the twenty-sixth weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin, on page 13. 
The second citation refers to the same revenue ruling; however, in 
this instance its source is the first volume of the 1979 Cumulative 
Bulletin, page 145.
Prior to 1953, rulings by the Internal Revenue Service appeared 
under various titles, such as general counsel’s memorandums 
(G.C.M.), appeals and review memorandums (A.R.M.), internal 
revenue mimeographs (I.R.-Mim.), and tax board memorandums 
(T.B.M.), to name just a few. While some of these rulings still have 
potential value, in Revenue Procedure 67-6, 1967-1 C.B. 576, the 
IRS announced a continuing review program of rulings.7 If the IRS 
revokes or modifies a prior revenue ruling, open tax years can be 
retroactively affected for all taxpayers other than the taxpayer who 
initially requested the ruling. The modification will affect the latter 
party only if a misstatement or omission of material facts was involved. 
In researching a problem, the tax practitioner should consult a current 
status table to avoid the embarrassment of relying on a ruling that 
has been revoked or modified. The current rulings volume (vol. 7) 
of Mertens’ Law o f Federal Income Taxation is particularly helpful 
for this task. The CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter also contains 
a Finding List in the index volume, which lists the current status of 
revenue rulings. The Federal Tax Coordinator 2d features a main 
table of revenue rulings and procedures that are still valid. In 
addition, this tax service includes a separate table listing of obsolete, 
revoked, and superseded rulings and procedures.
Published revenue rulings generally have less force than Treasury 
regulations because they were intended to cover only specific fact 
situations. Consequently, published rulings provide valid precedent 
only if a second taxpayer’s facts are substantially identical. In dealing 
with revenue agents and other Internal Revenue Service personnel, 
however, one might remember that regulations, revenue rulings, and 
acquiesced Tax Court decisions constitute the official policy of the 
service. Thus, an agent is often more easily persuaded by a revenue 
ruling than by a district court or even a circuit court decision. An 
agent’s work must be approved by a supervisor and sometimes by 
the review staff; these persons tend to minimize litigation hazards.
7 Supplemented by Rev. Rul. 67-112, 1967-1 C.R. 381.
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Revenue Procedures
Revenue procedures announce administrative practices followed by 
the Internal Revenue Service. The depreciation guidelines announced 
in Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 are an example. If a taxpayer 
will accept the estimated lives recommended in these revenue 
procedures, as liberalized by the Revenue Act of 1971, the service 
will not challenge the result of their application if proper procedures 
were followed.
Publication and identification methods for revenue procedures are 
identical to those used for revenue rulings. That is, they are initially 
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently in the 
Cumulative Bulletin and are numbered in the sequence of their 
appearance. Only the prefix “Rev. Proc.’’ is different.
Technical Information and News Releases
Until March 30, 1976, technical information releases (T.I.R.s) were 
used by the Internal Revenue Service to disseminate important 
technical information on specific issues. T.I.R.s were not published 
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin but were distributed via a practi­
tioners’ mailing list. In addition, the major tax services published 
them in their current-matters volume. If the IRS decided that a 
T.I.R. had enough general application, it was reissued as a revenue 
procedure. In such an instance, of course, the T. I. R. appeared in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently in the Cumulative 
Bulletin. A T.I.R. usually included a statement indicating the extent 
to which the practitioner could rely on the announcement.
The information formerly contained in T.I.R.s is now published in 
news releases (I.R.s), which are distributed only to the press. The 
reason for discontinuing the T.I.R.s, according to the IRS, was simply 
a matter of cost; the mailing list for T.I.R.s had grown too large. I.R.s 
are announced in the CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter and the 
P-H Federal Taxes via the Finding List in the index volume, and the 
text is published in the current-matters volume.
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda
To further clarify provisions of the code, the Internal Revenue Service 
has furnished interpretive rulings in the form of private letter rulings 
and technical advice memorandums. Private letter rulings are issued 
to taxpayers who formally request advice about the tax consequences 
applicable to a specific business transaction. Such ruling requests
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have been employed frequently by taxpayers to assure themselves of 
a preplanned tax result before they consummate a transaction and as 
a subsequent aid in the preparation of the tax return. The Internal 
Revenue Service may refuse a ruling request; even when a ruling is 
given, it is usually understood that the ruling is limited in application 
to the taxpayer making the request, and IRS personnel are instructed 
not to accept private rulings as precedent when offered by taxpayers 
other than those for whom the rulings were originally rendered. In 
the past, however, private letter rulings have often inspired the 
publication of revenue rulings or revenue procedures describing 
similar situations.
The technical advice memorandum, a special after-the-fact ruling, 
also may be requested from the technical staff of the Internal Revenue 
Service. For example, if a disagreement arises in the course of an 
audit between the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative and the 
revenue agent, either side may request formal technical advice on 
the issue(s) through the district director. If the advice is favorable to 
the taxpayer, IRS personnel usually will comply with the ruling. In 
some instances, such technical advice also has been used as the basis 
for the issuance of a revenue ruling.
During the 70s, the continuation of private rulings was placed in 
serious jeopardy. Through legal action brought by various taxpayers 
against the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of Infor­
mation Act (FOIA), the IRS was ordered to release unpublished 
rulings.8 Some experts thought that the release of such rulings to the 
general public would diminish their usefulness because confidential 
information relating to important prospective business deals could be 
jeopardized.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 inserted section 6110 into the Internal 
Revenue Code, allowing the public disclosure of IRS written deter­
minations issued after October 31, 1976. Under this provision private 
rulings and other written determinations are generally open to public 
inspection once the material has been “sanitized” to remove means 
of identifying the taxpayer requesting the information.
Both CCH and P-H are now publishing looseleaf services that 
contain technical advice memorandums and letter rulings issued by 
the IRS. Although such rulings cannot be used as precedent, they 
help taxpayers and their advisers to determine current IRS thought 
on a particular topic. Publication of rulings has apparently not slowed
8 Tax Analysts and Advocates, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); also Fruehauf Corp., 
369 F.Supp. 108 (D. Mich. 1974), aff'd 6th Cir. 6/9/75.
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requests significantly because the IRS continues to issue thousands 
of these rulings annually.
Judicial Interpretations
In situations in which statutory authority alone does not provide a 
clearcut solution for a particular problem, taxpayers or their advisers 
must consult judicial as well as administrative authority in forming 
an opinion. Judicial interpretations provide varying degrees of prec­
edent, depending upon the nature of the conflict and the jurisdictional 
authority of the court that rendered the opinion.
While a vast majority of all disagreements with the Internal 
Revenue Service are settled on the administrative level, unsettled 
disputes may be litigated by the filing of suit in one of three courts 
of original jurisdiction: the U.S. Tax Court, a U.S. district court, or 
the U.S. Court of Claims. Appeals from both the Tax Court and the 
district courts are heard by the circuit courts of appeals. Appeals 
from a circuit court or the Court of Claims must be directed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The judicial alternatives available to a taxpayer 
can be depicted as in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
Courts of
O rig ina l
Ju risd ic tion
United States 
Tax C ourt
United States 
D is tr ic t C ourts
United States 
C ourt o f C laim s
A ppe lla te
Courts
United States 
C ircu it Courts 
o f Appeals
United States 
Supreme C ourt
After receiving a request for certiorari from either the government 
or the taxpayer, the Supreme Court decides whether or not it should 
review a case. Certiorari is most commonly granted in situations in 
which a conflict already exists between two or more circuit courts of 
appeals and/or the Court of Claims. Sometimes the Supreme Court 
will grant certiorari without a prior conflict if it deems a case to have 
special significance. In order to understand fully the weight of a court
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decision, and the degree to which it sets precedent, an elementary 
understanding of the jurisdiction of each court is essential.
United States Tax Court
The U.S. Tax Court consists of nineteen judges, separate and distinct 
from the Treasury Department, appointed by the President for 
fifteen-year terms. Although the principal office of the Tax Court is 
located in Washington, D.C., the court conducts hearings in most 
large cities in the United States. The Tax Court is organized by 
divisions, which usually consist of only one judge, although they may 
consist of more than one. Commissioners may be assigned to assist 
a judge. Proceedings before the Tax Court may be conducted with 
or without trial; if sufficient facts are stipulated, the assigned judge 
may render an opinion without a formal trial.
After hearing a case, the assigned judge will submit the findings 
of fact and an opinion, in writing, to the chief judge, who then decides 
whether or not the case should be reviewed by the full court. Should 
the chief judge decide that a full review is not necessary, the original 
decision will stand and be entered either as a “regular” or a 
“memorandum” decision. Regular decisions are published by the 
Government Printing Office.
Prior to 1943, the Tax Court was known as the Board of Tax 
Appeals, the decisions of which were published in forty-seven volumes 
covering the period from 1924 to 1942. These volumes are cited as 
the United States Board o f Tax Appeals Reports (B.T.A.). For 
example, 39 B.T.A. 13 refers to the thirty-ninth volume of the Board 
of Tax Appeals Reports, page 13. Beginning with the latter part of 
1942, when Congress changed the name of the body, the proceedings 
have been published as The Tax Court o f the United States Reports 
(T.C.). Thus, an illustrative citation would be 12 T.C. 101. Bound 
volumes of the Tax Court reports are published only by the U.S. 
Government Printing Office.
Tax Court memorandum decisions are reproduced by the govern­
ment in mimeograph form only. However, Commerce Clearing 
H ouse pub lishes m em orandum  decisions in th e ir  Tax C o u rt M em o­
randum Decisions (T.C.M.) series, and Prentice-Hall makes them 
available as the Prentice-Hall Memorandum Decisions (P-H T.C.M.). 
In recent years the Tax Court has handed down more memorandum 
opinions than regular opinions. Memorandum opinions usually in­
volve conclusions that, in the opinion of the chief judge, have been 
well established and require only a delineation of facts. Nevertheless, 
in 1945 Judge Murdock publicly pointed out the precedent value of
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memorandum decisions and acknowledged that they could be cited 
in briefs.9
If, in the opinion of the chief judge, a case contains an unusual 
point of law or one on which considerable disagreement exists among 
the judges of the Tax Court, the chief judge may assign the case to 
the full court. After each judge has had an opportunity to study the 
case, the court meets for an expression of opinions and a vote. In 
such instances it is possible that one or more majority and minority 
opinions will be prepared and that the trial judge—possibly the only 
one to have actually heard the proceedings—could write the minority 
opinion. The majority opinion will be entered as the final decision 
of the Tax Court.
As a general rule, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction rests with the 
determination of deficiencies in income, excess profits, self-employ­
ment, estate, or gift taxes. Specifically excluded are claims for refunds 
if the commisssioner did not first assess a deficiency10 and matters of 
administrative policy.11 Claims for refund must be tried in either a 
district court or the Court of Claims. Thus, in order to bring suit in 
the Tax Court of the United States, a taxpayer must have received 
a notice of deficiency and a so-called ninety-day letter and, subse­
quently, have refused to pay the deficiency.
Some Tax Court transcripts disclose that a “decision has been 
entered under Rule 155’’ (prior to 1974 known as Rule 50). This 
notation signifies that the court has reached a conclusion regarding 
the facts and issues of the case but leaves the computational aspects 
of the decision to the opposing parties. Both parties will subsequently 
submit to the court their versions of the refund or deficiency 
computation. If both parties agree on the computation, no further 
argument is necessary. In the event of disagreement, the court will 
reach its decision on the basis of the data presented by each party. 
Data submitted or arguments heard under Rule 155 are usually not 
a part of the trial transcript.
As part of Public Law 91-172, Congress enacted IRC section 7463, 
which authorizes the creation of special trial procedures within the 
Tax Court for disputes involving $5,000 or less.12 A taxpayer may
9 J. Edgar Murdock, ‘“What Has the Tax Court of the United States Been Doing?” 
American Bar Association Journal (June 1945): 298-99.
10Scaife Co., 47 B.T.A. 964 (1942).
11 Cleveland House Brewing Co., 1 B.T.A. 87 (1924).
12The $5,000 limitation includes the initial tax contested, potential additional 
amounts, and penalties, but excludes interest.
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request trial before the Small Tax Case Division by executing Form 
2 of the Tax Court and paying a filing fee of $10. Even this fee may 
be waived if in the opinion of the court the petitioner is unable to 
make the payment. Legal counsel is not required, and taxpayers may 
represent themselves. Trial procedures are conducted on an informal 
basis with the filing of briefs permitted but not required. Only an 
informal record of the trial proceedings is prepared, and every 
decision is final, making an appeal from a decision of the Small Tax 
Case Division of the Tax Court-impossible. Decisions of this division 
may not be cited as precedent in other cases.
Acquiescence policy In some instances the commissioner of internal 
revenue will publicly announce an “acquiescence” or “nonacquies­
cence” to a regular Tax Court decision. This policy does not encompass 
Tax Court memorandum decisions or decisions of other courts. In 
announcing acquiescence, the commissioner publicly declares agree­
ment with a conclusion reached by the Tax Court. This does not 
necessarily mean that the commissioner agrees with the reasoning 
used by the court in reaching the conclusion, but only that in the 
future, unless otherwise announced, the Internal Revenue Service 
will dispose of similar disputes in a manner consistent with that 
established in the acquiesced case. In those situations in which the 
Tax Court has ruled against the government, the commissioner may 
wish to express nonacquiescence to inform taxpayers that similar 
disputes will continue to be contested in the future.
Acquiescence and nonacquiescence are announced in the weekly 
Internal Revenue Bulletin and are republished in the semiannual 
Cumulative Bulletin. In addition, citators of the major tax services 
indicate whether the commissioner has acquiesced or refused to 
acquiesce in a particular decision, giving specific reference to the 
Cumulative Bulletin in which the commissioner’s announcement can 
be found. If the tax adviser plans to rely on a specific acquiesced 
case, it is important that he or she check the original announcement, 
because it is possible that only a partial acquiescence exists. For 
example, a single Tax Court case may involve multiple issues, and 
the commissioner may acquiesce in only one of those issues. An 
interesting example of this is found in The Friedlander Corporation, 
25 T.C. 70 (1955), in which the Tax Court considered three issues. 
The commissioner remained silent on the first issue, expressed 
nonacquiescence to the second, and acquiesced to the third.13
13 Cumulative List of Announcements Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 1972- 
2C.B. 2.
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The commissioner’s acquiescence may also be withdrawn with 
retroactive effect. For example, in Caulkins, 1 T.C. 656 (1943), the 
commissioner initially published a nonacquiescence but later changed 
this to acquiescence when the court of appeals sustained the Tax 
Court.14 Eleven years later another commissioner reinstated the 
initial nonacquiescence.15 A taxpayer who claimed reliance on Caulk­
ins before the acquiescence was retroactively withdrawn found no 
relief when, in Dixon, the Supreme Court upheld the commissioner’s 
right to do so.16
United States District Court
The federal judicial system is divided into twelve judicial circuits, as 
illustrated in figure 4.2, page 100. Eleven of the circuits are numbered; 
the twelfth covers Washington, D.C. Each of the twelve circuits is 
further divided into districts. At least one district judge is assigned 
to each federal district. Depending upon need, however, two or more 
federal district judges may hear cases in any district. Taxpayers may 
bring suit in a federal district court only after they have paid a tax, 
either with the return or as a deficiency assessment, and have 
processed a request for refund.17 A U.S. district court is the only 
court in which a taxpayer can request a jury trial in a tax dispute. 
Published proceedings of the federal district courts can usually be 
found in the Federal Supplement reporter series, published by West 
Publishing Company. However, some district court opinions (like 
Tax Court memorandum decisions) are apparently never officially 
published in a primary source such as the Federal Supplement, and 
a researcher must consult a secondary source, such as United States 
Tax Cases (CCH) or American Federal Tax Reports (P-H) for the text 
of a district court decision.
United States Court of Claims
The U.S. Court of Claims was created by Congress in 1855 to dispose 
of claims against the U.S. government. The Court of Claims is a 
single court consisting of a chief judge and four associate judges 
appointed by the President. By statute, the court is required to hold
14See T.C. 1943-24-11581, 1943-1 C.B. 28; see T.C. 1944-24-11907, 1944-1 C.B. 5.
13Rev. Rul. 115-136, 1955-1 C.B. 7.
16W. Palmer Dixon, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
17Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 7422.
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an annual term in Washington, D.C.18 Most of the hearings are held 
by fifteen commissioners who report their findings to the judges. The 
prerequisites for filing suit in the Court of Claims are identical with 
those applicable to the district court; that is, the petitioners must 
have paid a tax and subsequently filed a request for refund that the 
commissioner rejected. The proceedings of the Court of Claims can 
be found in the Court o f Claims Reporter series published by the 
U.S. Government Printing Office. In addition, West’s Federal Re­
porter includes all Court of Claims cases between 1929 and 1932 and 
after 1959. From 1932 to 1960 the Court of Claims cases were 
published in the Federal Supplement series (West Publishing Com­
pany).
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit, the states and U.S. 
territories are geographically partitioned into judicial circuits num­
bered from one through eleven (see figure 4.2).19 Decisions of the 
Tax Court and a district court may be appealed by either the taxpayer 
or the government to the circuit court in which the taxpayer resides. 
Hearings before a circuit court are conducted by a panel of three 
judges.
Depending on need and policies within each particular circuit, 
federal district judges may be asked to serve on a panel during a 
session. Upon request by any circuit judge, regardless of whether or 
not the judge was a member of the trial panel, the full circuit court 
(that is, all the judges in that circuit) may review the decision of a 
trial panel. The proceedings of the circuit courts are published by 
West Publishing Company in the Federal Reporter (1st and 2d 
series).
United States Supreme Court
Final appeals from the Court of Claims or from a circuit court of 
appeals rest with the Supreme Court. As previously explained, appeal 
requires a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court may or may 
not grant. Supreme Court decisions are of special importance because 
they constitute the final judicial authority in tax matters. The Supreme
18United States Code Annotated, Title 28, sec. 174 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co., 1968).
19The eleventh circuit was created by a division of the fifth circuit effective July 1, 
1981 (P.L. 96-452).
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Court decisions can be found in any one of three publications: the 
United States Supreme Court Reports, lawyers’ edition (L.Ed.), 
Lawyers’ Co-Operative Publishing Company; Supreme Court Re­
porter (S.Ct.), West Publishing Company; the United States Reports 
(U.S.), Government Printing Office.
Special Tax Reporter Series
All tax decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts 
of appeals, the Court of Claims, federal district courts, and some 
state courts are separately published by Commerce Clearing House 
in the United States Tax Cases (U.S. Tax Cas.) series and by Prentice- 
Hall in the American Federal Tax Reports (A.F.T.R. and A.F.T.R. 2d) 
series. These two special judicial reporter series provide a tax 
practitioner with two major advantages: First, by collecting only tax 
cases in one reporter series, it is economically possible for most tax 
practitioners to acquire at least one complete set of all judicial 
authority dealing with tax problems; second, the space required to 
store one complete tax reporter series is minimal when compared 
with the many volumes that would otherwise have to be maintained 
were all judicial tax decisions readily available (tax cases would be 
mixed among other civil and criminal proceedings).
Tax Court decisions, which comprise a separate volume, are not 
included in either the U.S. Tax Cas. or A.F.T.R. series. In addition 
to the Tax Court reporter series published annually by the Govern­
ment Printing Office, however, both CCH and P-H provide a current 
looseleaf service that offers all regular and memorandum Tax Court 
decisions in an expeditious manner. If these looseleaf volumes are 
retained, it is unnecessary to purchase the government (T.C.) series 
to obtain a complete set. Most practitioners, however, make that 
purchase anyway in order to obtain bound volumes of the regular Tax 
Court decisions. As noted earlier, unlike the government, both 
Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish bound volumes 
of the Tax Court memorandum decisions.
Although the duplication of a single judicial proceeding in several 
court reporter series has the advantages noted earlier, that same 
duplication creates the problem of multiple citations. The extent of 
the present duplication is shown in exhibits 4.2 and 4.3, pages 104 
and 106. In preparing tax communications, a writer can never be 
certain of which reporter series is most readily available to the reader; 
therefore, it is difficult to know which series should be cited. In 
order to standardize citation presentation, most formal publications
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have accepted the practice of presenting at least an initial reference 
to the “official” or “standard” reporter series. If other (secondary) 
citations are also given, they generally follow the standard citation. 
Thus, one might properly cite the decision in Harris as Harris v. 
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950), 39 A.F.T.R. 1002, 50-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. ¶10,786. Obviously, additional secondary references could be 
added to the two in the above illustration.
The Citator
The tax researcher who must consider judicial authority has a most 
useful tool at his or her disposal in a citator, which is simply a 
compilation of cross-references to judicial decisions. Following the 
initial entry of each judicial proceeding in an alphabetical sequence, 
a citator includes later cross-references to additional citations—that 
is, to other cases—that in some way contain a reference to the initial 
entry. To illustrate, assume that only five judicial decisions have ever 
been rendered (those being Able, Baker, Charlie, Daley, and Evert, 
in chronological order). Assume further that the court in Baker made 
some mention of the Able decision; that the court in Daley made 
some reference to the decisions in Able and Charlie, but not to that 
in Baker; and that the court in Evert made reference only to the 
decision in Baker. Given these assumptions a complete citator could 
be prepared as follows:
Able (initial citation)
. . . Baker (cross-reference to page in Baker that “cites” Able)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley that “cites” Able)
Baker (initial citation)
. . . Evert (cross-reference to page in Evert that “cites” Baker)
Charlie (initial citation)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley that “cites” Charlie)
Daley (initial citation only)
Evert (initial citation only)
Obviously, there are thousands of judicial decisions and many 
thousands of cross-references. Were there no citators (or other 
equivalent data retrieval systems), it would be virtually impossible 
to locate much of the pertinent judicial authority on most tax 
questions. With citators available, the task is at least feasible. To 
illustrate, consider the problem of interpreting what the words 
“ordinary” and “necessary” mean as they are used in code sections 
162 and 212. This task was undertaken by the Supreme Court in
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1933 in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Since that 1933 
decision, Welch v. Helvering has been “cited” in more than 350 
subsequent court decisions. A citator greatly facilitates the task of 
locating any or all of these decisions, which just may offer additional 
perspective on the meaning of the words “ordinary” and “necessary, ” 
because it identifies a reasonable set of cases to examine further. In 
most instances, of course, the list of cases suggested by a citator will 
be much smaller than the 350 noted here.
Using the Citator To demonstrate the methodology applied in 
searching for pertinent judicial decisions, assume that a tax researcher 
has somehow identified a potentially important case with a primary 
citation. If that practitioner has only the U.S. Tax Cas. or A.F.T.R. 
reporter series available, an “equivalent” secondary citation must first 
be found before the decision he or she is interested in reviewing can 
be read. If the A.F.T.R. series is available, the practitioner should 
begin with the P-H Citator; if the U.S. Tax Cas. series is available, 
the practitioner should begin with the CCH Citator. Each citator 
will give the secondary citation for its own reporter series only. The 
case “names” (technically called style) are arranged in alphabetical 
sequence in both citators. However, the P-H Citator consists of five 
separate volumes, whereas the CCH Citator consists of only one. 
Thus, in working with P-H materials, tax researchers may have to 
consult more than one volume i f  they want to locate all of the 
subsequent decisions that have cited the initial entry. The number 
of volumes to be consulted will depend on the year the initial case 
was heard. If a case was first tried sometime between 1796 and 1941, 
the researcher using the P-H series must consult all three volumes 
of the A.F.T.R. series, volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and the 
looseleaf volume for current citations. On the other hand, if the case 
being examined was first tried sometime between 1948 and 1954, the 
researcher would consult only volume 3 of the A.F.T.R. series, 
volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and the current (looseleaf) 
volume. Exhibit 4.4 compares the CCH Citator with the P-H Citator; 
exhibit 4.5 cross-references the P-H Citator to other judicial reporters.
Exhibit 4.4
Key to Citator Services
1796-1941 1941-1948 1948-1954 1954-1977 Since 1977
Prentice-Hall 1st Series 
vol. 1
1st Series 
vol. 2
1st Series 
vol. 3
2d Series 
vol. 1
Loose­
leaf
Commerce Clearing 
House Only one looseleaf volume covering all dates
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Any meaningful comparison of these two citator services must go 
beyond the apparent convenience factor of working with one CCH 
volume as opposed to five P-H volumes because the usefulness of 
either citator becomes a function of what the researcher wants to 
find. Should he desire to obtain a brief judicial history of a case, the 
CCH Citator is a handy research tool. For example, assume that the 
researcher wants to trace the history of Germantown Trust Co. This 
case came to the researcher’s attention in a tax periodical, where it 
was cited as 309 U.S. 304 (1940). A simple check in the one-volume 
CCH Citator, which is arranged in alphabetical order, discloses that 
Germantown Trust Co. was originally tried by the Board of Tax 
Appeals in 1938 and entered as a memorandum decision; this decision 
was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and in turn was 
reversed by the Supreme Court (see exhibit 4.6, page 110). In 
addition, the CCH Citator discloses that Germantown Trust Co. has 
subsequently been cited in over twenty additional cases, most recently 
in 1973. All of this information may or may not be pertinent to the 
researcher’s tax problem. Finally, of course, the CCH Citator gives 
the cross-reference of the case in the U.S. Tax Cas. series.
To gather this same information through the use of the P-H Citator, 
the researcher would proceed along the following lines (see exhibits 
4.7 through 4.11, pages 111-115). The original citation, Germantown 
Trust Co., 309 U.S. 304 (1940), discloses the decision year; thus, the 
researcher turns to volume 1 of the P-H Citator (1796-1941) to learn 
that the Board of Tax Appeals was the court of original jurisdiction, 
which tried the case twice. Furthermore, the P-H Citator shows that 
the B.T.A. decision was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals and that the text of the Supreme Court decision may be 
found at 23 A.F.T.R. 1084. Whether that decision sustained or 
reversed the circuit court cannot be determined from the citator. 
Additional cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited are 
listed, but, in order to compile a more complete listing, all five citator 
volumes must be consulted, that is, volumes 2 and 3 of the A.F.T.R. 
series, volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and finally the looseleaf 
edition covering cases since 1977.
It should be apparent that the CCH Citator is the more convenient 
source for locating a particular case in order to determine its original 
trial court, to trace its history through the appeals courts, and finally 
to compile a summary of cases in which the decision was subsequently 
cited. However, in the case of Germantown, the multiple-volume P- 
H Citator, in the aggregrate, discloses a larger number of cases in 
which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited than does the one-
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Exhibit 4.6 
CCH Citator Page
110
Exhibit 4.7
P-H Citator—Volume 1 for A.F.T.R. Series (1919-1941)
111
Exhibit 4.8
P-H Citator—Volume 2 for A.F.T.R. Series (1941-1948)
112
Exhibit 4.9
P-H Citator—Volume 3 for A.F.T.R. Series (1948-1954)
113
Exhibit 4.10
P-H Citator—Volume 1 for A.F.T.R.—2d Series (1954-1977)
114
Exhibit 4.11
P-H Citator— Loose-Leaf Volume for A.F.T.R.—2d Series (Since 1977)
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volume CCH Citator. Furthermore, the P-H Citator features several 
other advantages not to be found in the CCH Citator, which may be 
of considerable importance to the careful tax researcher. Most of 
these advantages will assist the tax adviser in the process of assessing 
potential tax authority; thus, a detailed discussion of these desirable 
features will be deferred until the following chapter.
Editorial Interpretations
The sheer bulk and complexity of the tax statutes make it humanly 
impossible for any individual to understand all of the rules and 
regulations pertinent to a tax practice. Fortunately, tax practitioners 
have at their disposal a variety of editorial interpretations, ranging 
from extensive looseleaf tax services to brief explanations in profes­
sional journals and pamphlets, much of which is invaluable to an 
efficient tax practice.
Tax Services
Perhaps the most significant assistance is available through a sub­
scription to one or more major tax services. Tax services are designed 
to help locate statutory, administrative, and judicial authority quickly 
and to give helpful editorial interpretations of those primary author­
ities. The various tax services constantly update the information they 
provide. Subscribers are regularly informed of changes in the statute 
or regulations, new court decisions and revenue rulings, and other 
pertinent matters. Nothing is more embarrassing to a practitioner 
than to plan a tax strategy with an outdated authority. Current 
subscription tax services are a tremendous time-saving device that 
the tax practitioner can ill afford to be without.
A practitioner usually begins the research process with the service 
with which he or she is most familiar. Dependence on one service, 
however, can become detrimental. Each service is compiled and 
maintained by editors with divergent approaches to solving the same 
tax problem. Consequently, each service develops a distinct interpre­
tive personality. While the salesperson representing the publisher 
may believe that the product is adequate by itself, the experienced 
researcher will discover that, because of their unique features, most 
tax services really complement each other.
The key to utilizing each tax service effectively lies in the mastery 
of its index systems. Access to materials in individual services may 
be gained through code section numbers, topical references, or both.
The individuality of the 1980 indexes of at least two frequently
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used tax services can be demonstrated by the following situation. A 
double bass player in the local symphony orchestra is unable to 
transport her instrument by means of public transportation and 
therefore uses her personal automobile to cart the string bass to her 
various engagements. A question arises about the deductibility of 
transportation expenses for her instrument.
If the tax researcher begins the inquiry with the topical index of 
the Prentice-Hall tax service, then, under the key word entry 
“musicians,” the researcher will find the subheading “instruments” 
and a further sub-subheading, “transportation of,” with a reference 
to paragraph 11,407(10). Paragraph 11,407(10) presents a detailed 
discussion entitled “Transportation of baggage, equipment or uni­
forms.” The discussion refers to Revenue Ruling 63-100, which 
allowed a musician to deduct transportation costs because the instru­
ment was too bulky to be carried otherwise. However, Revenue 
Ruling 75-380, which revokes Revenue Ruling 63-100, is also men­
tioned; it declares that, based on the Supreme Court decision in 
Fausner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973), since January 1, 1976, only transpor­
tation expenses in excess of normal commuting expenses are de­
ductible.
If the researcher begins with the Commerce Clearing House index, 
he or she will find three subheadings under the entry “musicians,” 
namely, “business expenses,” “traveling expenses,” and “withholding 
of tax on wages.” None of the references direct the researcher to a 
discussion involving the deductibility of transportation expenses for 
a musical instrument. Although the Commerce Clearing House 
editors chose not to include in their index transportation expenses 
specifically referenced to musical instruments, the tax service does 
include an equally detailed discussion of Revenue Rulings 63-100 
and 75-380 as well as the Fausner case at paragraph 1354.2501. To 
locate that discussion, the researcher must start with one of two key 
words, “tools” or “transportation.” Should the researcher begin with 
the key word “tools,” the subheading “transportation expenses” 
directs the researcher to paragraph 1354.25. The same result is 
achieved if the researcher commences with the key word “transpor­
tation,” since the subheading “tools” also refers the user to paragraph 
1354.25, with the needed discussion following at paragraph 1354.2501.
The foregoing example is not designed to recommend one particular 
index and tax service over another; its purpose is to demonstrate the 
trial-and-error approach necessary to locate pertinent authority. 
Furthermore, it also demonstrates the advisability of having more 
than one tax service available.
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In addition to variations in index systems, each tax service is known 
for specific features that may prove to be helpful, depending on the 
research problem in question. A summary of cost, organization, and 
techniques of supplementation used by major tax service publishers 
can be found in exhibit 4.12, page 120.
The following general comments outline some of the features of 
each service. Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish 
major tax services annually in looseleaf binders under the titles 
Standard Federal Tax Reporter and Federal Taxes respectively. In 
many ways, these two services are similar. Both publications follow 
the organization of the Internal Revenue Code. Each major division 
begins with a preliminary discussion introducing the subject in 
general terms; subdivisions include exact quotations of the code 
sections and the related Treasury regulations. In addition, each 
subdivision contains interpretive explanations by the editorial staff 
and brief synopses of related court decisions, revenue rulings, and 
revenue procedures. Each service also features a separate volume 
containing the most recent developments regarding statutory, ad­
ministrative, and judicial authority.
Mertens’ tax service, entitled Law o f Federal Income Taxation 
(Chicago: Callaghan and Co.), is organized on a topical basis and, 
therefore, does not follow the sequence of the code.20 The separate 
looseleaf volumes of Mertens’ service can be divided into two 
groupings: (1) the treatise volumes, each volume containing scholarly 
discussions of the various tax topics (statutory, administrative, and 
judicial authorities are cited in footnote form) and (2) volumes 
containing the Internal Revenue Code, a code commentary, Treasury 
regulations, and various rulings and procedures. Although the code 
commentary volumes do not feature complete texts of the committee 
reports, the editorial summaries do provide historical background 
and suggest the apparent congressional intent for many sections. The 
ruling volumes comprise revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and 
miscellaneous announcements beginning with 1954. These volumes 
embody an efficient index system that, in addition to showing the 
current status of revenue rulings, assists in identifying all rulings 
issued in connection with a particular Internal Revenue Code section. 
Because of its encyclopedic approach to the subject matter, the 
Mertens service is especially helpful to the individual with limited
20See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law o f Federal Gift and Estate Taxation (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Co., 1969).
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knowledge of the topic to be researched. Due to its scholarly 
excellence, Mertens is cited in court opinions.
Perhaps one weakness of Mertens is the fact that revised and new 
material is organized on a cumulative basis and appears in the front 
of each volume. This makes it somewhat cumbersome to locate the 
most recent developments on any particular topic. Furthermore, the 
revision process of Mertens occurs less frequently than that of 
Commerce Clearing House or Prentice-Hall.
Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (13 vols.), by Jacob 
Rabkin and Mark H. Johnson (New York: Matthew Bender), is a 
looseleaf tax service organized by subject rather than by code section. 
For example, all material dealing with partnerships is found in one 
cumulative discussion. The Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury 
regulations are published in separate volumes. One of the outstanding 
features of the Rabkin and Johnson service is the availability of the 
legislative committee reports, which are interspersed in the Internal 
Revenue Code volumes.
The Research Institute of America (RIA) publishes Federal Tax 
Coordinator 2d, a compilation of professional tax research. The 
service is divided into twenty-six separate chapters, each identified 
by a lettered tab card. Each division begins with an explanation of 
all problems in a given area, supported with citations to appropriate 
authorities. Next is the text of the applicable code section and 
Treasury regulation. Explanations of latest developments appear 
immediately following the verbatim reprints of the code and regu­
lations. Editorial explanations include illustrations, planning points, 
tax traps, and appropriate recommendations. In addition to a number 
of helpful aids, such as the weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin and 
Internal Revenue Service audit manuals, the Federal Tax Coordinator 
2d contains a “Parallel Reference Table,” which references court 
decisions published in the United States Reports (U.S.), the Federal 
Reporter, the Federal Supplement to the American Federal Tax 
Reports (first and second series), and the United States Tax Cases. 
Since Research Institute of America does not publish its own judicial 
reporter series, the parallel reference table allows the researcher to 
use the Federal Tax Coordinator 2d in conjunction with either the 
United States Tax Cases (CCH) or the American Federal Tax Reports 
(P-H).
The Bureau of National Affairs publishes a portfolio tax service 
entitled Tax Management. At present the total service consists of 
some 300 portfolios that range in length from fifty to 200 pages. Each 
portfolio deals with a specific tax topic. The organization of the
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material within each portfolio follows a standard pattern. Part A 
contains a detailed analysis of the subject matter. This analysis is 
written in narrative form, with extensive footnotes to statutory, 
administrative, and judicial authority. The format of discussion lends 
itself to research progressing from general backgrounds through 
specific problems within the topic under consideration. Part B 
provides helpful working papers, appropriate forms, and illustrations, 
and part C includes a bibliography of related resource material.
Previously noted were two special judicial reporter series, namely, 
the Commerce Clearing House U.S. Tax Cas. series and the Prentice- 
Hall A.F.T.R. series. To some extent, the cases appearing in these 
series are “selected” by editorial staffs. In addition, the editors 
prepare headnotes for each case published. Headnotes enumerate 
the issue(s) contained in each case in brief form and give the court’s 
conclusion. Thus, a researcher may gain a quick understanding of the 
general subject matter of each case included in either series by simply 
scanning the headnotes. The researcher must remember, however, 
that the headnotes are in effect editorial comments and not an integral 
part of any official opinion.
The decision to subscribe to only one tax service or to several must 
be made on the basis of how many services a practice can support. 
However, the tax adviser should keep in mind that, just as two heads 
are better than one, two or more tax services can increase effective­
ness. The real benefit of any tax service lies in the time-saving factor 
that allows the tax practitioner to quickly find a correct answer to a 
tax question. However, time constraints in a tax practice make it 
impossible to consult all available services on every problem. Antic­
ipation of which service will most efficiently direct research to an 
acceptable solution comes only with experience.
Books
The economics of a tax practice demand that the researcher find 
solutions quickly and without excessive cost to the client. Conse­
quently, a tax adviser cannot afford the luxury of pulling a full-length 
book from the shelf and spending a day or two pursuing the subject 
in leisurely fashion. However, some treatises on specific tax topics 
have attained significant reputations among tax practitioners. A few 
of the more often cited works are Federal Income Taxation o f 
Corporations and Shareholders, fourth edition (Boston: Warren, 
Gorham & Lamont, 1979), by Boris I. Bittker and James E. Eustice; 
Partnership Taxation, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill/
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Shepard’s Citation, 1976), by Arthur B. Willis; Federal Taxation o f 
Partnerships and Partners (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 
1978), by William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, and Robert L. 
Whitmire; and Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations Filing 
Consolidated Returns (New York: Matthew Bender, 1976), by Herbert 
J. Lerner et al. Their special status implies that they contain 
information discussed and summarized in a fashion not elsewhere 
available.
Numerous tax institutes and seminars are held annually throughout 
the United States. At such institutes, tax topics are discussed, and 
papers are presented that usually deal with significant current issues. 
Three very popular tax institutes—the New York University Tax 
Institute, the University of Southern California Tax Institute, and 
the Tulane Tax Institute—publish their proceedings in annual bound 
volumes. Because of the emphasis on current and complex topics, tax 
researchers may benefit from consulting such materials.
Tax Magazines
More than a dozen magazines are currently published dealing 
exclusively with taxation and providing valuable assistance to the tax 
practitioner. Their formats range from those appealing to the general 
tax practitioner to those specializing in a particular field of taxation. 
For example, the Journal o f Taxation features regular departments 
dealing with corporations, estates, trusts and gifts, exempt institu­
tions, partnerships, and so on. The Tax Adviser, published monthly 
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, is another 
popular tax journal for the general practitioner.
To locate pertinent articles in the periodical tax literature, a 
researcher may consult the cumulative indexes provided in the 
various issues. A more efficient means of locating journal material is 
through CCH Tax Articles, a three-volume service including a topical 
index, a code section index, and an author’s index. The P-H tax 
service index volume also contains an “Index to Tax Articles’’ that is 
organized by topic using the P-H paragraph index system. In 1975 
Warren, Gorham & Lamont published an Index to Federal Tax 
Articles compiled by Gersham Goldstein. The initial three-volume 
publication will be periodically updated with additional volumes. 
This service features both a topical and an author index. For a 
complete list of available tax magazines that may assist the tax 
researcher, see exhibit 4.13, page 126.
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Tax Newsletters
Most tax newsletters are published weekly and are, therefore, 
excellent sources of the most recent developments. They keep the 
tax adviser in touch with the dynamics of the tax laws. Occasionally, 
in scanning a newsletter, a practitioner will spot an item that has 
relevance to a client’s problem. More often, however, the newsletter 
simply provides the practitioner with ideas that may be recalled and 
used in later work. See exhibit 4.14, page 130, for a comprehensive 
listing of the available publications.
How many technical publications a tax adviser should purchase is, 
of course, an individual decision. Many publications duplicate infor­
mation, and reading all of them would demand too much of a tax 
adviser’s valuable time. The decision must, therefore, be based on 
the size and nature of the practice. The larger the firm, the more 
varied the personalities, and the greater the areas of specialization 
represented, the greater the variety of subscriptions required.
Computer-Assisted Tax Research
In the 70s, Mead Data Central developed a computer storage and 
retrieval system marketed under the trade name LEXIS, which 
contains source materials needed in tax research. A recent addition 
to the field of computerized legal and tax research is West Publishing 
Company’s WESTLAW/System II. The systems are useful in situa­
tions in which authority is scarce and a manual search may overlook 
appropriate authority. The inherent speed of the computer also makes 
computer research invaluable in situations in which authority is 
voluminous and access must be obtained quickly. When used by a 
knowledgeable tax practitioner, the computer search systems can be 
thorough and accurate.
The researcher subscribing to the LEXIS or WESTLAW data base 
communicates with the computer through a terminal (possibly in­
stalled in the researcher’s office) that is connected via telephone lines 
to the central computer. Access to the information stored in the 
computer memory is accomplished through “key-words-in-context.’’ 
The researcher must select the words (or phrases) likely to be found 
in the original text of any authority that might be pertinent to the 
problem at hand. The computer scans all of the documents in its file 
and indicates via the terminal video screen the number of documents 
it has that include the selected words. The user may then narrow or 
expand the original key-word selection, depending on the computer
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response. If key words are used that are too common, the computer 
simply will have too many entries to justify looking at each of them. 
If key words are used that are too restrictive, the computer will 
overlook authority that may be pertinent to the problem. For 
example, if the researcher enters only the words “personal residence” 
and “sale of,” the computer would be likely to locate 500 to 1,000 
citations that contain those common words. In order to reduce the 
number of documents to be examined, the researcher might add the 
specific phrase “taxpayer 65 or over” and may find that this addition 
reduces the number of available documents substantially. Comple­
menting this request with “primary residence” may bring the number 
of applicable documents down to an even more manageable size. 
When the search has been sufficiently narrowed, the complete text 
of actual documents can then be retrieved on the video screen and, 
if necessary, printed out in hard copy (provided the terminal contains 
a printer). The critical difference between a computer search and a 
manual search is in the key words. Successful retrieval in the 
computer system depends on the correct identification of key words 
actually used in a tax authority; in the manual system it depends on 
identification of the key word selected by the preparer of an index. 
Nevertheless, experience with one system is usually helpful in the 
other.
Exhibit 4.15 presents a summary of the basic features, as they 
relate to tax research, found in either LEXIS or WESTLAW. 
However, LEXIS and WESTLAW are not exclusively tax research 
systems but have much broader capabilities. Basically, they are 
designed to perform research in most legal areas; WESTLAW, for 
example, contains Shepard’s citations. The LEXIS system has addi­
tional features that may be of importance to accountants. Through its 
computer, the accounting data banks of the AICPA National Auto­
mated Accounting Research System (NAARS) can be accessed, 
allowing the user to retrieve information on over 4,000 corporate 
annual reports, extracts from selected proxy statements, statements 
of auditing standards, and accounting series releases issued by the 
AICPA, the SEC, the APB, and the FASB.
Ultrafiche
Maintaining a complete tax library often requires expensive office 
space. To partially alleviate the space problem, Commerce Clearing 
House has employed an ultrafiche technique to reproduce up to 1,700 
pages on a single four-by-six-inch transparent plastic card. These
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cards are read on viewers, similar to those used with microfilm, which 
may be equipped with printing capacity. At the present time the 
following texts have been reproduced by CCH using this technique:
Original Publisher
Board o f Tax Appeals Report (1924-1942) GPO
United States Tax Court Reports (1943-present) GPO 
Cumulative Bulletins (1919-present) GPO
United States Tax Cases (1913-present) CCH
Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (1943-present) CCH
This entire collection of ultrafiche plastic plates is filed in CCH 
looseleaf binders and requires less than one foot of shelf space.
133
5
. . .  as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for 
interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence 
may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody 
is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can 
ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, 
and which all collectively create.
JUDGE LEARNED HAND
Assessing and 
Applying Authority
After a tax researcher has located authority that seems pertinent to 
a given problem, the important task of assessing that material begins. 
The researcher’s aim is to arrive at a course of action that can be 
confidently communicated to the client along with identification of 
the risks and costs accompanying it.
Locating appropriate authority for a particular tax problem is only 
half the battle. The technical jargon of many portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code and Treasury regulations requires the tax adviser to 
read and comprehend unusually complex sentences in order to 
determine congressional intent; other portions of the code and 
regulations hinge upon deceptively simple words or phrases whose 
definitions may be debatable. Furthermore, while available secondary 
authorities or such interpretive sources as Treasury regulations, 
revenue rulings, or court decisions may be more comprehensible 
than are primary statutory authorities, they are frequently less 
authoritative.
The researcher faces another, more serious hurdle when authorities 
conflict. The applicable law may be questionable due to conflicts 
between statutes or between interpretations of those statutes, be­
tween the IRS interpretations and various federal courts, and among
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the courts themselves at various levels of jurisdiction. Finally, a 
researcher may be unable to locate any authority at all on a particular 
problem.
In attempting to assess authority and apply it to complex practice 
problems, the researcher may encounter any one of four fundamen­
tally different situations. The first involves clear, concise tax law that 
could be applied if the researcher were able to gather additional facts 
from the client. In two other circumstances, the adviser may be in 
possession of clearly established facts but find (1) conflicting statutes 
or (2) conflicting interpretations of those statutes. Finally, a researcher 
may encounter a fourth situation in which existing tax law is 
incomplete or inapplicable, requiring that issues be resolved through 
interpolation from related authorities and application of creative 
thinking.
The Law Is Clear—the Facts Are Uncertain
A tax adviser frequently finds it difficult to reach a conclusion and to 
make a recommendation more because of insufficient knowledge of 
the facts in the case than because of confusion in the applicable rules. 
In many situations, the biggest single problem is gathering sufficient 
evidence to support the taxpayer’s contention that he or she be 
granted the tax treatment clearly authorized in a specific provision 
of the Internal Revenue Code.
To illustrate this kind of problem, assume that a client, Mr. Jerry 
Hill, includes what he describes as a “$16,000 casualty loss’’ with the 
information he provides for the filing of his income tax return. A 
cursory line of questioning by his tax adviser reveals that the loss is 
claimed for a handwoven Indian wall carpet that, the client claims, 
was chewed and clawed to bits by a stray dog. Mr. Hill explains that 
while on vacation last summer, he left his residence in the care of his 
housekeeper. Apparently one day the housekeeper neglected to close 
a door securely and a stray dog wandered into the house. Upon the 
Hills’s return from vacation, they were told the following story. 
A ttracted  by strange noises, th e  h o u sek eep er en te re d  th e  study  and 
found a dog gnawing and tearing on the wall rug. As the housekeeper 
entered the room, the dog turned and ran growling from the house. 
Although not certain of it, the housekeeper reported noticing foam 
around the dog’s mouth. Later a neighbor said that a rabid dog had 
been seen roaming the neighborhood. The housekeeper, who cared 
for Hill’s own dogs, stated that the dog discovered in the study was 
not one of Mr. Hill’s. Mr. Hill checked with the city dogcatcher
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concerning the reported sighting of a mad dog. He was, however, 
unable to confirm any such report with the dogcatcher. He did not 
check with the police department.
Through a little research, the tax adviser is convinced that in order 
for Mr. Hill to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under section 
165(a) he must satisfy the following specific requirements:
1. The loss must have been sudden and unexpected (Matheson v. 
Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1931)).
2. The loss could not constitute a mysterious disappearance (Paul 
Bakewell, Jr., 23 T.C. 803 (1955)).
3. The amount of the loss deduction is limited to fair market value 
(FMV) immediately before the casualty occurred, less the FMV 
immediately after the casualty, less any insurance recovery, and 
less a $100 floor (Treas. regs. sec. 1.165-7(b)).
4. The loss could not be attributable to the taxpayer’s own dog 
(J . R. Dyer, T.C.M. 1961-705).
At this point a tax adviser would be faced with two alternatives: 
accept the client’s statement at face value and claim the deduction, 
or suggest that the client accumulate additional substantiation of the 
loss if he desires to claim the deduction. An adviser following the 
former alternative is simply postponing the collection of evidence 
until a possible audit by the IRS, since the presence of a rather 
sizable casualty loss on a client’s tax return undoubtedly would 
increase the risk of an audit. Furthermore, it might be self-defeating 
to defer the collection of evidence because two or three years from 
now individuals who could render statements on matters now fresh 
in their minds may be unavailable, or they may not recall necessary 
details. Furthermore, helpful police records may be destroyed. Since 
the taxpayer may be unaware of what is needed to substantiate the 
loss deduction, he may, in the meantime, dispose of important 
evidence, such as the ruined rug.
If a tax adviser pursues the second alternative, the client should 
be presented with a list of instructions, including the suggestion 
that he accumulate the necessary evidence to support the deduction 
in th e  ev en t of an aud it or even tua l litigation. T he list could include 
the following items:
1. Sworn statements from (a) the housekeeper and (b) the indi­
vidual who sighted the apparently rabid dog in the neighbor­
hood.
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2. Appraisal by a qualified expert or experts showing the value of 
the rug before and after the casualty.
3. Color photographs of the rug before and after the casualty.
4. Instructions to retain the damaged rug as evidence, if possible.
5. Statements from, or correspondence with, insurance agents 
relative to the amount of any insurance recovery.
6. Purchase invoice showing proof of ownership and cost.
A client may ignore an adviser’s request or he or she may be 
unable to obtain all of the recommended evidence. Nevertheless, 
the adviser will have informed the client on a timely basis of the 
requirements necessary to sustain the right to the claimed deduction.
In tax research work involving situations in which tax laws are 
clear but the facts of the situation are in question, it behooves the tax 
adviser to establish the facts necessary to reach a conclusion and 
either to accumulate appropriate supporting evidence or to suggest 
that the client do so. Then, in the event of an audit, the tax adviser 
would have only to persuade a revenue agent to accept the mass of 
overwhelming evidence and, therefore, to reach the desired conclu­
sion.
The Facts Are Clear—the Law Is Questionable
The tax researcher may encounter another kind of problem involving 
situations in which facts are well established but the law is uncertain. 
Uncertainty may arise either because of conflicting or ambiguous 
statutes or because of conflicting interpretations of a statute, the latter 
of which is the more common.
Conflicting Statutes
Although it is rather rare, the facts of a problem sometimes can be 
analyzed in light of two entirely different provisions of the statute, 
with each provision furnishing a different tax result. It is reasonable 
under these circumstances for the tax adviser to report the transactions 
u n d e r th a t section o f th e  In te rn a l R evenue C ode th a t w ould p roduce 
the lowest tax liability for the client. In this situation the adviser and 
the client should be prepared for a possible IRS challenge.
In Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 562 (1964), the Tax Court 
was faced with an apparent conflict in statutory authority.1 The facts 
of the case reveal that a taxpayer transferred stock in two companies
1 Aff ' d as John M . Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).
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that he owned to a third corporation in exchange for that corporation’s 
stock and boot (cash). After the transfer, the taxpayer owned more 
than 82 percent of the third corporation’s stock. Accordingly, the 
taxpayer treated the transaction as a nontaxable transfer under section 
351, with boot received in the transfer taxable as a capital gain. The 
government, on the other hand, claimed that section 304 was 
controlling. Having to choose one of these statutory provisions, the 
Tax Court said in part
Both parties present a multiplicity of arguments as to which section 
controls. If section 351 controls, the gain is to be taxed as a capital 
gain. If section 304 controls, then the gain is to be taxed as a capital 
gain or the $64,850 cash payment is to be taxed as a dividend, 
depending upon the relevant parts of section 302.
We have no reason to believe that Congress had any intent with 
regard to the fact pattern of this case. However, the statements in 
sections 301(a) and 302(d), “except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter [or subchapter]’’ of the Code, indicate that Congress made the 
policy decision that dividend treatment will result from the application 
of section 302 only if no other provision in the relevant parts of the 
Code requires other treatment. Section 351 has no such limitation. 
That section is, by its terms, applicable. That section provides for tax 
treatment of the payment in question in a manner other than and 
different from the distribution treatment provided for by sections 
302(d) and 301. Consequently, the very words of the latter sections 
preclude dividend treatment in this case.2
The rather dubious conclusion reached by the Tax Court rests 
importantly on a very careful reading of the code. It suggests, in fact, 
that no statutory conflict exists even though the net result seems 
clearly to be inconsistent with the general intent of section 304. 
Fortunately, conflicting statutory authority is rare; when it is discov­
ered, however, the taxpayer should be prepared to litigate his or her 
right to rely on the more advantageous provision.
In a few instances, the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code 
anticipated the possible application of two provisions of the statute 
to the same situation and provided a statutory resolution of the 
conflict. For example, section 368(a)(2)(A) explicitly provides that a 
corporate reorganization that satisfies the rules of both a type C and
2 Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562 (1964).
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a type D reorganization will be treated as a type D reorganization 
only. Unfortunately, not all conflicts in the statutes are so easily 
resolved.
Conflicting Interpretations
A tax researcher more frequently encounters conflicting interpreta­
tions of tax statutes by various authorities. Conflicts may be found 
between the Treasury regulations and the code, between the Treasury 
regulations and the courts, or between two federal courts. In such 
situations, the tax adviser must consider the alternatives and weigh 
the risks—including the cost of lengthy administrative battles with 
the IRS and potential litigation—before recommending a particular 
conclusion or course of action.3 While it is the responsibility of the 
tax adviser to discover conflicting interpretations of the statutes and 
to advise the client of the risks and alternatives, the client should 
decide which course of action to pursue. Although only the client can 
decide whether to incur the costs of an administrative or legal 
confrontation with the IRS, he or she generally relies heavily on the 
recommendation of the tax adviser in reaching that decision. Other 
pertinent considerations include the general inconvenience associated 
with such disputes, the risk of exposure to additional audits, and the 
possibility of adverse publicity.
Regulations Versus Individual Interpretation During his or her 
research efforts, every tax adviser will form a personal opinion 
concerning the validity of specific regulations. Sometimes a tax 
adviser may have serious reservations concerning the Treasury’s 
interpretation of a statute and may so inform the client. However, 
to plan a tax strategy that depends solely on having a particular 
segment of the Treasury regulations declared invalid is certainly a 
high-risk proposition. Nevertheless, if all other attempts to sustain 
a client’s position fail, legal counsel may advise a taxpayer to challenge 
the validity of a Treasury regulation.
In analyzing the validity of a specific regulation, a tax researcher 
should determine, among other things, the age of that regulation. 
Perhaps a life in excess of ten years would categorize a regulation as 
“old” and anything short of ten years would warrant the designation 
“new. ” Old regulations—especially those that have been unsuccess­
3 For additional discussion of factors to be considered by a CPA in giving tax advice, 
see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Responsi­
bilities in Tax Practice 8, Advice to Clients (New York: AICPA, 1970).
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fully challenged in the courts—should be considered as the equivalent 
of the statute itself. This is especially true if, subsequent to the 
unsuccessful court action, Congress revised other segments of the 
statute but left unchanged the provision that had been challenged. 
An example of a situation in which a regulation was challenged and 
later upheld by the courts can be found in Paul J . Ussery.4 In this 
instance the taxpayer took issue with the construction of Treasury 
regulations section 1.117-4, which excludes from the terms “fellow­
ship” and “scholarship” any payments granted for academic work 
performed primarily for the benefit of the grantor. Because Congress 
amended the Internal Revenue Code subsequent to the Ussery 
decision but did not further clarify section 117, one might assume 
that Congress has given its approval to the court’s interpretation in 
Ussery. This conclusion is frequently stated by the court; see, for 
example, Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
Tax advisers should generally consider old regulations that have 
never been challenged to be well established. Most attempts to 
overturn old regulations through court action would be futile, while 
the possibility of successfully challenging a new regulation is signif­
icantly greater. Before challenging a new regulation, however, the 
tax adviser should determine the kind of regulation in question.5 The 
likelihood of a successful challenge will be very slim if the regulation 
has been issued under specifically delegated authority. In the event 
that a tax adviser feels that a new and previously untested interpretive 
regulation construes a statute contrary to the intent of Congress, legal 
counsel must be obtained before embarking upon an all-out battle 
against the regulation.
Regulations Versus Courts If a regulation has already been chal­
lenged, one of three possible outcomes may exist. First, the Internal 
Revenue Service may have lost the challenge and either revised or 
withdrawn the contested regulation. Second, the government may 
have lost one or more specific tests of the regulation but still be 
unwilling to concede defeat. Third, the IRS may have been able to
4 Paul J. Ussery, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
5 Examples of statutory regulations are those under sec. 1502, where Congress 
delegated the authority to the Treasury secretary in the consolidated tax return 
area. Another example of statutory regulations is found in sec. 385, where the 
secretary or his delegate has been granted authority to prescribe regulations that 
offer guidelines for purposes of determining whether an interest in a corporation 
is either debt or equity. Proposed regulations under section 385 were issued in 
1980.
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defend a regulation successfully, and, therefore, further attempts to 
challenge that regulation would not hold much promise.
During the sixties, an interesting and prolonged conflict developed 
between certain Treasury regulations and a number of court decisions, 
beginning in 1954 with the Kintner decision.6 Prior to 1962, self- 
employed professionals, who were unable to incorporate under state 
law, could not deduct for tax purposes contributions made to profit- 
sharing or pension plans.7 At the same time, a tax deduction for 
contributions to similar plans was available to corporations. In order 
to obtain the benefits available to corporations, professional partner­
ships attempted to assume the characteristics of associations, which 
qualify as corporations for tax purposes. These characteristics were 
first established in Morrissey and later adopted in the Treasury 
regulations.8
In opposing the classification of professional partnerships as “cor­
porate associations,” the commissioner lost numerous court battles. 
In an attempt to strengthen its position, the Treasury amended the 
regulations barring corporate treatment for unincorporated profes­
sional partnerships. This move resulted in the passage of state laws 
permitting the formation of professional corporations.
In a further move to strengthen the service’s position, subsection 
h was added to Treasury regulations section 301.7701-2 on February 
2, 1965. Subsection h provided that all professional corporations 
would be taxed for federal income tax purposes as partnerships, even 
if incorporated under state professional corporation acts. Interested 
taxpayers declared war on the so-called Kintner regulations and 
consistently won one decision after another.9 The issue was finally 
settled when, on August 8, 1969, the IRS announced that henceforth 
organizations formed under state professional corporation acts would 
be treated for tax purposes as corporations.10 Treasury decision 7515 
(approved October 5, 1977) eventually deleted subsection h of 
Treasury regulations section 301.7701-2.11
6 Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
7 In 1962 the “H.R. 10” or “Keogh” plan was passed by Congress, allowing self- 
employed individuals a contribution deduction for retirement plans of up to the 
lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of earned income. The amounts were amended in 
1974 to read $7,500 and 15 percent respectively.
8 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), and Treas. regs. sec. 301.7701-2.
9 See, for example, Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969); O’Neill, 410 F.2d 888 
(6th Cir. 1969); Kurzner, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
10T.I.R. 1019, Federal Taxes (P-H, 1969), 5155, 334.
111977-2 C.B. 482.
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During the time of controversy, tax advisers and their clients were 
faced with the options of accepting the Treasury regulations at face 
value or casting their lot with court decisions, which time after time 
proved to be successful for the taxpayer. Many taxpayers were willing 
to invest time and assume the risk and expense of battling the IRS 
through administrative appeals procedures and the courts. While in 
this instance the final result was favorable to the taxpayers, in other 
conflicts taxpayers have been less successful.12
What has been said here concerning conflicting authority between 
Treasury regulations and judicial opinions is, obviously, equally 
applicable to conflicting authority between judicial opinions and 
revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other official IRS pro­
nouncements. While any dispute between the IRS and the courts is 
still in progress, taxpayers with similar questions become prime 
targets for future litigation if they adopt a position contrary to the 
service’s. The service is often looking for a “better” fact case (from 
its point of view) or for a more favorable circuit in which to litigate 
further. Any time a tax adviser recommends a position contrary to 
that of the Internal Revenue Service, even if that contrary position 
is adequately supported by judicial authority, the adviser should also 
explain to the client the potential risks and extra costs implicit in 
taking that position.
As far as revenue agents and appellate conferees are concerned, 
the IRS position is the law, and they will challenge a departure from 
this position. A tax adviser should recommend an intentional disregard 
of the official IRS position only if the client is aware of the potential 
disagreement and the possible need to litigate.
One Court’s Interpretation Versus Another’s Disagreements be­
tween courts on similar issues can be characterized as “horizontal” 
and “vertical. ” Horizontal differences mean conflicting opinions issued 
by courts at the same level of jurisdiction; vertical differences refer 
to conflicts between lower and higher courts. Horizontal differences 
can occur between federal district courts, between the Tax Court and 
a district court, and between the several circuit courts. In such 
conflicts, the service is under no obligation to follow, on a nationwide 
basis, the precedent set by either court. Thus, a district court opinion 
favorable to the taxpayer would technically have precedent value only 
for a taxpayer residing within the jurisdiction of that district court.
12See, for example, B . Foreman Co., Inc., 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972), which deals 
with the creation of income issue under I.R.C. sec. 482.
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Similarly, any circuit court opinion technically has precedent value 
only within the circuit where the decision originated because one 
circuit court is not bound to follow the precedent of another. If 
appealed, conflicting district court opinions, from district courts 
within the same circuit, are settled by the appropriate circuit court. 
The Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari, settles conflicts between 
circuits. Prior to the time that a circuit court or the Supreme Court 
disposes of such opposing views, the tax adviser and client should be 
fully aware of the risks involved when relying on a court decision that 
may subsequently be appealed and overturned.
An interesting example of conflict between courts involves em­
ployee expenses for transportation of the tools of one’s trade. Relying 
on Revenue Ruling 63-100,13 which at that time allowed a musician 
an automobile expense deduction for the transportation of his musical 
instrument between his personal residence and his place of employ­
ment, a taxpayer deducted his driving expenses because he trans­
ported a thirty-two-pound bag of tools to work each day. The Tax 
Court denied the deduction; however, the second circuit reversed 
and remanded the case to the Tax Court. On rehearing, the Tax 
Court allowed more than 25 percent of the total driving expenses 
claimed by the taxpayer.14 Subsequently, in Fausner and in Hitt, two 
airline pilots, who were required by their employers and by govern­
ment regulations to carry extensive flight gear, attempted to deduct 
transportation expenses between their home and the airport. In 
Fausner, the Tax Court felt constrained by the Sullivan decision, 
since Fausner resided in the second circuit, and it allowed the 
deduction for the 1965 tax year.15 However, because Hitt resided in 
the fifth circuit, the Tax Court, ruling on the same day, disregarded 
Sullivan and disallowed the deduction.16 Fausner’s returns for 1966 
and 1967 were again challenged by the Internal Revenue Service on 
the same issue, and Fausner once more petitioned the Tax Court to 
rule on the matter. Although Fausner had resided in New York 
during 1966 and 1967, he had moved to Texas in 1968 and was thus 
petitioning from the fifth circuit in the latter years. In this instance, 
the Tax Court sustained the service, as it had done previously in 
Hitt.17 Fausner appealed to the fifth circuit and received an adverse
13Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 C.B. 34 (now revoked by Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 
59).
14Sullivan, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966) and T.C.M. 1968-711.
15Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
16Hitt, 55 T.C. 628 (1971).
17Fausner, P-H T.C.M. ¶71,277.
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ruling.18 At this point a conflict between the second and the fifth 
circuit courts existed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
an appeal from Fausner.19 The Supreme Court finally settled the 
controversy by ruling against the taxpayer.20
The foregoing example demonstrates both horizontal and vertical 
differences injudicial decisions. In horizontal differences, a taxpayer 
cannot rely on a decision rendered by another court at the same level 
of jurisdiction, because courts at the same level of jurisdiction simply 
are not bound by decisions of other courts at that same level. Vertical 
differences are harder to explain because lower courts generally are 
bound by decisions of higher courts. In the case of the Tax Court, 
however, even vertical differences may exist because the Tax Court 
has national jurisdiction. The Tax Court considers itself bound by the 
decisions of the circuit courts of appeals only to the extent that 
taxpayers reside in the jurisdiction of a circuit court that has rendered 
a decision on that issue. This maxim is frequently referred to as the 
Golsen Rule, since it was first expressed by the Tax Court in J . E. 
Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
Since the Tax Court is not obligated to accept any circuit court 
opinion on a nationwide basis, it has ample opportunity to express 
its displeasure with a circuit court opinion by disregarding it in cases 
involving taxpayers from other circuits. Such a result can be dem­
onstrated with two cases, in which the Tax Court arrived at opposing 
conclusions, involving two 50-50 stockholders in the same sub­
chapter S corporation where each taxpayer had sued on an identical 
issue. In both Doehring and Puckett, the issue to be decided revolved 
around whether or not the two taxpayers’ loan company had lost its 
subchapter S status.21 The IRS had previously disallowed the election 
on the grounds that more than 20 percent of the corporation’s gross 
revenue was derived from interest (passive income). The taxpayers, 
relying on House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972), 
argued that the ceiling did not apply to loan companies. The Tax 
Court ruled against the taxpayer in Doehring, stating that House did 
not apply since Doehring would be appealed to the eighth circuit. In 
Puckett, however, the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer’s contention, 
although disagreeing with it, since appeal would be to the fifth circuit,
18Fausner, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973).
19 Actually the conflict between the circuits involved another decision, in which the 
court held for the taxpayer (Tyne, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967)).
20Fausner, 93 U.S. 820 (1973).
21K. W. Doehring, T.C.M. 1974-1035; and P. E. Puckett, T.C.M. 1974-1038.
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in which House was controlling. Subsequently, Doehring was ap­
pealed to the eighth circuit, where the taxpayer prevailed.22 The 
sequence of events demonstrates, however, the uncertainty created, 
at least for a time, for taxpayers and their advisers with similar 
situations.
One taxpayer tested the commissioner’s right to ignore established 
judicial precedent. In that case the IRS sent deficiency notices to two 
taxpayers claiming that certain distributions received from their 
corporation were dividends. Both stockholders challenged the defi­
ciency assessment in the Tax Court. While taxpayer Divine’s suit was 
pending, the Tax Court ruled against taxpayer Luckman.23 Upon 
appeal, however, the seventh circuit reversed the Tax Court.24 The 
commissioner pressed on with the same position he had taken in 
Luckman and obtained another favorable ruling from the Tax Court 
in Divine.25 Taxpayer Divine then appealed to the second circuit 
court, claiming that when the commissioner is relitigating an issue 
that he has previously lost and the facts are distinguishable only by 
virtue of the identity of the taxpayer, the commissioner should be 
barred from again bringing suit. Although the second circuit court 
held for taxpayer Divine, it struck down his contention that the 
commissioner was prevented from bringing suit.26
The Facts Are Clear—the Law Is Incomplete
As explained earlier, whenever a statute is silent or imprecise on a 
particular tax question, tax researchers must consult such other 
interpretive authorities as Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, or 
court decisions. In their search for interpretive material, tax advisers 
soon discover that finding authority with facts identical to their own 
will be the exception rather than the rule. In most circumstances, 
therefore, the ability to distinguish cases on the basis of facts becomes 
critical, for many times it is necessary to piece together support for 
the researchers’ positions from several authorities.
An illustration of this third class of common tax problems follows. 
Assume that a client, an Austrian named Werner Hoppe, presents 
the following facts. Werner visited his brother Klaus, who had
22K. W. Doehring, 527 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1975). The government also appealed 
Puckett, trying for a reversal of House. However, the fifth circuit affirmed the 
original Tax Court decision (P. E. Puckett, 522 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1975)).
23Sid Luckman, 50 T.C. 619 (1968).
24 Luckman, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969).
25Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152 (1972).
26Divine, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
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immigrated to the United States six years ago and resides in Dallas, 
Texas. At the time of the visit, Werner was under contract to an 
Austrian soccer team and was expected to return to the team to begin 
play for the fall 1980 season. Werner’s brother Klaus had fallen in 
love with American football and had become an enthusiastic fan of 
the Dallas Cowboys. The Cowboys had recently lost their regular 
kicker to an injury, and a replacement, picked up on waivers, proved 
to be less than satisfactory. Knowing of Werner’s kicking ability, 
Klaus was convinced that Werner could help the Cowboys if given 
an opportunity. Klaus took Werner to a Cowboy workout and 
introduced him to the kicking coach. As a result, Werner was given 
a tryout by the Cowboys, who were desperate for a good kicker. 
Werner’s performance was far superior to others at the tryout, and 
the Cowboys offered him the kicking job. Werner, however, was 
reluctant to accept the offer because he had planned to return to 
Austria in a few weeks to continue his soccer career. Considerable 
encouragement from Klaus and the Cowboy organization seemed to 
be in vain until the Cowboys, at Klaus’s suggestion, offered Werner 
a $40,000 bonus. At this point Werner overcame his reluctance and 
signed a contract, which Klaus cosigned as witness and interpreter. 
Economically speaking, the regular salary offered by the Cowboys 
was considerably more attractive than was Werner’s salary as a soccer 
player in Austria. Grateful to his brother for assisting as an interpreter 
and negotiator, and for encouraging him to stay, Werner instructed 
the Cowboys to pay $15,000 of the negotiated bonus directly to Klaus. 
Klaus reported the $15,000 as other income on his 1980 income tax 
return and paid the appropriate tax. After examining Werner’s 1980 
tax return, the IRS made a deficiency assessment claiming that the 
$15,000 paid to Klaus constituted income to Werner and should thus 
be included in his income under section 61(a)(1). The IRS agent relied 
at least in part upon the authority of Richard A. Allen, 50 T.C. 466 
(1968).
After determining the foregoing facts, the tax researcher decides 
that, according to the language of Treasury regulations section 1.61- 
2(a)(1), the total bonus payment should be included in Werner’s 
return. The regulations specify that, in general, wages, salaries, and 
bonuses are income to the recipient unless excluded by law. After 
additional research , th e  tax adviser locates th e  decision in Cecil 
Randolph Hundley, Jr., which appears to contain a similar situation.27 
In Hundley, to which the commissioner acquiesced, the taxpayer
27Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339, acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
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included the bonus payments in his income but was allowed a 
business expense deduction for that portion of the bonus paid to his 
father. Before relying solely on the authority of Hundley, the tax 
adviser must be certain that the facts of Hundley are in effect 
substantially similar to Werner’s situation and that the expense of 
further negotiations with the IRS is warranted and based on a sound 
premise. Thus, the tax adviser will carefully compare the Allen and 
Hundley cases with the facts presented by Werner Hoppe. In doing 
this the adviser might prepare the following list of facts.
Allen
1. Professional 
baseball player re­
ceived sizable bo­
nus.
2. Taxpayer was 
amateur prior to 
signing contract.
3. Parent and ball­
playing minor child 
signed professional 
ball contract.
4. Some bonus 
payments were ac­
tually made to 
mother.
5. Mother knew lit­
tle about baseball.
6. Mother was pas­
sive partic ipan t in 
negotiations for 
contract and bonus.
7. No oral agree­
ment existed.
Hoppe
1. Professional foot­
ball player received 
sizable bonus.
2. Taxpayer was 
professional soccer 
player prior to sign­
ing contract.
3. Ballplayer alone 
signed contract, but 
brother signed as 
witness and inter­
preter.
4. Some bonus 
payments were ac­
tually made to 
brother.
5. Brother had av­
erage knowledge of 
football.
6. Brother was an 
active p artic ipan t in 
negotiations for 
contract and bonus.
7. No oral agree­
ment existed.
Hundley
1. Professional 
baseball player re­
ceived sizable bo­
nus.
2. Taxpayer was 
amateur player be­
fore signing con­
tract.
3. Parent and ball­
playing minor child 
signed professional 
ball contract.
4. Some bonus 
payments were ac­
tually made to 
father.
5. Father was 
knowledgeable in 
baseball and taught 
his son extensively.
6. Father handled 
most of the negotia­
tions for a contract 
and bonus.
7. Oral agreement 
existed on how to 
divide the bonus 
payments.
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Because Allen was decided for the government and Hundley for 
the taxpayer, it may be important to distinguish the two cases on the 
basis of facts. Utilizing a simple diagram technique, we begin with 
seven facts identified in each case.
Figure 5.1
Allen Hundley
Next the researcher should identify those issues that are very similar 
in both cases and those that are more readily distinguishable.
Figure 5.2
Allen Hundley
The second diagram shows that facts one through four are “neutral” 
in that they are nearly identical in both cases, and that the important 
facts, which perhaps swayed the outcome of the Hundley case in 
favor of the taxpayer, appear to be facts five through seven. Comparing 
Hundley with Hoppe produces the following result.
Figure 5.3
Hundley Hoppe
This diagram shows that Hoppe and Hundley agree in facts one, four, 
and six only. The following comparison of all three fact situations 
might provide additional insight for the tax adviser.
Figure 5.4
Allen Hundley
Hoppe
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This analysis shows that facts one and four are neutral in all three 
cases and perhaps should not be considered to have an impact upon 
the final outcome. Fact two, dealing with the professional status of 
Hoppe, which can be distinguished from both Allen and Hundley, 
might significantly bolster Hoppe’s claim for an ordinary and necessary 
business expense under section 162. Hoppe has already established 
his business as a professional athlete; fact three, the signing of the 
contract by Hoppe alone (again distinguished from Allen and Hun­
dley), seems to support the fact that Klaus was needed in the 
negotiations as an interpreter, the capacity in which he signed the 
contract. Facts five and six, which indicate the degree of expertise 
exhibited by the respective relatives of the ballplayers and the roles 
played by the relatives in the contract negotiations, seem to be of 
much greater significance. In Hundley’s and Hoppe’s cases both 
relatives took active roles in negotiating final contracts. In Hundley, 
the father was knowledgeable about baseball and contract negotia­
tions. Hoppe’s situation is certainly similar. Klaus exhibited an ability 
to negotiate by recommending that a bonus be offered, and he 
displayed his expertise as an interpreter. The final fact—number 
seven—in which Allen and Hoppe are distinguished from Hundley, 
appears to be a liability to Hoppe’s position and weakens his case 
considerably.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates a situation in which the statute 
is incomplete and a taxpayer and the adviser must rely on equally 
incomplete interpretive materials. Careful analysis indicates that 
previous interpretations appear to apply to some but not all the 
existing facts. Once a thorough examination of the facts and a review 
of the applicable authority have been completed, a decision must be 
made about the course of action. Possible risks must be evaluated 
and additional expenses must be estimated before the decision to 
contest the deficiency assessment is made. Consultation with legal 
counsel concerning litigation hazards will assist the taxpayer in 
deciding whether to carry the case beyond administrative procedures 
into the courts.
The Facts Are Clear—the Law Is Nonexistent
It is possible that a tax researcher may discover that a problem is not 
clearly covered by any statutory, administrative, or judicial authority. 
In such circumstances, the tax adviser has an opportunity to utilize 
whatever powers of creativity, logical reasoning, and persuasion he 
or she possesses. Since the revenue agent making an examination
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likewise will have little authority to substantiate any proposed 
adjustment, it is up to the tax adviser to present a convincing 
argument in support of the client’s position. However, as stressed 
throughout this chapter, before the tax adviser proceeds with a course 
of action, the client should be advised of the possible risks and 
expenses associated with it. In these circumstances, the client may 
want to ask the IRS for a letter ruling before a final decision is 
reached.
We have suggested that in all questionable situations the cost and 
risk factors be considered before reaching a conclusion. Risk should 
be interpreted as any possible adverse consequence that might occur 
as a result of a specific course of action adopted by the taxpayer. One 
might ask whether the questionable treatment of a particular item on 
the return will trigger an examination, and whether such an exami­
nation is likely to subject other items on the return to scrutiny and 
a possible proposed adjustment.28 Furthermore, proposed adjust­
ments on one year’s tax return may lead to similar adjustments on a 
prior year’s return. Thus, in addition to developing a strong case 
against the IRS claims, potential risks must be considered in the final 
decision process in the treatment of all tax matters. At the same 
time, one should not forget that the cost of disputing a tax liability 
is generally deductible. For the taxpayer in a high marginal tax 
bracket, this may be a point in favor of continuing a dispute with the 
IRS.
Working With the Citator
In addition to its usefulness in locating appropriate authority, the 
citator can assist in the assessment process. Throughout this chapter 
we have observed how conflicting interpretations of the code by 
taxpayers, their tax advisers, the IRS, and the courts result in 
considerable litigation. In the litigation process, court decisions 
sometimes are appealed and, subsequently, either affirmed or re­
versed by the appropriate appellate court. Furthermore, it should be 
apparent that, while a particular court decision may support a 
taxpayer’s position, subsequent decisions by the same court or by 
other courts may reverse a previous decision. It is imperative, 
therefore, that the researcher carefully investigate the judicial history
28 A questionable treatment should not be confused with an illegal treatment. The 
former refers to items supported by adequate authority that lend themselves to 
honest disagreement between taxpayers and IRS.
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of any decision before placing much emphasis on it. The citator can 
assist the researcher in this evaluative process. Verifying the judicial 
history of a particular case can be accomplished effectively only 
through the P-H Citator; the CCH Citator simply does not include 
the information necessary to make this determination. To illustrate, 
let us return to exhibit 4.6, page 110. The entry in the CCH Citator 
for the Germantown Trust Co. case discloses that Germantown was 
cited in Automobile Club o f Michigan, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). Because 
the latter case was decided by the Supreme Court, it would be 
important to know which issue was involved and whether or not the 
Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision in Germantown Trust Co. 
Such information cannot be gleaned from the CCH Citator. As shown 
in exhibit 4.10, page 120, the P-H Citator lists information similar to 
that found in the CCH Citator. However, the symbol “n-1” precedes 
the Automobile Club citation, and similar symbols precede other 
cases in which Germantown was cited. The P-H symbol explanation 
sheet (see exhibit 5.1, page 153), discloses that “n” denotes that 
Germantown was cited only in a dissenting opinion. The number “1” 
in connection with the symbol “n” refers the reader to the corre­
sponding headnote number in the A.F.T.R. series, which identifies 
the issue involved. A further examination of cases in which German­
town was cited (exhibit 4.10) indicates that issue “3” is most frequently 
cited, that in one instance Germantown was “explained,” and that in 
another instance it was “distinguished.” (See exhibit 5.1 for an 
explanation of the terms explained and distinguished, as well as other 
interpretive symbols.)
How the P-H Citator can assist the researcher can be demonstrated 
with the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Wilcox, 327 
U.S. 404 (1946). In this decision the Supreme Court held that 
embezzled money does not constitute taxable income to the embez­
zler. The Supreme Court overruled the Wilcox decision in James, 
366 U.S. 213 (1961). The extract from the P-H Citator shown in 
exhibit 5.2, page 154, reveals that Wilcox was cited on various issues 
in James and that in James the court overruled Wilcox on issues three, 
four, nine, and twelve. Thus, reliance on Wilcox, simply because it 
represented a Supreme Court decision, would be ill advised.
Before researchers rely explicitly upon the authority of any partic­
ular judicial decision, they should take the few minutes it requires 
to trace that case through the P-H Citator to be sure that subsequent 
developments did not render the case invalid for their purposes.
In addition to the P-H Citator, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., publishes 
a comprehensive legal citator that can assist tax researchers in tracing
152
Exhibit 5.1
Prentice-Hall Citator Symbols
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Exhibit 5.2
Prentice-Hall Citator Extract
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the history and current status of any case.29 Since Shepard's Citations 
includes almost all federal and state cases, the publication consists of 
numerous volumes, requiring extensive space. While it may not be 
economically feasible to include Shepard’s citator in a typical tax 
library, it can be found in nearly all law libraries, and the tax 
researcher may wish to make use of it in unusual circumstances.
29Shepard’s Citations (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Shepard’s Citations, Inc.).
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6
True ease in writing comes from art, 
not chance,
As those move easiest who have 
learned to dance.
ALEXANDER POPE
Communicating 
Tax Research
Throughout this tax study we have used the terms tax researcher and 
tax adviser synonymously. If a distinction could be made between 
the two forms of practice, it would be based on the tax adviser's task 
of reporting the conclusion that has been so painstakingly pieced 
together. While some tax conclusions can be communicated orally, 
much of the information gathered by tax researchers must eventually 
be placed in writing as either internal or external documentation. 
The task of writing introduces two major problems for practitioners. 
First, the ability of some to write well is more often than not an 
acquired trait, the result of practice and more practice. Second, 
communicating the conclusions of tax research requires the ability to 
perceive how much or how little to express. This task is complicated 
by the fact that highly technical solutions frequently must be distilled 
into layman’s language. Also, tax advisers often must hedge on their 
solutions because, as discussed in chapter 5, a definitive answer 
simply is not available in every case. In addition, tax advisers must, 
to protect their own professional integrity, foresee potential future 
claims against them. Like writing skill, the ability to determine 
precisely what needs to be said usually can be improved through
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practice. In larger offices, all inexperienced tax researchers should 
be given an early opportunity to present much of their initial research 
in written form. New researchers should also be assigned the 
responsibility of preparing draft copies of correspondence that will 
subsequently be reviewed by a supervisor for weaknesses in writing 
style and technical presentation. Experience and assistance can mold 
good researchers into good advisors with a mastery of writing style 
and an ability to pinpoint the finer information required in tax 
documents.
The form in which a written tax communication appears is deter­
mined by the audience for which it is intended. Some documents are 
prepared for internal purposes, or firm use, only. Other documents, 
such as client letters, protest letters, and requests for rulings, are 
prepared for an external audience. In the following pages we will 
illustrate the appropriate formats and contents of some of the more 
frequently encountered communications. Of course, firm policies 
often dictate specific formats and procedures; nevertheless, certain 
basic features are universal to most tax communications.
Internal Communications
Within the accounting firm, the client file is the basic vehicle used 
to communicate specific client information between the various levels 
of the professional staff. Pertinent information concerning each client’s 
unique facts is contained in the file in the form of memos and working 
papers.
Memo to the File
A memo to the file may be initiated as a result of any one of several 
developments. Often such memos are the result of a client’s request— 
in person, over the telephone, or in a letter—for a solution to a tax 
problem. The importance of facts in tax research was explained in 
chapter 2; a memo to the file is commonly used to inform the 
researcher of the underlying facts needed to identify issues, locate 
authorities, and reach solutions. In most large offices the initial 
contact with the client occurs at the partner or manager level, while 
much of the actual research will be performed by a staffperson. It is 
critical, therefore, that accurate information be communicated be­
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tween the various levels of the professional staff. A typical memoran­
dum to the files may appear as follows.
October 30, 1980
TO: Files
FROM: Tom Partner
SUBJECT: Potential exchange of common voting stock for preferred 
nonvoting stock in Allemania Electronic, Inc.
Today Jane Dietz, financial vice-president of Electric Supply Co., 
called to request information concerning the tax consequences of a 
proposed recapitalization in Allemania Electronic, Inc., an 85 percent- 
owned subsidiary. Allemania was acquired by Electric on June 1, 1975, 
and has been carried in the financial statements as a temporary 
investment on the equity basis. The auditors of Electric (Meyerson, 
Garner, and Leavitt) are now insisting that continued association with 
Allemania would require the inclusion of the subsidiary in Electric’s 
financial statements on a fully consolidated basis. The directors of 
Allemania are not in favor of such a disclosure and have suggested that 
Allemania exchange sufficient common voting stock for preferred 
nonvoting stock to reduce Electric’s ownership in the form of voting 
stock from 85 percent to 50 percent or below. The board hopes, 
through the reduction of ownership in voting stock, that inclusion of 
Allemania on a consolidated financial basis with Electric can be 
avoided. At the present time Electric and Allemania join in the filing 
of a consolidated tax return on a May 31, fiscal-year basis. Responsibility 
for preparation and filing of the return rests with Electric’s internal tax 
department, which we review on an annual basis. Jane Dietz requested 
that our report reach her prior to Electric’s next board meeting, 
scheduled for November 22, and she requested that we contact her 
personally for additional information.
The information contained in the above memo should be sufficient 
for the researcher to begin work. Furthermore, the memo commu­
nicates a specific deadline and indicates that the client is willing to 
supplement this information with additional facts if necessary.
A less formal procedure is often followed when a long-established 
client calls the tax adviser for an immediate answer to a routine tax 
question on a well defined, uncontroversial topic. If the tax adviser 
gives an oral reply, the conversation should be placed in writing, 
thus creating a record for the files. Such a record serves as protection 
against subsequent confusion or misinterpretation that may jeopardize
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the tax adviser’s professional integrity, and it can serve as a basis for 
billing the client.1
Leaving Tracks
Once the necessary information has been recorded in a memo to the 
files, the researcher may begin the task of identifying questions and 
seeking solutions. Supporting documents for conclusions, such as 
excerpts from or references to specific portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, court deci­
sions, tax service editorial opinions, and periodicals, should be put 
in the files. All questions and conclusions should be appropriately 
cross-indexed to facilitate subsequent retrieval of the information. 
Pertinent information in supporting documents should be highlighted 
to avoid unnecessary reading. Examples of the content and organi­
zation of a client’s file are presented in chapter 7.
Because time is the most important commodity any tax adviser has 
for sale, a well organized client file is of the utmost importance; it can 
eliminate duplication of effort. Supervisory review of a staff person’s 
research can be accomplished quickly, and additional time is saved 
if and when it becomes necessary to refer to a client’s file months, 
or even years, after the initial work was performed. Such a delayed 
reference to a file may be required because of subsequent IRS audits, 
preparation of protests, or the need to solve another client’s similar 
tax problem. Because promotions, transfers, and staff turnover are 
common occurrences in accounting firms, well organized files can be 
of significant help in familiarizing new staff members with client 
problems.
Another time-saving device used by practitioners is the tax subject 
file. To prepare such a system, members of the practitioner’s tax staff 
contribute tax problems together with documented conclusions, 
which are then pooled and arranged on a subject basis. In a multioffice 
firm such files are duplicated, in some instances on microfilm, and
1 The question of whether oral advice should be confirmed in writing arises 
frequently. The AICPA Subcommittee on Responsibilities in Tax Practice makes 
the following recommendation: “Although oral advice may serve a client’s needs 
appropriately in routine matters or in well-defined areas, written communications 
are recommended in important, unusual or complicated transactions. In the 
judgment of the CPA, oral advice may be followed by a written confirmation to the 
client. A written record will limit misunderstandings and provide a basis for future 
discussions, reference, planning, and implementation of suggestions.” (AICPA, 
Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8, Advice to Clients (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970)).
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made available to each office. A subject file can eliminate many hours 
of duplicative research.
External Communications
A tax practitioner’s written communication to an external audience 
takes on added significance because it demonstrates professional 
expertise, renders professional advice, and exposes professional 
reputation. Perhaps the most frequently encountered external doc­
ument in a CPA’s tax practice is the client letter. Communications 
with the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of a client to protest a 
deficiency assessment or to request a ruling for a proposed transaction 
are also quite common.
Client Letters
In a client letter the tax adviser expresses a professional opinion to 
those who pay for his or her services. The significance of a client 
letter can perhaps best be expressed as follows:
Tax opinion letters are emerging as a new work product for tax 
professionals. Anyone who has written such a letter knows why he said 
what he said and has reasons for discussing certain items in more or 
less detail. It is no easy task to balance the proper degree of necessary 
technicality with everyday English, trying all the while to foresee any 
misunderstanding that could arise and to write only what is meant. 
The ability to write good tax opinion letters has become one of the 
finer attributes of the tax practitioner.2
The detailed format of client letters may vary from one firm to 
another. Most good client letters, however, have several things in 
common.
Style Like a good speaker, a good writer must know the audience 
before beginning. Because tax clients vary greatly in their own tax 
expertise, it is important to consider the technical sophistication of 
a client or the client’s staff when composing a tax opinion letter. The 
style of a letter may range from a highly sophisticated format, which 
includes numerous technical explanations and citations, to a simple 
composition that uses only laymen’s terms. In many situations, of 
course, the best solution lies somewhere between the two extremes.
2 W. J. DeFillips, “Developing a Tax Department in a Growing Organization,” 
Journal o f Accountancy (June 1974): 64.
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Format and Content Regardless of the degree of technical sophis­
tication, a well drafted client letter follows a well planned format. It 
should begin with an enumeration of the facts upon which the tax 
adviser’s research is based. In conjunction with a statement of the 
facts, a statement of caution (see “Disclaimer Statements,” page 163) 
should be included to warn the client that the research conclusions 
stated are valid only for the specified facts. Next, the letter should 
state the important tax questions implicit in the previously identified 
facts. Finally, the tax practitioner should list his conclusions and the 
authority for those conclusions. An example of appropriate form and 
typical content of a client letter is shown in chapter 7. Additional 
examples can be examined in the AICPA Tax Study 4, Tax Practice 
Management, by William L. Raby.3
A client letter may identify areas of controversy (or questions that 
are not authoritatively resolved) that might be disputed by the 
Internal Revenue Service. Some highly qualified tax advisers seriously 
question the wisdom of including any discussion of disputable points 
in a client letter because that letter may end up in the possession of 
a revenue agent at a most inopportune time. Furthermore, by 
authority of section 7602, the IRS has the right to examine all relevant 
books, papers, and records containing information relating to the 
business of a taxpayer liable for federal taxes. Tax accountants are 
well aware that documents in their possession, relating to the 
computation of a client’s federal tax liability, are not considered 
privileged communication. Those granted privileged communication 
are usually based on an attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privi­
lege—never on an accountant-client privilege.
The accountant in tax practice is thus faced with a dilemma. If a 
client letter discloses both the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s 
tax posture, exposure of the letter to a revenue agent may considerably 
weaken the client’s position and even assist the revenue agent in 
preparing the case. On the other hand, if the potential weaknesses 
of the position are not clearly communicated to the client, the tax 
adviser exposes himself to potential legal liability for inappropriate 
advice.
Although many advisers do not agree, we believe that client letters 
should contain comprehensive information, including some reference 
to the more vulnerable factors that could expose the client to potential 
challenge by the IRS. In our opinion, full disclosure and self­
3 William L. Raby, Tax Study 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: AICPA, 
1974).
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protection against claims by clients, which may endanger the profes­
sional reputation of all tax practitioners, is more important than the 
risk of an IRS challenge. Any disclosure of weaknesses must be 
carefully worded, and the client should be cautioned in advance to 
control possession of the letter.
The issue of privileged communication is most frequently raised 
in connection with tax fraud cases, and, in the long run, a tax 
practitioner will do his or her practice more good by preserving a 
professional reputation than by protecting a few clients who may be 
guilty of tax fraud. In situations in which a CPA suspects that fraud 
may be involved, the client should be immediately referred to an 
attorney for all further work. If it is felt that the accountant may be 
of assistance, the attorney may reengage the accountant or another 
accountant and thereby possibly extend privileged communication to 
the accountant’s workpapers.4
Disclaimer Statements Tax advisers deal with two basically dif­
ferent situations. In the case of after-the-fact advice, tax practitioners 
must assure themselves that they understand all of the facts necessary 
to reach valid conclusions. Incomplete or inaccurate facts may lead 
advisers to erroneous conclusions. In planning situations, in which 
many of the facts are still “controllable,” tax advisers must assure 
themselves that they fully understand their clients’ objectives and 
any operational constraints on achieving those objectives. Further­
more, planning situations frequently involve lengthy time periods 
during which changes in the tax laws may occur, thus possibly 
changing the recommended course of action. Statement 8, issued by 
the AICPA Responsibilities in Tax Practice Subcommittee, noted 
some of the problems associated with new developments in tax 
matters.
The CPA may assist clients in implementing procedures or plans 
associated with the advice offered. During this active participation, 
the CPA continues to advise and should review and revise such advice 
as warranted by new developments and factors affecting the transaction.
Sometimes the CPA is requested to provide tax advice but does not 
assist in implementing the plans adopted. While developments such 
as legislative or administrative changes or further judicial interpreta­
tions may affect the advice previously provided, the CPA cannot be
4 See Robert E. Meldman and Thomas E. Mountin, “Strategies Available to the 
Accountant to Protect a Client in a Tax Fraud Investigation,” Taxation for  
Accountants (December 1978): 370-74.
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expected to communicate later developments that affect such advice 
unless he undertakes this obligation by specific agreement with his 
client. Thus, the communication of significant developments affecting 
previous advice should be considered extraordinary service rather than 
an implied obligation in the normal CPA-client relationship.5
On the advisability of including some type of disclaimer statement 
in a client letter, the same subcommittee stated
Experience in the accounting and other professions indicates that 
clients understand that advice reflects professional judgment based on 
an existing situation. Experience has also shown that clients customarily 
realize that subsequent developments could affect previous professional 
advice. Some CPAs use precautionary language to the effect that their 
advice is based on facts as stated and authorities which are subject to 
change. Although routine use of such precautionary language seems 
unnecessary based on accepted business norms and professional 
relationships, the CPA may follow this procedure in situations he 
deems appropriate.6
In summary, the AICPA subcommittee concludes that a disclaimer 
statement is not required. The authors of this study, however, are 
of the opinion that client letters generally should contain disclaimer 
statements as a matter of policy. In our opinion, the client letter 
should include a brief restatement of the important facts, a statement 
to the effect that all conclusions stated in the letter are based on 
those specific facts, and a warning to the client of the dangers implicit 
in any changes or inaccuracies in those facts. In the case of tax­
planning engagements, we also recommend that the tax practitioner 
include a warning that future changes in the law could jeopardize the 
planned end results. An example of such a disclaimer statement in 
client letters appears in chapter 7.
Protest Letters
A nother ex ternal docum en t com m only p rep ared  by th e  tax p racti­
tioner is the “protest” of a client’s tax deficiency as assessed by the 
Internal Revenue Service. Formal written protests are only required 
for proposed tax deficiencies in excess of $2,500 originating from field 
audits. Some tax advisers feel, however, that a well written formal
5 AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8.
6 Ibid.
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protest enhances the chances of resolving a disagreement successfully 
even in cases resulting from office audits or deficiencies of $2,500 or 
less. The Internal Revenue Service suggests that a protest include 
the following information:
1. A statement that you want to appeal the findings of the examining 
officer to the regional director of appeals.
2. Your name and address (the residence address of individuals; the 
address of the principal office or place of business of corporations).
3. The date and symbols on the letter transmitting the proposed 
adjustments and findings you are protesting.
4. The taxable years, periods, or returns involved.
5. An itemized schedule of adjustments of findings with which you do 
not agree.
6. A statement of facts supporting your position in contested factual 
issues. This statement and all major evidence submitted with the 
protest is to be declared true under penalties of perjury. This may 
be done by adding to the protest the following declaration, signed 
by the taxpayer as an individual or by an authorized officer of a 
corporation:
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have 
examined the statement of facts presented in this protest 
and in any accompanying schedules and statements and, to 
the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, 
and complete.
7. Instead of the declaration required in 6 above, if your representative 
prepares or files the protest, he or she may substitute a declaration 
stating:
(a) That he or she prepared the protest and accompanying docu­
ments, and
(b) Whether he or she knows personally that the statements of fact 
contained in the protest and accompanying documents are true 
and correct.
8. A statement outlining the law or other authority upon which you 
rely.7
In principle, the body of a protest follows the format of a client 
letter in th a t th e  p ro te s t specifies im portan t facts, delinea tes con tested  
findings, and lists the authority supporting the taxpayer’s position. 
An example of a typical protest letter follows.
7 IRS Publication 5, Appeal Rights and Preparation o f Protests fo r  Unagreed Cases, 
rev. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
165
July 14, 1980
District Director of
Internal Revenue8 
Federal Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: Intermountain Stove, Inc. 
1408 State Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646
Corporate income taxes for 
the year ended 12/31/78
Sir (or Madam):
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1980 (Reference— 
B:S:59-A:FS:rs), which transmitted a copy of your examining officer’s 
report dated May 8, 1980, covering his examination of Intermountain 
Stove’s corporate income tax return for the year ended December 31, 
1978. In the report, the examining officer recommended adjustments 
to the taxable income (loss) in the following amount:
Amount of
Tax Year Increase in Income Reported
December 31, 1978 $42,000
PROTEST AGAINST ADJUSTMENT
Your letter granted the taxpayer a period of thirty days from the 
date thereof within which to protest the recommendations of the 
examining officer, which period was subsequently extended to July 
22, 1980, by your letter dated June 6, 1980, a copy of which is 
attached. This protest is accordingly being filed within that period, as 
extended.
The taxpayer respectfully protests against the proposed adjustment 
stated below.
FINDINGS TO WHICH TAXPAYER 
TAKES EXCEPTION_______
Exception is now taken to the following item:
Disallowance of the following expenses of 
Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Description Year Amount
Professional Fees December 31, 1978 $42,000
Although a conference is requested with the regional director of appeals, the 
protest letter is directed to the district director. See IRS publication 5 (n. 7, 
herein).
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GROUNDS UPON WHICH TAXPAYER RELIES 
The taxpayer submits the following information to support its
contentions:
Expenses of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Your examining officer contends that fees paid in the amount of 
$42,000 in connection with the employment of certain individuals who 
were experienced in various phases of the production and sale of cast 
iron stoves should be considered as the acquisition costs of assets in 
connection with expansion of operations and establishment of a new 
cast iron stove division.
Taxpayer contends, for reasons set forth below, that the examining 
officer’s position is untenable on the facts and in law and that such 
costs are clearly deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses incurred 
in its trade or business, deductible in accordance with section 162 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.
Facts concerning the operations of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Intermountain Stove, Inc. (ISI) is a manufacturer of campers. As a
result of the fuel crisis, orders in 1978 declined, and ISI decided, in 
addition to their camper operation, to again produce wood and coal 
burning stoves, a product ISI had manufactured until the end of World 
War II and for which a strong demand suddenly developed. To begin 
immediate operation in a new stove division, ISI contracted with a 
consulting firm to locate personnel with experience in the production 
and marketing of cast iron stoves. The fee paid for such services during 
1978 amounted to $42,000.
Discussion of authorities
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
There shall be allowed as a deduction all of the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any 
trade or business. . . .
To contend, as the examining officer does, that assets were acquired 
with the employment of the newly acquired employees is not within 
the usual interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
There were no employment contracts purchased, as may sometimes 
be found in the hiring of professional athletes; the employees were 
free to sever their employment relationships at any time, and, in fact, 
certain of these specific individuals have done so. The examining
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officer’s position was considered in David J . Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, in 
which the court stated
It might be argued that the payment of an employment fee is capital in 
nature and hence not currently deductible. Presumably under this view 
the fee would be deductible when the related employment is terminated. 
However, the difficulty with this view is to conjure up a capital asset 
which had been purchased. Certainly the expense was not related to 
the purchase or sale of a capital asset. . . . Certainly in the ordinary 
affairs of life common understanding would clearly encompass the fee 
paid to the employment agency herein as “ordinary and necessary 
expenses in carrying on any trade or business” (Section 162) within the 
usual, ordinary and everyday meaning of the term.
Your examining officer is here attempting to disallow deductions for 
amounts paid to outside consultants in a situation in which the expenses 
would clearly be deductible if the work had been performed by the 
company’s own staff. No such distinction should be made. The 
corporation employed the expertise of a knowledgeable consultant to 
assist in the location of personnel with specific background and 
experience. The payment of fees for such assistance may be compared 
with the direct payroll and overhead costs of operating an “in-house’’ 
personnel department.
The examining officer apparently believes that such costs should be 
capitalized primarily because they might be nonrecurring in nature. 
This is not the test of whether an expense is ordinary and necessary. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Welch, 290 U.S. 111, 3 
U.S. Tax Cas. A1164, “Ordinary in this context does not mean that the 
payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same 
taxpayer may make them often.” The fees are ordinary and necessary 
because it is the common experience in the business community that 
payments are made for assistance in the procurement of personnel. 
This is emphasized by the Court in Primuth by the following statement: 
“ ‘Fees’ must be deemed ordinary and necessary from every realistic 
point of view in today’s marketplace where corporate executives change 
employers with a notable degree of frequency. ”
These expenditures, if paid by the individual employees and 
reimbursed by the employer, would have been clearly deductible by 
both the employee and the employer, with the employee having an 
offsetting amount of income for the reimbursement. See Rev. Rul. 60- 
223, 1960-1 C.B. 57, and Rev. Rul. 66-41, 1966-1 C.B. 233. The 
expense is no less deductible when paid directly by the corporation.
It is, therefore, contended that the disallowance made by the 
examining officer was in error.
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REQUEST FOR CONFERENCE 
An oral hearing is requested before the regional director of appeals.
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION9
The attached protest was prepared by the undersigned on the basis 
of information available to him (or her). All statements contained 
therein are true and correct to the best of his (or her) knowledge and 
belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner
Requests for Rulings and Determination Letters
Frequently tax practitioners find it necessary to seek a ruling from 
the IRS to fix the tax consequences of a client’s anticipated business 
transaction or to settle a disagreement with a revenue agent during 
an examination. The general procedures with respect to the issuance 
of advance rulings (before the fact) and determination letters (after 
the fact) are outlined in Revenue Procedure 79-45, 1979-2 C.B. 508, 
in which the IRS announced that a careful adherence to the specified 
requirements will minimize needless delays in processing requests 
for rulings and for determination letters. In addition to Revenue 
Procedure 79-45, the IRS has on occasion issued procedures that 
govern ruling requests dealing with specific topics. For example, 
Revenue Procedure 73-10 suggests specific guidelines for ruling 
requests involving section 351. Similarly, Revenue Procedure 74-17 
delineates requirements for ruling requests concerning the classifi­
cation of organizations, for example, partnerships versus associations.
Requests for rulings, which are addressed to the national office of 
the IRS, generally take the following format.
It is assumed that an appropriate power of attorney has been filed with the IRS. 
Otherwise, a power of attorney must be attached to the protest.
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Washington, D.C. 20224
Attention: T:PS:T
Re: Allemania Electronic, Inc. 
(I.D. 73-2113112)
1403 South State Street 
Austin, Texas 78712
Request for ruling under 
section 306 to fix status of 
nonvoting preferred stock 
to be issued under sec­
tion 368(a)(1)(E) in ex­
change for voting com­
mon stock.
Dear Sir:
Allemania Electronic, Inc., is a Texas corporation with 10,000 shares 
of common voting stock issued and outstanding. Of this issue, 8,500 
shares are owned by Electric Supply Co., while the remaining shares 
are owned by several minority interests. Electric and Allemania join 
in the filing of a consolidated tax return on a calendar-year basis. A 
plan has been proposed under which Allemania will exchange 3,500 
shares of its common voting stock now held by Electric for 3,500 shares 
of preferred non voting stock. The proposed exchange should constitute 
a recapitalization to which section 368(a)(1)(E) applies. A ruling is 
respectfully requested concerning whether or not the proposed issue 
of preferred nonvoting stock would constitute section 306 stock.
FACTS
Electric Supply Co. acquired 85 percent of Allemania’s common 
voting stock on June 1, 1975. Since that time Electric has included 
Allemania’s stock as a temporary investment on its audited financial 
statements. Considerable pressure is now being exerted by Electric’s 
auditors to include Allemania as a fully consolidated subsidiary on its 
audited statement or to dispose of the investment. Since Allemania is 
a supplier of needed components to Electric, divesture is out of the 
question. On the other hand, inclusion on a fully consolidated basis 
is out of the question since the board of directors fears a negative 
effect on Electric’s stock prices. Allemania has therefore adopted a 
plan to exchange 3,500 shares of voting common stock for an equal 
number of nonvoting preferred stock, thus making it possible to 
continue to show Allemania on Electric’s audited financial statements 
as a line-item investment, since ownership in voting stock does not 
exceed 50 percent.
November 15, 1980
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DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES 
Internal Revenue Code section 306(c)(1)(B)(ii) seems to imply that
the preferred stock to be issued would be tainted as section 306 stock. 
Similar thoughts are expressed in Rev. Rul. 59-84, Rev. Rul. 66-332, 
and Rev. Rul. 70-199. However, given the nature of the transaction 
contemplated by Allemania, there also appears to be substantial 
authority for arguing that the newly issued preferred stock should not 
be section 306 stock. Since, after the proposed exchange of common 
for preferred, the percentage interest in Electric’s voting stock would 
be substantially reduced, the preferred stock should not be section 
306 stock. This position seems to be supported by Rev. Rul. 59-84, in 
which one of the shareholders reduced his proportionate interest in 
the common stock of the distributor corporation from 55.8 percent to 
0 percent. In that instance the Internal Revenue Service ruled that, 
since the shareholder’s percentage interest in the common stock was 
substantially reduced by the recapitalization, section 306 did not apply 
to the newly issued preferred stock.
BUSINESS PURPOSE
Taxpayer also contends that avoidance of income taxes is not a 
reason for the proposed recapitalization, but that recapitalization is 
motivated entirely by a valid business purpose. The business purpose 
in this instance is the avoidance of the negative impact on stock prices 
that Electric contends will result if Allemania is included as a fully 
consolidated subsidiary on Electric’s audited financial statements.
REQUEST FOR RULING
It is respectfully requested that the commissioner rule that the 
proposed issuance of preferred nonvoting stock in exchange for common 
voting stock under section 368(a)(1)(E) does not qualify the newly 
issued preferred stock as section 306 stock.
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CONTENT 
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this
request, including accompanying documents, and to the best of my 
knowledge and belief the facts presented in support of the requested 
ruling are true, correct, and com plete.
Allemania Electronics, Inc.
b y ------------------------------------------------------
Vice President and Treasurer
171
STATEMENT REGARDING IDENTICAL ISSUES 
To the best of the knowledge of the taxpayer and his or her
representative, none of the issues upon which a ruling is requested is 
being considered by any field office of the Internal Revenue Service 
or by a branch office of the appellate division.
Allemania Electronics, Inc.
b y ------------------------------------------------------
Vice President and Treasurer
Signature of Tax Practitioner
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION 
The attached request for ruling was prepared by the undersigned
on the basis of information made available to him (or her). All 
statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of his 
(or her) knowledge and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner
As mentioned in chapter 4, under the Freedom of Information Act 
and section 6110(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, rulings and the 
background file are open for inspection by the public. However, the 
IRS is required under section 6110(c) to delete certain information. 
For that reason Revenue Procedure 79-45 suggests that a ruling 
request be accompanied by a statement of proposed deletions via a 
copy of the ruling request using brackets that show the material the 
taxpayer suggests deleting.
As depicted in the sample ruling request, a request should also be 
signed by the taxpayer or an authorized representative. If signed by 
an authorized representative, the request should include an appro­
priate power of attorney and evidence that the representative is 
currently either an attorney, a certified public accountant, or an 
enrolled agent in good standing and duly licensed to practice.
172
7
These examples are the school of mankind, and they will 
learn at no other.
EDMUND BURKE
Tax Research in the 
“Closed-Fact” Case: 
An Example
The preparation of a well organized working paper file cannot be 
overemphasized because it proves that research efforts have been 
thorough, are logically correct, and are adequately documented. The 
elements of this chapter comprise a sample client file. The formats 
of files used in practice vary substantially among firms; the new tax 
accountant who uses this tax study as a guide for actual research 
efforts should be prepared to modify this illustration to conform to 
the format used by his or her employer. It is hoped that the general 
format suggested here would be approved by most experienced tax 
advisers, although any employer might disagree with any of several 
specifics. The sample is based on a relatively simple incorporation 
transaction. Because the tax problems illustrated are relatively simple, 
the supporting file would be considered excessive by most advisers; 
the cost of preparing such an elaborate file would be too great to 
justify. In this case, the reader should concentrate more on general 
working paper content and arrangement than on the substantive tax 
issues illustrated, although in more complex problems this kind of 
detail would be appropriate.
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Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the client has contacted 
the accountant after all aspects of the incorporation transaction were 
completed. In other words, the accountant’s task in this engagement 
is restricted to compliance-related tax research. We have combined 
the information for three clients into one file, that is, that of the new 
corporate entity and that of its president and vice president. In 
practice, however, three separate files would be maintained. Finally, 
in practice a file would very likely include a substantial number of 
photocopies of excerpts from the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
regulations, revenue rulings, judicial decisions, commercial tax serv­
ices, and other reference works. We have attempted to simulate a 
real file by combining script and ordinary type. Anything in script 
type would be handwritten in a real file. Anything enclosed by a tint 
block represents material that would be photocopied.
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Reef E. Ink, Judith Dixon, Ready, Inc.
Tax File 
December 1980
IND EX TO WORKING PAPERS
Item
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M emo to File, R. U. Partner 
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Working Papers
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Summary o f Questions & Conclusions
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Summary o f Questions & Conclusions 
Working Papers
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Page Ref.
1 to 3
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A-4
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D-1 & D-2
E-1 & E-2 
F-1 to F-5
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants 
2010 Professional Tower 
Calum City, USA 00001
December 24, 1980
Mr. Red E. Ink, President
Ms. Judith Dixon, Vice President
Ready, Incorporated
120 Publisher Lane
Calum City, USA 00002
Dear Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon:
This letter confirms the oral agreements of December 17, 1980, in which 
our firm agreed to undertake the preparation of your respective federal 
income tax returns along with that of Ready, Incorporated, for next year. 
This letter also reports the preliminary results of our investigation into the 
tax consequences of the formation of Ready, Incorporated, last March. We 
are pleased to be of service to you and anticipate that our relationships will 
prove to be mutually beneficial. Please feel free to call upon me at any time.
Before stating the preliminary results of our investigation into the tax 
consequences of your incorporation transaction, I would like to restate 
briefly all of the important facts as we understand them. Please review this 
statement of facts very carefully. Our conclusions depend on a complete and 
accurate understanding of all the facts. If any of the following statements is 
either incorrect or incomplete, please call it to my attention immediately, 
no matter how small or insignificant the difference may appear to be.
Our conclusions are based on an understanding that on March 1, 1980, 
the following exchanges occurred in the process of forming a new corporation, 
Ready, Incorporated. Ms. Dixon transferred two copyrights to Ready, 
Incorporated, in exchange for 250 shares of common stock. Ms. Dixon had 
previously paid $200 for filing the copyrights. In addition, the corporation 
assumed an $800 typing bill, which Ms. Dixon owed for these two 
manuscripts.
Mr. Ink concurrently transferred all the assets and liabilities of his former 
sole proprietorship printing company, Red Publishings, to the new corpo­
ration in exchange for 750 shares of Ready, Incorporated, common stock. 
The assets transferred consisted of $20,000 cash, $10,000 (estimated market
(draft)
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Red E. Ink 
Judith Dixon 
December 24, 1980 
Page 2
value) printing supplies, $50,000 (face value) trade receivables, and $60,000 
(book value) equipment. The equipment, purchased new in 1976 for 
$100,000, had been depreciated on a double-declining-balance method for 
the past four years. An investment credit was claimed in 1976 on the 
purchase of the equipment. The liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc., consisted 
of the $40,000 mortgage remaining from the original equipment purchase 
in 1976 and current trade payables of $10,000. We further understand that 
Ready, Inc., plans to continue to occupy the building leased by Red 
Publishings on October 1, 1978, from Branden Properties until the expiration 
of that lease on September 30, 1982. Finally, we understand that Ready, 
Incorporated, has issued only 1,000 shares of common stock and that Mr. 
Ink retains 730 shares; that Mr. Ink’s wife Neva holds ten shares; that Mr. 
Tom Books, the corporate secretary-treasurer, holds ten shares; and that 
Ms. Dixon holds the remaining 250 shares. The shares held by Mrs. Ink and 
Mr. Books were given to them by Mr. Ink, as a gift, on March 1, 1980.
Assuming that the preceding paragraphs represent a complete and 
accurate statement of all the facts pertinent to the incorporation transaction, 
we anticipate reporting that event as a wholly non taxable transaction. In 
other words, neither of you, the incorporators (individually), nor your 
corporation will report any taxable income or loss solely because of your 
incorporation of the printing business. Furthermore, no amount of invest­
ment credit will have to be recaptured. However, in the future Ready, Inc., 
will be restricted to a 150 percent declining-balance depreciation deduction 
on the equipment transferred. The trade receivables collected by Ready, 
Inc., after March 1, 1980, will be reported as the taxable income of the 
corporate entity; collections made between January 1, 1980, and February 
28, 1980, will be considered part of Mr. Ink’s personal taxable income for 
1980.
There is a possibility that the Internal Revenue Service could argue (1) 
that Ms. Dixon is required to recognize $800 of taxable income and/or (2) 
that the corporation could not deduct the $10,000 in trade payables it 
assumed from the proprietorship. If either of you desire, I would be pleased 
to discuss these matters in greater detail. Perhaps, it would be desirable for
(draft)
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Red E. Ink
Judith Dixon
December 24, 1980
Page 3
Mr. Bent and myself to meet with both of you and review these potential 
problems prior to our filing the corporate tax return.*
If you wish to report the first corporate taxable income on a cash method 
fiscal-year basis, ending February 28, 1981, it is imperative that you have 
Mr. Tom Books keep the corporation’s regular financial accounts on that 
same basis. If he desires any help in maintaining those records, we shall be 
happy to assist him. It will be necessary for us to have access to your personal 
financial records no later than March 1, 1981, and to your corporate records 
no later than April 15, 1981, if the federal income tax returns are to be 
completed and filed on a timely basis.
Finally, may I suggest that we plan to have at least one more meeting 
in my office sometime prior to February 28, 1981, to discuss possible tax­
planning opportunities available to you in the new corporation. Among other 
considerations, we should jointly review the possibility that you may want 
to make a subchapter S election and that you may need to structure executive 
compensation arrangements carefully and may wish to institute a pension 
plan. It may be desirable to discuss these opportunities at the same time 
that we meet with Mr. Bent to consider the two questions noted above. 
Please telephone me to arrange an appointment if you would like to do this 
shortly after the holidays.
Thank you again for selecting our firm for tax assistance. It is very 
important that some of the material in this letter be kept confidential, and 
we strongly recommend that you carefully control access to it at all times. 
If you have any questions about any of the matters discussed, feel free to 
request a more detailed explanation or drop by and review the complete 
files, which are available in my office. If I should not be available, my 
assistant, Fred Senior, would be happy to help you. We look forward to 
serving you in the future.
Sincerely yours,
Robert U. Partner
* Some advisors would delete this paragraph and handle the matter orally.
(draft)
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants 
2010 Professional Tower 
Calum City, USA 00001
December 17, 1980
MEMO TO FILE
FROM: R. U. Partner
SUBJECT: Ready, Inc.—Tax Engagement
Mr. Red E. Ink (president) and Ms. Judith Dixon (vice president) this 
morning engaged our firm to prepare and file their personal annual federal 
income tax returns and that for Ready, Inc. During an interview in my 
office, the following information pertinent to the first year’s tax returns was 
obtained.
On March 1, 1980, Red E. Ink and Judith Dixon incorporated the sole 
proprietorship publishing house that Mr. Ink has for six years previously 
operated as Red Publishings. There were two primary business reasons for 
incorporating: (1) The incorporators desired to limit their personal liability 
in a growing business; (2) greater access to credit was desired, since it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain credit as individuals or as a 
partnership because of the prevailing interest rates and the state usury laws.
Judith Dixon is a full-time practicing trial lawyer and has done a substantial 
amount of work in media law. Several years ago she wrote, on her own 
time, five articles in various professional journals. Her objective in writing 
the articles was to establish a reputation among her professional peers and 
to enjoy such resulting benefits as client referrals and seminar speaking 
engagements. As a matter of fact, Ms. Dixon obtained such benefits. The 
articles were written on a gratis basis.
For the past four years, Ms. Dixon has devoted many hours to writing 
two full-length books, Trials and Tribulation and Media Law: Developing 
Frontiers. Ms. Dixon has encountered unexpected difficulty in getting her 
manuscripts published. This difficulty has been very frustrating to Ms. 
Dixon.
Ms. Dixon met Mr. Ink at a seminar—entitled “Media and Its Place in 
Our American Society’’—during the fall of 1979. This was one of several 
seminars at which Ms. Dixon lectured annually on a fee basis. Red 
Publishings had never been approached by Ms. Dixon because she had
A-1 (RUP 12/17/80)
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Memo to File (R. U. Partner)
Page 2
wanted to be associated with a larger organization. However, at this point 
Ms. Dixon was fearing the possibility that her works would never appear in 
print. Thus, after a period in which Ms. Dixon sold Mr. Ink on the quality 
of her books and, conversely, Mr. Ink sold Ms. Dixon on the capability and 
growth potential of his publishing house, they convinced one another that 
their association would bring adequate returns to all concerned.
The following incorporation transaction was agreed upon: Judith trans­
ferred the copyrights to her two manuscripts to Ready, Inc., a newly formed 
corporation. Judith’s tax basis in the two manuscripts was $200, the amount 
she paid another lawyer to file the copyright papers. She still owed $800 for 
the manuscript typing. Ready, Inc., agreed to assume this liability and to 
issue Judith 250 shares of Ready, Inc., common stock.
Red transferred all the assets and liabilities of his former proprietorship 
to Ready, Inc., in exchange for 750 shares of Ready, Inc., common stock. 
Immediately after receiving the 750 shares, Red gave ten shares to his wife, 
Neva, and another ten shares to Tom Books, an unrelated and long-time 
employee who was named the corporate secretary-treasurer. Red stated that 
these two transfers were intended as gifts and not as compensation for any 
prior services.
Tom Books provided me with a copy of the balance sheet for Red 
Publishings just prior to the incorporation. It appears as follows:
Red Publishings 
Balance Sheet 
February 28, 1980
Assets
Cash $ 20,000
Supplies on hand 10,000
Trade receivables 50,000
Equipment (net) 60,000
Total assets $140,000
Liabilities & Equity
Trade payables $ 10,000
Mortgage payable 40,000
Total liabilities 
Red E. Ink, capital
Total liabilities & equity
$ 50,000 
90,000
$140,000
A-2 ( RUP 12/17/80)
180
Memo to File (R. U. Partner) 
Page 3
The balance sheet was prepared at the request of Mr. Hal Bent, who 
served as legal counsel to Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon during the Ready, Inc., 
incorporation. Mr. Bent and Ms. Dixon are members of the same law firm. 
Incidentally, Mr. Bent recommended to Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon that our 
firm be engaged to prepare and to file their federal tax returns.
During our interview Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon stated that they had always 
reported their respective personal incomes on a calendar-year, cash basis. 
It is their intention to report the corporation’s taxable income on a cash 
basis in the future. They plan, however, to have the corporate (taxable) 
fiscal year run from March 1 to February 28/29.
The $40,000 mortgage payable represents the balance payable on equip­
ment that was purchased for $100,000 in 1976. This equipment has been 
depreciated on a double-declining-balance method since then. Investment 
credit was claimed when the equipment was purchased (new). The $60,000 
shown on the balance sheet is book value. Red estimates that the fair market 
value of the equipment transferred was approximately $75,000 at the time 
of the incorporation transaction. The trade payables represent the unpaid 
balances for supplies, utilities, employees’ wages, etc., as of the end of 
February 1980. All of these accounts were paid by Ready, Inc., within sixty 
days following incorporation. Tom has agreed to provide us with Ready’s 
income statement and year-end balance sheet by no later than March 30, 
1981. Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon will provide us with additional details 
concerning their personal tax returns in early February.
I have assigned Fred E. Senior the responsibility of investigating all tax 
consequences associated with the initial incorporation of Ready, Inc. He is 
immediately to begin preparation of our file, which will be used early next 
year in connection with the completion of the tax returns for these new 
clients. All preliminary research should be completed by Fred and reviewed 
by me before December 31, 1980. I have also asked Fred to prepare a draft 
of a client letter confirming this new engagement and stating our preliminary 
findings on the tax consequences of the incorporation transaction.
A-3 (RUP 12/17/80)
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants 
2010 Professional Tower 
Calum City, USA 00001
December 19, 1980
MEMO TO FILE
FROM: Fred E. Senior
SUBJECT: Additional Information on Ready, Inc., Tax Engagement
After reviewing Mr. Partner’s file memo of December 17, 1980, and 
subsequently undertaking limited initial research into the tax questions 
pertinent to filing the Red E. Ink, Judith Dixon, and Ready, Inc., federal 
income tax returns, I determined that additional information should be 
obtained. Specifically, I observed that the February 28, 1980, balance sheet 
included no real property, and I believed that it was necessary for several 
reasons to confirm all of the facts pertinent to this client’s real estate 
arrangements. Accordingly, with R. U.’s approval, I telephoned Tom Books 
today and obtained the following additional information.
Tom explained that Red had signed a forty-eight-month lease with 
Branden Properties, Inc., on October 1, 1978, and that Ready, Inc., had 
continued to occupy the same premises and had paid all monthly rentals 
due under this lease ($6,000 per month) since March 1, 1980. It is Tom’s 
opinion that Red probably will construct his own building once this lease 
expires but that he probably will not try to get out of the present lease 
before its expiration on September 30, 1982. Tom said that the lease 
agreement calls for a two-month penalty payment (that is, a $12,000 payment) 
if either party should break the lease prior to its expiration. According to 
this agreement, whichever party breaks the lease must pay the other the 
stipulated sum. Tom further stated that the present lease “really is not a 
particularly good one. ’’ In late 1978 it appeared to Red that office space in 
Calum City was going to be scarce, and he thought that the lease then 
negotiated was a wholly reasonable one. By the spring of 1980, however, 
the available office space exceeded the demand. Tom suggested (and, based 
on his square-footage estimates, I agree) that this same lease could now be 
negotiated for about $5,500 per month. The penalty for breaking the lease 
would just about equal the saving that could be obtained by renegotiating 
a new lease today. Under the circumstances, Red has elected to continue 
with the old lease for the present. This option allows him time to decide 
whether to build or purchase another building sometime prior to 1982.
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Red E. Ink (Personal Account) 
Summary o f Questions Investigated 
December 1980
1. Was the March 1, 1980, incorporation transaction be­
tween Red E. Ink, Judith Dixon, and Ready, Inc., a 
tax-free transfer under sec. 351?
Conclusion: Yes; all o f the requirements o f sec. 351 were 
reasonably satisfied.
a. Collateral Question: Do Ms. Dixon's copyrights 
qualify as "property” fo r  purposes o f sec. 351?
Conclusion: Although the answer is not wholly cer­
tain, there is reasonable support to treat Ms. Dixon’s 
copyrights as sec. 351 property.
b. Collateral Question: Do Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon 
"control” Ready, Inc., fo r  sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: Yes. There are no control problems that 
would preclude the application o f sec. 351.
c. Collateral Question: Could Ready’s assumption
of liabilities cause partial taxability o f the incorpora­
tion transaction
(1) in regard to Mr. Ink?
(2) in regard to Ms. Dixon?
Conclusion: 1(c) (1) — Mr. Ink would clearly receive 
fu l l  nontaxable treatment pursuant to sec. 357 (c)
(3).
Conclusion: 1(c) (2) —Although the issue is not 
totally free  o f doubt, there is reasonable authority 
fo r  characterizing Ms. Dixon’s incorporation transac­
tion as fu lly  nontaxable.
C-1 and C-2
C-2 thru C-5
C-5 and C-6
C-6 thru C-12
C-6 thru C-10
C-10 thru C-12
W.P. Ref.
2. Is the portion o f the $ 60,000 in trade receivables
transferred by Red E. Ink to Ready, Inc., and collected 
by the latter, properly considered to be the taxable in­
come of Mr. Ink (individually) or that o f Ready, Inc. 
(the corporation)?
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Summary o f Questions Investigated 
December 1980
treating the trade receivables collected after
Conclusion: Reasonable authority now exists to justify
incorporation
as the taxable income o f Ready, Inc.
3. M ust Red E. Ink recapture any portion (or all)
o f the investment credit claimed in 1976 because o f his 
transfer o f the related equipment to Ready, Inc., on 
3/1/80?
Conclusion: No recapture is required.
4. W hat is Mr. Ink’s tax basis in the 730 shares 
of Ready, Inc., common stock that he retained?
Conclusion: In our opinion, Mr. Ink’s basis in 730 shares 
is $39 ,200.
W.P. Ref. 
C-12 and C-13
C-13 and C-14
C-14 thru C-16
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1. Was the incorporation o f Red Publishings on 3 /1/80 a 
tax-free transaction?
Red E. Ink (Personal Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
Conclusion: Yes; reasonable authority now exists to justify  
treating the incorporation of Red Publishings as a tax-free 
transaction pursuant to sec. 351, 1.R.C. 1954, which reads 
as follows:
For facts, see 
W.P. A-1 
thru A-4
SEC. 351. TRANSFER TO CORPORATION
CONTROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.
See collateral  
question 1(b)
(a) General Rule—No gain or loss shall be recognized if propert y  
is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely 
in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and 
immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in 
(control)(as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation. For 
purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for services 
shall not be considered as issued in return for property.
See
collateral 
question 1(a)
the rule
(b) Receipt of Property—If subsection (a) would apply to an 
exchange but for the fact that there is received, in addition to 
the stock or securities permitted to be received under subsection 
(a), other property or money, then—
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but 
not in excess of—
(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property re­
ceived: and
N fA  (no 
boot rec’d  by 
Mr. Ink or 
Ms. Dixon)
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule.—In determining control, for purposes of this  
section, the fact that any corporate transferor distributes part 
or all of the stock which it receives in the exchange to its 
shareholders shall not be taken into account.  
(d) Exception.—This section shall not apply to a transfer of 
property to an investment company.
(e) Cross References.—
(I) For special rule where another party to the exchange 
assumes a liability, or acquires property subject to a liability, 
see section 357.
NfA
See W.P. C-7 
thru C-12
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Working Papers
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(2) For the basis of stock, securities, or property received 
in an exchange to which this section applies, see sections 
358 and 362.
(3) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in 
this section but which results in a gift, see section 2501 and 
following.
(4) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in 
this section but which has the effect of the payment of 
compensation by the corporation or by a transferor, see 
section 61(a)(1).
See W.P. C 
and C-16
W.P. Ref.
N fA
N /A
a. Collateral Question: Are Ms. Dixon's copyrights 
considered "property” fo r  sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: The term "property” as used in sec. 351 
is neither statutorily defined (the definition in sec. 
317(a) is applicable only to part 1 o f subchapter C 
and thus does not apply to sec. 351) nor interpreted 
by Treasury regulations. Basically, the problem here 
is whether income must be recognized on the incor­
poration of a going business when previously un­
taxed rights, created by personal services, are trans­
ferred  fo r  stock. As pointed out by Bittker and Eus­
tice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 4th ed., p. 3-13, this issue is reminis­
cent o f cases in the capital gain area involving such 
items as industrial knowhow, trade names, profes­
sional goodwill, trade secrets, employment contracts, 
etc. Profit on the sale of such assets has sometimes 
been denied capital gain status, partly on the ground 
that the transferred item did not constitute 
within the meaning
sec. 351 was intended to perm it the tax-free incorpo­
ration of going businesses, however, there is less 
reason to interpret "property” in sec. 351 to exclude 
such commonly encountered items. There is a lack of 
an extensive body o f law in this area. There are no 
cases which have held that copyrights are not sec.
351 property. However, it m ust be recognized that
o f sec. 1221. Sinceproperty
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W.P. Ref.
the service could attem pt to characterize Ms. Dixon's 
copyright transfers as a device, in whole or in part, 
to compensate her fo r  past services or to convert the 
copyright ordinary income (per sec. 1221 (3) (A)) 
into a block o f stock that can qualify as a capital 
asset upon sale. The service could argue that a 
taxable disposition has occurred under sec. 1001, 
with the am ount o f gain being determined under 
sec. 1001(a) and sec. 1001(b). If  that position were 
sustained, Ms. Dixons gain would be ordinary in­
come (since the copyrights are not capital assets as 
defined in sec. 1221) in an am ount equal to the 
excess o f the fa ir  market value o f the shares o f 
Ready, Inc., over her adjusted basis (determined by 
sec. 1012 to be her cost o f $ 2 00) in the copyrights.
Ms. Dixon could counter with many arguments o f 
various strengths. First, Ms. Dixon could point to the 
wording o f other code provisions. For example, in all 
three subsections 1001(a), 1001(b), and 1001(c), 
there is reference to a "disposition o f property” or a 
"sale or exchange o f property" ( emphasis added). 
Doubtless the service would contend that "property" 
did not possess identical definitions fo r  the two sepa­
rate code provisions, sec. 1001 and sec. 351.
Even more explicit code recognition o f copyrights 
as property is fo u n d  in the sec. 1221 definition o f a 
capital asset. Section 1221(3) states that "a copyright, 
. . .  or similar property” under certain circumstances 
is not a capital asset (emphasis added).
In addition to the above statutory language, vari­
ous administrative references exist that refer to 
copyrights as property. For example, Rev. Rul. 53- 
234, 1953-2 C.B. 29, held that the sale o f a manu­
script would qualify as a casual sale o f personalty 
eligible fo r  installment sale reporting. The ruling 
cited favorably two prior administrative releases, 
G.C.M. 236, VI-2 C.B. 27 (1927), and I.T. 2735,
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X II-2 C.B. 131 (1933). These prior releases dealt 
with other issues, but both stated, inter alia, that 
copyrights were personalty. Thus, Rev. Rul. 53-234 
stated, "A literary composition is recognized as 
property in the Internal Revenue Code.” In addition 
to the statutory and administrative language argu­
ments ju s t  discussed, Ms. Dixon could make some 
general arguments. The entire thrust o f any service 
attack would be that the exchange was an abusive 
attem pt to convert ordinary income property into 
capital gain property. However, Ms. Dixon could 
analogize to the situation where inventory o f a sole 
proprietorship manufacturer is transferred upon in­
corporation. Both situations involve previously un­
taxed assets created by personal services being trans­
ferred  fo r  stock. Presumably, the inventory-for-stock 
exchange would raise no questions, so why should 
the copyrights-for-stock exchange be different?
If it were held that copyrights are not sec. 351 
property, Ms. Dixon would be placed in the inequit­
able position o f having a currently recognizable tax 
gain without any concurrent wherewithal to pay.
Any "cashing-in" in this case is certainly tenuous and  
speculative in nature. Ms. Dixon’s minority 
shareholder status places substantial restrictions on 
her realization of income. Real value is dependent 
on the fu ture success o f the corporation.
As can be gathered fro m  the above discussion, 
authority regarding this issue is limited. This, in and  
of itself, may be the strongest argument fo r  treating 
Ms. Dixon’s copyrights as sec. 351 property. There is 
certainly no direct authority that would dictate a 
contrary treatment.
In summary, there is reasonable authority to ju s­
tify treating the incorporation of Red Publishings as a 
tax-free transaction under sec. 351. The critical issue 
is whether Ms. Dixon’s copyrights are "property" fo r
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sec. 351 purposes. Direct authority fo r  answering this 
issue does not exist. In this case it is reasonable to 
adopt the position favorable to the taxpayer. How­
ever, I recommend advising the clients o f the possi­
bility that the service could argue fo r  the taxability 
of the incorporation transaction because it did not 
view the copyrights as "property” fo r  sec. 351 pur­
poses.
b. Collateral Question: Do Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon 
have any "control” requirement problems under sec. 
351(a)? Specifically, since Mr. Ink individually owns 
only 75%, o f Ready, Inc., common stock, is the sec. 
351 (a) control requirement met?
general rule o f sec. 351(a) to
Conclusion: There are no problems. The sec. 351(a) 
control requirement is met.
In order fo r  the 
apply, the shareholders involved in the transfers 
m ust be in control o f the corporation immediately 
after the exchange. Section 351 "control” is statutorily 
governed by the definition o f "control” contained in 
sec. 368(c). The requisite ownership percentage in 
sec. 368(c) is 80%. This control requirement is m et 
if, in the words o f both the statute and the regula­
tions, "immediately after the exchange such person 
or persons are in control” (emphasis added). In our 
case Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon are the "persons," and  
they own 98%, o f the Ready, Inc., stock. "Control" 
does not have to be maintained by a sole 
shareholder. Treasury regulations section 1.351-1 (a)
(2) example (1) illustrates a situation that contains 
an ownership structure almost identical to our case, 
that is, two shareholders, one owning 75%, and one 
owning 25%,. The example states that no gain or 
loss is recognized by either shareholder.
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TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.351-1. TRANSFER TO
CORPORATION CONTROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.
(a) (1) Section 351(a) provides, in general, for the nonrecog­
nition of gain or loss upon the transfer by one or more persons 
of property to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or 
securities in such corporation, i f  immediately after the. exchange, 
such person or persons are in control of the corporation to 
which the property was transferred. As used in section 351. the 
phrase "one or more persons" includes individuals, trusts, 
estates, partnerships, associations, companies, or corporations 
(see section 7701(a)(1)). To be in control of the transferee 
corporation, such person or persons must own immediately 
after the transfer stock possessing at least 80 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to 
vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of 
all other classes of stock of such corporation (see section 
368 (c)).
(2) The application of section 351 (a) is illustrated by the 
following examples:
Example (1). C owns a patent right worth $25,000 and D 
owns a manufacturing plant worth $75,000. C and D 
organize the R Corporation with an authorized capital stock 
of $100,000. C transfers his patent right to the R Corporation 
for $25,000 of its slock and D transfers his plant to the new 
corporation for $75,000 of its stock. No gain or loss to C or 
D is recognized.
Identical to 
our case
c. Collateral Question: Could the liabilities
assumed by Ready, Inc., exceed the adjusted basis 
of the assets transferred so that the exception of sec. 
557(c) might require the recognition o f some gain?
Conclusion: No; see below fo r  reasons. Section 557 
reads as follows.
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SEC. 357. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY.
(a) General Rule.—Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permit­
ted to be received under section 351. 361, 371, or 374 
without the recognition of gain if it were the sole consid­
eration, and
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the 
exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires 
from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as 
money or other properly, and shall not prevent the exchange 
from being within the provisions of section 351, 361, 371, or 
374, as the ease may be.
(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.—
(1) In general.—If, taking into consideration the nature of 
the liability and the circumstances in the light of which the 
arrangement for the assumption or acquisition was made, 
it appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with 
respect to the assumption or acquisition described in sub­
section (a)—
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the 
exchange, or
(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business 
purpose, then such assumption or acquisition (in the 
total amount of the liability assumed or acquired pur­
suant to such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 
351. 361. 371, or 374 (as the case may be), be considered 
as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(2) Burden of proof.—In any suit or proceeding where the 
burden is on the taxpayer to prose such assumption or 
acquisition is not to be treated as money received by the 
taxpayer, such burden shall not be considered as sustained 
unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by the clear 
preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.—
(1) In general. In the case of an exchange—
(A) to which section 351 applies, or
the rule
N /A
N /A
Exception to 
rule in 
§357(a)
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See collateral 
question 1(c) 
(1) fo r  dis­
cussion o f this 
subsection 
and the Red 
Publishings 
liabilities that 
were as­
sumed by 
Ready, Inc.
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of 
reorganization within the meaning of section 
368(a)(1)(D), if the sum of the amount of the liabilities 
assumed, plus the amount of the liabilities to which the 
property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted 
basis of the property transferred pursuant to such 
exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a gain 
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property 
which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.
(2) Exceptions.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any ex­
change to which—
(A) subsection (b)(1) of this section applies, or
(B) section 371 or 374 applies.
(3) Certain liabilities excluded.—
(A) In general.—If—
(i) the taxpayer’s taxable income is computed under 
the cash receipts and disbursements method of 
accounting, and
(ii) such taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which 
section 351 applies, a liability which is either—
(I) an account payable payment of which would 
give rise to a deduction, or
(II) an amount payable which is described in 
section 736(a),
then, for purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of 
such liability shall be excluded in determining the 
amount of liabilities assumed or to which the prop­
erty transferred is subject.
(B) Exception.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to 
any liability to the extent that the incurrence of the 
liability resulted in the creation of, or an increase in, 
the basis of any property.
Exception to 
rule in 
§357(a)
N /A
Collateral 
question 1(c)
(2) : Would 
Ready’s as­
sumption of 
Ms. Dixon's
■ typing bill o f 
$ 8 00  fa ll  
within the 
exception to 
the exception 
of sec. 357(c)
(3)?
N /A
Per R. U. Partners memo to file  (12/17/80), p. 2, the 
assets transferred to Ready, Inc., by Red E. Ink and  
Judith Dixon were as follows:
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Asset FMV Basis
Cash $ 20,000 $20,000
(1) Supplies 10,000 -0-
(2) Trade receivables 50,000 -0-
(3) Equipment 75,000 60,000
(4) Copyrights — 200
Total basis o f assets $ 80,200
FOOTNOTES:
(1) In response to my  telephone inquiry o f today, Tom 
Books confirmed that Mr. Ink has always expensed all 
supplies fo r  tax purposes when paid.
(2) Mr. Ink has always reported his taxable income on 
a cash basis.
(3) Value estimated; adjusted basis is book value.
(4) Value unknown.
Liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc., were
Mortgage payable o f Red Publishings $ 40,000
Trade payables o f Red Publishings 10,000
Typing services payable o f Ms. Dixon ______ 800
$ 5 0,8000
d. Collateral Question: Will Mr. Ink recognize
taxable income as a result o f Ready’s assumption of 
all Red Publishing liabilities? More specifically, how 
does sec. 357(c) apply to the assumption of Red 
Pubblishing liabilities by Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: In the incorporation transaction, Ready,
Inc., assumed all the liabilities o f Red Publishings.
For tax purposes, the liabilities consisted o f the 
mortgage payable in the am ount o f $ 40,000, the 
trade payables in the amount o f $ 10,000, and, ar­
guably, Red Publishings’ lease obligation.
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In this case, sec. 557 (c) (1) would clearly not 
apply to the assumption of the mortgage by Ready, 
Inc. The mortgage liability is$ 40,000 while the 
adjusted basis o f the property is $ 60,000. Thus, 
there is no excess o f liability over basis, and the 
general rule o f sec. 557(a) would apply (meaning 
no problems fo r  sec. 551 purposes).
Section 557(c)(5), the exception to the exception, 
would clearly apply to the assumption by Ready,
Inc., o f the remainder o f Red Publishings’ liabilities. 
Thus, there will be no recognizable taxable income 
as a result o f the assumption of the Red Publishings 
debt here involved.
e. Collateral Question: Will Ms. Dixon rec­
ognize taxable income as a result o f Ready’s as­
sumption o f her $ 8 00 typing bill?
Conclusion: No, probably not. Although the issue is 
not free  fro m  doubt, I fe e l  Ms. Dixon will not 
recognize income as a result o f Ready’s assumption 
of her $ 8 00 typing bill.
The resolution of this question depends on how 
sec. 557(c) applies to the assumption of the typing 
bill. The critical issue is whether the typing bill can 
be characterized as a sec. 557(c)(5)(A )( ii)(1) 
liability. In other words, i f  Ms. Dixon had paid it, 
would it have been deductible?
The code provisions that authorize the largest 
range o f deductions are undoubtedly sec. 162 (appli­
cable to all taxpayers engaged in a trade or busi­
ness) and sec. 212 (applicable only to individual 
taxpayers). Section 162 allows the deduction of  "all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred 
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business.” Section 212 authorizes the deduction of 
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year — (1) fo r  the pro­
duction or collection of income.” The sec. 212(1) test
A-5
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of deductibility is similar to tha t o f sec. 162 with the 
exception that the expense need not be incurred in a 
trade or business (Lonnie Hawkins, Jr., P-H T.C.M.
¶ 79, 101).
The main code provisions that limit the range o f 
the cited sections are sec. 262 and sec. 265. The 
form er section disallows deductions o f personal, liv­
ing, and fa m ily  expenses, while the latter section 
disallows deductions o f capital expenditures.
In our case, Ms. Dixon could argue that the $ 800 
typing bill was an allowable deduction under either 
sec. 162 or sec. 212. For example, Treas. regs. sec. 
1.162-7 discusses the deduction o f a reasonable pay­
m ent that is made in exchange fo r  the performance 
of services. However, the service could counter that 
the typing bill was a nondeductible capital ex­
penditure or that it was a personal expenditure in­
curred in a transaction where profit had not been 
expected (that is, a hobby expenditure).
The capital expenditure claim would seem to be 
the strongest argument fo r  the service. Revenue Rul­
ing 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87, involved a taxpayer not 
engaged in a trade or business. It held that various 
expenses (including expenses fo r  secretarial help, 
artwork, supplies, and postage) incurred in producing 
and copyrighting a manuscript o f a literary composi­
tion were directly attributable to the producing and  
copyrighting o f the manuscript. Accordingly, the serv­
ice said the expenses were not deductible fo r  federa l 
income tax purposes.
The service reaffirmed this position in Rev. Rul. 
75-595, 1975-2 C.B. 87. The latter ruling also stated 
that the service would not follow the decision in 
Stern v. U.S., 27A.F.T.R2d 71-1148 (D. Cal. 1971).
The taxpayer in Stern, a Los Angeles resident, 
had spent considerable time in N ew  York preparing
Red E. Ink (Personal Account)
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a book. The necessary material fo r  this book could 
be obtained only in N ew  York. The taxpayer 
claimed his travel expenditures were deductible 
under sec. 162. The service claimed that the ex­
penditures were nondeductible capital expenditures. 
The court, while holding in favor o f the taxpayer, 
summarily stated, "Nor were they expenses fo r  se­
curing a copyright and plates which remain the 
property o f the person making the payments,” refer­
ring to Treas. regs. sec. 1.263(a)-2(b).
A recent Tax Court decision also upheld an au­
thors right to deduct nearly $ 5,000 in prepublication 
costs (rent, postage, telephone, transportation, etc.). 
The court rejected the IRS attem pt to require 
capitalization of these costs. See Fernando Faura e t  
al. v. C om m ’r., 73 T.C. No. 68 (1980). The major 
question in this instance may, therefore, be whether 
or not Ms. Dixon is — a t this point in her life — an 
author. That, o f course, is a. fa c t  issue.
In summary, although the treatment would not 
be free  fro m  attack fro m  the service, I fe e l  Ms. 
Dixon should not recognize taxable income as a 
result o f Ready’s assumption o f her typing liability. 
This result flow s fro m  the characterization o f her 
typing bill as fitting within the exception to the 
exception contained in sec. 357(c)(3) (A)( ii)(1).
2. Are collections o f the trade receivables transferred by 
Mr. Ink to Ready, Inc., on 3/1/80 to be considered the 
taxable income o f Mr. Ink or o f Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: For many years, in reliance on the 
"assignment-of-income” doctrine, the courts held 
that an individual transferor, rather than the controlled 
corporate transferee, was taxable on the inchoate income 
items transferred in a sec. 351 transaction (Brown v. 
Comm’r., 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940), and Adolph 
Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233 (1965), a f f 'd  per curiam 3H6 
F.2d H36 (9th Cir. 1967)).
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The Tax Court was finally persuaded, however, to 
allow the cash basis taxpayer to transfer accounts receiv­
able tax free  under sec. 351-(Thomas Briggs, T.C.M. 
1356-86). Since Briggs a t  least two cases, H em pt Bros., 
Inc. v. U.S., 354 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Pa. 19 73), and Divine, 
Jr.  v. U.S. 19 62-2 U.S. Tax Cs s. ¶ 8 5,532 (W.D. Tenn. 
19 62), have argued that the assignment-of-income doc­
trine is inapplicable in such situations. Bittker and Eustice 
also note that the implicit holding of Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 
604 (19 66), is that receivables transferred would not 
have been recognized but fo r  sec. 357(c) (Bittker and  
Eustice, 4th ed., p. 3-67). Under the circumstances of 
Ink’s case, there seems to be sufficient authority to argue 
that any receivables collected by Ready, Inc., should be 
treated as the taxable income o f the corporation and not 
that o f Mr. Ink individually.
Red E. Ink (Personal Account)
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3. M ust Mr. Ink recapture any o f the investment credit
claimed in 19 76 because o f his transfer o f the equipment 
to Ready, Inc., in 19 80?
Conclusion: No; all conditions o f Treas. regs. sec. 1.47- 
3(f)(1) are satisfied. The pertinent regulation reads as 
follows.
TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.47 3(f)
(f) Mere change in form of conducting a trade or Business.— 
(1) General rule.
(i) Notwithstanding the provision of § 1.47-2. relating 
to “disposition" arid “cessation,” paragraph (a) of § 1.47- 
1 shall not apply to section 38 property which is disposed 
of, or otherwise ceases to Be section 38 property with 
respect to the taxpayer, Before the close of the estimated 
useful life which was taken into account in computing 
the taxpayer’s qualified investment by reason of a mere 
change in the form of conducting the trade or Business 
in which such section 38 property is used provided that
the rule
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the conditions set forth in subdivision (ii) of this sub- 
paragraph are satisfied.
(ii) The conditions referred to in subdivision (i) of this 
subparagraph are as follows:
(a) The section 38 property described in subdivision 
(i) of this subparagraph is retained as section 38 
property in the saint; trade or business,
(b) The transferor (or in a case where the transferor 
is a partnership, estate, trust, or electing small 
business corporation, the partner, beneficiary, or 
shareholder) of such section 38 property retains a 
substantial interest in such trade or business.
(c) Substantially all the assets (whether or not section 
38 property) necessary to operate such trade or 
business are transferred to the transferee to whom 
such section 38 property is tranferred. and
(d) The basis of such section 38 property in the 
hands of the transferee is determined in whole or 
in part by reference to the basis of such section 38 
property in the hands of the transferor.
This subparagraph shall not apply te) the- transfer of 
section 38 property if paragraph (e) of this section, 
relating to transactions to which section 381 applies, 
applies with respect to such transfer.
OK here 
(same bus.)
OK here 
(73% re­
tained)
OK here (all 
prop. transf.)
OK here (see 
W.P. C-15 
and C-16)
N /A
4. W hat is Mr. Ink’s tax basis in the 730 shares o f Ready, 
Inc., stock that he retained after the 3/1/80 incorpora­
tion?
Conclusion: I.R.C. sec. 358 determines the adjusted basis 
of stocks and securities received in a sec. 351 transaction. 
It reads as follows.
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here,
$ 80,000
None
N /A
N/A
N /A
SEC. 358. BASIS TO DISTRIBUTEES.
(a) General Rule.—In the case of an exchange to which section 
351. 354, 355, 356, 361, 371(b), or 374 applies—
  (1) Nonrecognition property.—The basis of property per­
mitted to be received under such section without the 
recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as that of the 
property exchanged—
(A) decreased by— (i) the fair market value of any other property (except money) received by the taxpayer,
(ii) the amount of any money received by the 
taxpayer, and
(iii) the amount of loss to the taxpayer which was 
recognized on such exchange, and
(B) increased by—
(i) the amount which was treated as a dividend.  
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was  
recognized on such exchange (not including any 
portion of such gain which was treated as a divi­
(2) Other property.—The basis of any other property (ex­
cept money) received by the taxpayer shall be its fair market
(b) Allocation of Basis.—
(1) In general.—Under regulations prescribed by the Sec­
retary, the basis determined under subsection (a)(1) shall 
be allocated among the properties permitted to be received
  without the recognition of gain or loss.
(2) Special rule for section 355.—In the case of an exchange 
to which section 355 (or so much of section 356 as relates 
to section 355) applies, then in making the allocation under 
paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall be taken into 
account not only the property so permitted to be received 
without the recognition of gain or loss, but also the stock 
or securities (if any) of the distributing corporation which 
are retained, and the allocation of basis shall be made among
  all such properties.
$40,000  
(See sec. 
358(d)) 
N/A
N /A
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N /A
N /A
For result 
refer to sec. 
358(a)(1) 
(A)(ii), 
above
N /A
(3) Certain exchanges involving ConRail.—To the extent 
provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, in the 
case of an exchange to which section 354(d) (or so much of 
section 356 as relates to section 354(d)) or section 374(c) 
applies, for purposes of allocating basis under paragraph 
(1), stock of the Consolidated Rail Corporation and the 
certificate of value of the United States Railway Association 
which relates to such stock shall, so long as they are held
   by the same person, be treated as one property.
  (c) Section 355 Transactions Which Are Not Exchanges.—For
purposes of this section, a distribution to which section 355 (or 
so much of section 356 as relates to section 355) applies shall 
be treated as an exchange, and for such purposes the stock and 
securities of the distributing corporation which are retained 
shall be treated as surrendered, and received back, in the
  exchange.
(d) Assumption of Liability.—
(1) In general.—Where, as part of the consideration to the 
taxpayer. another party to the exchange assumed a liability 
of the taxpayer or acquired from the taxpayer property 
subject to a liability, such assumption or acquisition (in the 
amount of the liability) shall, for purposes of this section, 
be treated as money received by the taxpayer on the 
exchange.
(2) Exception.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the amount 
of any liability excluded under section 357(c)(3).
  (e) Exception.—This section shall not apply to property ac­
quired by a corporation by the exchange of its stock or securities 
(or the stock or securities of a corporation which is in control 
of the acquiring corporation) as consideration in whole or in
  part for the transfer of the property to it.
Thus, N /A  to 
any lease ob­
ligation or 
trade pay­
ables
According to sec. 358(a), therefore, Mr. Ink’s basis in the 
750 shares he initially received would be $40,000 (that 
is, $80,000 basis transferred less $40,000 liabilities as­
sumed by Ready, Inc.).
because Mr. Ink gave ten shares to Mrs. Ink and ten 
shares to Mr. books, the basis in his remaining 980 
shares would be $39,200 (98% o f $40,000). Each 
donee would have a basis o f $400  in the ten shares 
received per sec. 1015.
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1. Were the March 1, 1980, incorporation exchanges
between Ready, Inc., and Judith Dixon tax-free transfers 
under sec. 351?
Conclusion: Yes, there is reasonable authority that all of 
the requirements o f sec. 351 were satisfied.
a. Collateral Question: Can Ms. Dixon s transfer o f 
her copyrights be considered a sec. 351 transfer o f 
"property”?
Conclusion: Although the answer is not free  fro m  
total doubt, there is reasonable support to treat Ms. 
Dixon s copyrights as sec. 351 "property.”
b. Collateral Question: Do Ms. Dixon and Mr. Ink 
"control” Ready, Inc., fo r  sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: There are no control problems that 
would preclude the application o f sec. 351.
c. Collateral Question: Could Ready's assump­
tion o f liabilities cause partial taxability o f the incor­
poration transaction
(1) in regard to Mr. Ink?
(2) in regard to Ms. Dixon?
Conclusion: Although the issue is not totally free  o f 
doubt, there is strong authority fo r  characterizing 
Ms. Dixons incorporation as fu lly  nontaxable.
2. W hat is Ms. Dixon s tax basis in the 250 shares o f Ready,
Inc., common stock that she obtained in the incorpora­
tion transaction?
Conclusion: In our opinion, Ms. Dixons basis in her 250 
shares is $ 200. Ms. Dixons basis in this case is determined 
by sec. 35X. (See W.P. C-15 fo r  a copy o f the code 
section.) According to sec. 35X(a), Ms. Dixons basis in
See again 
C-1 and C-2
See again 
C-2 thru C-5
See again 
C-5 and C-6
See again 
C-6 thru C-12
See again 
C-10 thru 
C-12
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transferred in exchange fo r  the stock).
her 250 shares would be $ 200 (tha t is, the basis o f the 
copyrights she
(See W.P. C-2 thru C-5 fo r  the discussion relating to the 
characterization of the copyright as sec. 557 "property" 
subject to nontaxability.)
D-2 (FES 12/20/80)
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Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Summary o f Questions Investigated
December 1980
W.P. Ref.
I. M ust Ready, Inc., report any taxable income in its firs t 
tax year because o f its exchange o f previously unissued 
stock fo r  either the assets o f Red Publishings or Ms. 
Dixon’s copyrights?
Conclusion: No (sec. 1032). F-1
2. Can Ready, Inc., claim a tax deduction under sec. 162 
fo r  the $ 10,000 expended within sixty days following 
incorporation in paym ent o f the trade payables it as­
sumed fro m  Red Publishings?
Conclusion: The officers o f Ready, Inc., should be alerted 
to the remote possibility that the IRS might challenge the 
propriety o f the corporation s deducting the $ 10,000 ex­
pended in paym ent o f these accounts. We believe, how­
ever, that they are properly deductible.
3. Is the portion of the trade receivables transferred by Mr. 
Ink to Ready, Inc., and collected by the corporation after 
the incorporation, properly deem ed to be the taxable 
income of the corporation?
F-1
and F-2
Conclusion: Sufficient authority exists to justify treating 
the receivables collected as the taxable income of Ready, 
Inc.
See again 
C-12 and  
C-13
4. W hat is Ready’s adjusted tax basis in the various assets 
it received on 3/11/80?
Conclusion: F-2 and  
F-3
Cash $ 20,000
Supplies -0-
R ece iva b les  -0 -
Equipment 60,000
Copyrights 200
E-1 (FES 12/19/80)
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5. W hat is the m axim um  depreciation method that Ready, 
Inc., can utilize relative to the equipment acquired fro m  
Red E. Ink. on 3/1/80?
Conclusion: 150 percent declining-balance depreciation as­
suming the equipment has a remaining useful lif e  o f 
three years or longer.
6. M ust Ready, Inc., obtain the commissioner’s approval to 
f i le its f irst tax return on a February 28/29 f iscal-year, 
cash method basis?
Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Summary o f Questions Investigated
December 1980
Conclusion: No; no special permission is required so long 
as the corporate f inancial records are maintained on this 
same basis.
W.P. Ref.
F-3 and 
F-4
F-4 and 
F-5
E-2 (FES 12/19/80)
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Ready, Inc. ( Corporate Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
M ust Ready, Inc., report any taxable income in its firs t 
tax year because o f its exchange o f previously unissued 
stock fo r  various assets on 3/1/80?
Conclusion; No; see code sec. 1032 below.
SEC. 1032. EXCHANGE OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY.
(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss.—No gain or loss shall be 
recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other 
property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such 
corporation.
(b) Basis.—For basis of property acquired by a corporation in 
certain exchanges for its stock, see section 362.
W.P. Ref.
the rule
2. Can Ready, Inc., claim a tax deduction under I.R.C. sec.
162 fo r  the $10,000 it expended within sixty  days follow- For facts, see
ing incorporation in paym ent o f the trade accounts it  W.P. A-1
assumed fro m  Red Publishings? thru A-3
Conclusion; Generally the courts have denied a deduction 
fo r  ordinary (sec. 162) expenses incurred by the trans­
feror but paid by the corporate transferee following a sec.
351 incorporation. As recently as 19 72 the Tax Court 
declared
It is well settled that an expenditure of a preceding owner of 
property which has accrued but which is paid by one acquiring 
that property is a part of the cost of acquiring that property, 
irrespective of what would be the lax character of the expend­
iture to the prior owner. Such payment becomes part of the 
basis of the property acquired and may not be deducted when 
paid by the acquirer of that property.
[M. Buten and Sons, Inc., T.C.M. 1972-44]
Thus, the Tax Court in Buten indicates that a d e f inite 
uniformity of application exists in this area. Despite the 
significant number o f cases supporting that conclusion,
F-1 (FES 12/19 /80)
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W.P. Ref.
however, it may be significant that in Peter Raich, 46 
T.C. 604 (19 66), the parties stipulated that the accounts 
payable were deductible by the transferee corporation.
Furthermore, in Bongiovanni, 470 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.
19 72), the second circuit court in 19 72 noted that "where 
the acquiring corporation is on an accrual basis, such 
accounts are also deductible in its initial period.” (Note:
Ready, Inc., will be a cash basis taxpayer.) Perhaps the 
most significant argument favoring deductibility was pre­
sented in U.S. v. Smith, 41# F.2d 5#3 (5th Cir. 19 69).
There the court noted, "If this factual inquiry reveals a 
primary purpose other than acquisition o f property, the 
court may properly allow a deduction to the corporation 
i f  all the requirements of Title 26 USC, Sec. 162, are 
met. . . .” In Ink’s incorporation it is arguable that the 
liabilities o f Red Publishings were assumed by Ready,
Inc., solely fo r  business convenience reasons and not fo r  
the acquisition o f property. I f  Red’s decision to transfer 
these liabilities can be demonstrated to have been moti­
vated by this criterion, the reasoning in Smith might 
support Ready s claim fo r  deductibility. Given the weight 
of contrary authority, however, the officers o f Ready,
Inc., should be alerted to a possibility o f an IRS chal­
lenge. See Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 334 (19 42);
Hold craft Transportation Co., 153 F.2d 323 ( 8th Cir.
1946); Haden Co. v. Comm’r., 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.
19 48); and Athol Mfg. Co., 54 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1931).
3. Are collections fro m  the $50,000 in trade accounts re­
ceivable transferred by Mr. Ink to Ready, Inc., on 3/1/80 
to be considered the taxable income o f Mr. Ink or of 
Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: O f Ready, Inc.; see again W.P. C-12 and C-13.
4. W hat is Ready s adjusted tax basis in the various assets 
it received on 3 /1/80?
Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
Conclusion: The basis o f the assets received by a corpo-
F-2 (FES 12/13/80)
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the rule
rate transferee in a sec. 351 transaction are determined 
by sec. 362(a), which reads as follows.
Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Working Papers
December 19 80
W.P. Ref.
SEC. 362. BASIS TO CORPORATIONS.
(a) Property Acquired by Issuance of Stock or as Paid-In 
Surplus.—If property was acquired on or after June 22, 1954, 
by a corporation—
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 351 
(relating to transfer of property to corporation controlled by 
transferor) applies, or
  (2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital,
then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of 
the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recognized to 
the transferor on such transfer.
Accordingly, Ready’s adjusted tax basis o f assets received 
is as follows:
See W.P.
A-1 thru A-3
Cash $ 20,000
Supplies -0-
Trade receivables -0- 
Equipment 60,000
Copyrights 200
W hat is the m axim um  depreciation method that Ready, 
Inc., can utilize in depreciating the equipment acquired 
fro m  Mr. Ink on 3 /1/80?
Conclusion: Because sec. 381 does not apply to sec. 351 
transfers, all property received by Ready, Inc., is deemed  
to be used property. Such property cannot be depreciated 
under any o f the rapid methods granted only to original 
users in sec. 167(b)(2), (3), or (4). See Rev. Rul.
67-286, 1367-2 C.B. 101. However, according to Rev. Rul. 
57-352, 1957-2 C.B. 150, as modified by Rev. Rul. 67- 
248, 19 67-2 C.B. 9 8, such property can be depreciated by
F-3 (FES 12/ 19 /80)
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Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Working Papers
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a declining-balance method not to exceed 150 percent of 
the straight-line rate if  the used tangible property has an 
estimated remaining life of three years or longer.
6. M ust Ready, Inc., obtain the commissioner’s approval to 
file  its firs t tax return on a March 1 fiscal-year, cash 
basis?
Conclusion: See below Treas. regs. sec. 1.441-1 (b)(5).
TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(b)(3)
(3) A new taxpayer in his first return may adept any taxable 
year which meets the requirements of section 441 and this 
section without obtaining prior approval. The first taxable year 
of a new taxpayer must be adopted on or before the time 
prescribed by law (not including extensions) for the filing of the 
return for such taxable year. However, for rules applicable to 
the adoption of a taxable year by a partnership, see paragraph 
(b)(2) of § l .442-1, section 706(b). and paragraph (b) of § 1.706-
1. For rules applicable to the taxable year of a member of an 
affiliated group which makes a consolidated return, see § 1.1502- 
76 and paragraph (d) of 1.442-1.
See also Treas. regs. sec. 1.441-(e).
TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(e)
ie) Fiscal year.
(1) The term “fiscal year" means—
(i) A period of 12 months ending on the last day of any 
month other than December, or 
(ii) The 52-53-week annual accounting period, if such 
period has been elected by the taxpayer.
(2) A fiscal year will be recognized only if it is established 
as the annual accounting period of the taxpayer and only if 
the books ot the taxpayer are kept in accordance with such 
fiscal year.
W.P. Ref.
Confirmed 
by phone 
with Tom 
Books 
12/19/80
See client let­
ter reminder
F-4 (FES 12/19/80)
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W.P. Ref.
The courts have held that a corporate transferee is a 
separate taxpayer fro m  that o f its transferor (Sid v. Ezo 
Products Co., 57 T.C. 5X5 (1551); Akron, Canton, and 
Youngstown Railroad Co., 22 T.C. 64X (1955); and  
Textile Apron Co., 21 T.C. 147 (1953)). Consequently, if  
Ready, Inc., will keep its financial books on the same 
basis as it desires to report its taxable income, no special 
permission is required.
Ready, Inc. (Corporate Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
F-5 (FES 12/19 /80)
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Red E. Ink, Ms. Dixon, Ready, Inc. 
Suggestions fo r  Clients’ Future Consideration 
December 1980
I f Mr. Ink or Ms. Dixon desires any assistance in future tax planning we 
should discuss with either o f them, in the near future, the following 
matters:
1. Subchapter S election
a. The circumstances under which this would be desirable or 
undesirable.
b. When the decision must be made (before 5/14/81).
c. N eed fo r  every shareholder s approval (possibly getting buy­
out agreements).
2. Executive compensation possibilities
a. Group-term life insurance (sec. 79(a)).
b. Health and accident insurance (sec. 106).
c. Death benefits (sec. 101).
d. Travel and entertainment ( requirements and advantages).
3. Pension plans ( costs and benefits).
4. Future contributions to capital.
a. Consider advantages of securities.
b. Section 1244 i f  additional stock is issued.
5. Could 85 percent dividend-received deduction be used 
effectively?
(FES 12/23/80)
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It is too well settled to need citation of authorities that it is 
no offense nor is it reprehensible to avoid the attachment 
of taxes. One may employ all lawful means to minimize 
taxes.
JUDGE WALTER A. HUXMAN
Research Methodology 
for Tax Planning
This final chapter examines the research methodology appropriate to 
tax planning. It considers (1) the general role of tax planning in the 
CPA firm and (2) the technical differences between research meth­
odologies for tax planning and tax compliance.
A survey in the 70s by an AICPA committee contained several 
implications about the role of tax practice in the CPA firm.1 First, the 
survey clearly established the fact that tax practice represents an 
important source of revenue for the CPA. (Tax work accounts for 
between 21 and 40 percent of the total billings in nearly 46 percent 
of the responding firms.) Second, although return preparation ac­
counted for the largest portion of the tax work revenues, consultation 
and planning ranked second—ahead of representation before govern­
ment bodies. Third, the larger practice units tended to generate a 
larger proportion of their total tax work revenues from consultation 
and planning than did the smaller practice units. Fourth, most of the 
respondents anticipated that consultation and planning would account 
for a greater proportion of future tax work fees.
1 Jerome P. Solari and Don J. Summa, “Profile of the CPA in Tax Practice,” Tax 
Adviser (June 1972): 324-28.
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Although the study has not been replicated, informal responses 
from practitioners seem to confirm the projections of the study. All 
of this suggests, of course, that the CPA who limits his or her tax 
practice to compliance work is not taking fu l l advantage of available 
opportunities. An expansion-oriented CPA is likely to discover that 
tax-planning work is a latent source of major growth. The continuing 
relationship that a CPA has with a client ordinarily provides the CPA 
with sufficient knowledge of facts to make tax-planning proposals with 
minimal additional input from the client.
As we noted in chapter 2, a final tax liability depends on three 
variables: the facts, the law, and an administrative process. A change 
in any one of those variables is likely to change a client’s tax liability. 
To devise a tax plan that relies for its success on an amendment to 
the Internal Revenue Code is usually unrealistic. Very few taxpayers 
wield that much influence and, even if they did, the response of 
Congress in tax matters typically is unpredictable and slow. Attempts 
to change the administrative process would be equally ineffective for 
similar reasons. Good tax planning always gives adequate consider­
ation to the administrative process, but it does not rely on changes 
in that process for its success. Thus, tax plans generally must be 
based on the existing law and administrative processes because only 
the facts are readily modified. The ultimate significance of those facts 
stems, of course, from existing options already in the code.
Tax-Planning Considerations
The fundamental problems encountered in tax planning might be 
compared to those inherent in, say, a decision to transport an object 
from New York City to Atlanta. Momentarily ignoring operational 
constraints, there appear to be an almost unlimited number of ways 
to achieve the objective. That is, the object could be shipped by a 
commercial carrier (with air, rail, ship, or surface carrier possibilities); 
it might be personally delivered, or a friend might deliver it. 
However, only a few transportation methods are realistic because of 
various operational constra in ts, such as tim e (the object m ust be  
delivered before 9 a.m. on Monday morning), cost (the object must 
be shipped in the most inexpensive manner possible), or bulk (the 
size of the object may exclude all but a few possibilities). The 
transportation decision can be managed successfully only if the 
decision-maker (1) knows which options actually exist and (2) under­
stands the constraints. A tax problem has very similar boundaries.
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Statutory Options
The Internal Revenue Code already contains many options from 
which a taxpayer must select alternative courses of action. For 
example, a taxpayer generally can choose to operate a business as a 
sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. By exercising 
any option, a taxpayer automatically causes several different portions 
of the code to apply to the business operations, any one of which may 
create a drastically different tax result. In addition to selecting a basic 
business form, a taxpayer may also have an opportunity to select a 
tax year, choose certain accounting methods, determine whether the 
entity selected should be a “foreign” or “domestic” one, choose 
between a “taxable” and a “nontaxable” incorporation transaction, or 
decide whether or not to capitalize certain expenditures. Selecting 
the most advantageous combination of statutory tax options is ob­
viously a difficult task, depending importantly on the decision-maker’s 
knowledge of the very existence of those options.
Client Constraints
In addition to understanding all of the options implicit in the Internal 
Revenue Code, a tax planner must also understand the objectives 
and operational constraints inherent in the client’s activities. Those 
objectives and constraints typically are a combination of personal, 
financial, legal, and social considerations. For example, such personal 
objectives as a desire to maximize wealth, to control the distribution 
of property after death, to drive a competitor out of business, or to 
retire with minimal financial concerns may dictate certain actions. 
Personal objectives are often constrained by financial and legal 
obstacles. A tax planner can understand a client’s objectives only if 
the client is willing to confide in the adviser; therefore, it is absolutely 
essential that mutual trust and openness exist between the client and 
the tax adviser before a tax-planning engagement is undertaken.
Because tax plans often necessarily involve very significant financial 
and legal implications, much tax planning is better achieved through 
a team effort than through individual work. For example, in an estate­
planning engagement, it is not unusual to include the taxpayer’s 
attorney, the insurance agent, and a trust officer, as well as the CPA 
on the tax-planning team. By combining the special expertise of 
several individuals, the client is better served; and, more importantly, 
the team approach generally protects the client from the danger of 
“secondary infection,” that is, from the danger of putting into
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operation a plan that may succeed from a tax standpoint but that may 
have undesirable legal or financial consequences.
Creativity
Even if a tax adviser knows all of the pertinent code provisions and 
fully understands all of the client’s objectives and constraints, the 
optimal tax plan may not be obvious. An optimal plan depends on the 
creative resources of the planner. Using all of his or her knowledge, 
the tax adviser must test tentative solutions in a methodical process 
that rejects some alternatives and suggests others. Without a system­
atic method of considering and rejecting the many alternatives, the 
tax planner is likely to overlook the very alternative being sought. As 
suggested earlier in this study, one common reason for overlooking 
a good alternative is simply the tax adviser’s failure to think long or 
hard enough about the problem. There appears to be a tendency to 
rush to the books or to another person for help, hoping that the best 
solution will automatically surface, when what is really needed is 
more creative thought on the subject. The thinking process is often 
stimulated by ideas found in books or suggested by other persons. 
Our recommendation is not that books and consultants be avoided, 
but rather that the ideas obtained from these sources be given an 
opportunity to mature in quiet contemplation.
Tax-Planning Aids
Books
Tax library materials can help generate successful tax-planning ideas. 
Many practical ideas are contained in AICPA Tax Study 4, Tax 
Practice Management, by William L. Raby.2 In addition to the “tax­
planning ideas’’ portion of a client file (suggested in chapter 2 of this 
study), Raby recommends more complete “tax-planning surveys’’ and 
“year-end tax reviews’’ to better evaluate and anticipate business and 
estate-planning decisions. AICPA Tax Study 3, Guide to Federal Tax 
Elections, edited by Irvin F. Diamond and Roger L. Miller, is a 
useful aid in locating many of the options that exist in the code.3
2 William L. Raby, Tax Study 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: AICPA, 
1974).
3 Irvin F. Diamond and Roger L. Miller, ed., Tax Study 3, Guide to Federal Tax 
Elections, 3d ed., rev. (New York: AICPA, 1980).
214
In addition to these two AICPA publications, most of the com­
mercial tax services include, in some form or another, tax-planning 
ideas intended to assist the CPA in his or her practice.4 For example, 
Prentice-Hall’s service, Federal Taxes, contains a tax-savings-idea 
“index” consisting of four major classifications: (1) types of taxpayers, 
(2) income, (3) deductions and credits, and (4) miscellaneous. Sub- 
topics within each classification refer the reader to editorial expla­
nations scattered throughout that tax service. In addition, Prentice- 
Hall publishes a separate, two-volume Tax Ideas service. Volume 
one deals with everyday business and personal transactions; volume 
two concentrates on somewhat more complicated tax problems. This 
service features a transaction checklist of those tax matters that should 
be taken into account for any given transaction.
The Standard Federal Tax Reporter, published by Commerce 
Clearing House, contains a tax-planning section, organized on a 
topical basis, in its index volume. The editorial comments found there 
contain sufficient detail to handle the easier tax-planning problems; 
they are cross-referenced to other CCH paragraphs that aid in the 
solution of the more difficult problems. Volume 5A of Federal Income, 
Gift, and Estate Taxation, published by Matthew Bender, contains 
a Planning Aids section as well as a “tax calendar” for various types 
of taxpayers.
Both Prentice-Hall (five volumes) and the Research Institute of 
America (seven volumes) publish an estate planning service; however, 
they consider not just tax ideas but all facets of the estate-planning 
function.
Although neither the Tax Coordinator, published by the Research 
Institute of America, nor the Tax Management Portfolios, published 
by the Bureau of National Affairs, contains tax-planning volumes per 
se, both include tax-planning recommendations throughout in the 
commentary on the tax issues to which they relate. Matthew Bender 
also publishes a two-volume family tax-planning service. In addition, 
the same publisher supplies the three-volume Income Tax Techniques 
and the three-volume Estate Tax Techniques, both edited by the J. 
K. Lasser Tax Institute. The authors of these services are various 
practitioners who have tried to anticipate the difficulties in tax 
planning for clients.
Many other books, with varying degrees of sophistication, have 
been written on tax planning; it simply is not practical to mention
4 For additional details concerning the publishers of the several commercial tax 
services, see exhibit 4.12, p. 120.
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each of them individually. Suffice it to note that readers should not 
be misled by all of the titles including the phrase tax planning. Many 
of these publications are intended for specific taxpayers and their 
unique tax problems, for example, tax planning for professionals, for 
real estate transactions, for closely held corporations, or for inter­
national operations. Topics covered in one publication are often 
duplicated in another. Before deciding to purchase such a book, a 
practitioner would be well advised to examine it in detail to make 
certain that it actually adds something to the material already available 
in his or her library. Although many of these publications can be of 
material assistance in tax-planning work, there is no good substitute 
for the ability that comes only from years of experience.
Continuing Education
The extension of formal classroom instruction beyond the college 
campus during the past decade may be partially attributable to the 
institution of mandatory continuing education requirements for sev­
eral professions, including the profession of accountancy. For tax 
practitioners, however, tax institutes provided continuing professional 
instruction long before it became mandatory in any state.
Today, continuing education programs are a second major source 
of assistance in successful tax planning. Well developed courses are 
readily available from national, state, and local professional societies, 
educational institutions, and private organizations. The American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants annually publishes a catalog 
describing most of the continuing education programs offered by the 
AICPA and the state CPA societies. The 1980-81 catalog includes a 
description of 100 different courses in taxation. The durations of the 
courses described there vary from “one-half day” to “five nights.” 
Costs of participation, when stated, vary from $55 to $350 per course. 
Most courses are scheduled during the summer and fall, throughout 
the United States.
Inform ation abou t o th e r tax courses can frequen tly  be  found in tax 
periodicals. Some courses are directed to the beginner, others to an 
advanced audience. Some cover specific subjects; others are of general 
interest. Some are well developed and taught by highly qualified 
instructors; others have been hastily prepared and are poorly pre­
sented. Obviously, the caveat “let the buyer beware” is applicable 
in the selection of any course.
216
Tree Diagrams
In tax-planning work, the alternatives that an adviser must consider 
multiply quickly. After clearly identifying a general course of action 
(based on an understanding of the client’s objective and knowledge 
of the code), and before reaching a conclusion, an adviser might 
consider structuring a problem in the form of a “tree diagram. ” This 
technique is commonly used in management services work.5 Such an 
exercise ensures a thorough and systematic consideration of each 
alternative because it focuses on the critical questions in a sequential 
manner. The branches of the tree derive from options existing in the 
code, any one of which can achieve the client’s objective. After 
ordering the options in this fashion, the adviser should quantify the 
tax result implicit in each alternative. This quantification will facilitate 
discovery of many of the risks and constraints that, in turn, eliminate 
some alternatives and favor others. For an example of a tree diagram, 
see figure 8.1 (p. 218).
As noted above, a tree diagram cannot be prepared for a tax 
problem until a tax adviser fully understands the client’s objective 
and determines the tax rules applicable to each available method of 
achieving that objective. Knowledge of the client’s objective can 
come only from a complete and open discussion of the problem with 
the client. In an operational sense, objectives and constraints can 
only be determined in the same way in which facts are established 
in compliance engagements. Determination of the possible alterna­
tives stems from a unique blend of prior experience, reading, and 
thinking about the problem. Ascertaining the tax outcome for each 
alternative is based on the same research techniques described in the 
earlier chapters of this study. In summary, then, the only major 
differences between the tax research methodologies applicable to 
compliance work and to planning work are in the adviser’s ability to 
identify possible alternatives and in the method for selecting the best 
of the several alternatives considered. In an attempt to focus on these 
aspects of tax planning, the following pages illustrate the process 
involved in a relatively simple planning engagement. We will not 
examine in detail the procedures by which the tax adviser determines
5 For further description of this technique in general, see R. J. Ainslie and Alan A. 
Kenney, “Decision Tables—A Tool for Tax Practitioners,” Tax Adviser (June 1972): 
336-45; see also Harley M. Courtney and Patricia C. Elliott, “Computing for Tax 
Planning,” Tax Adviser (May 1974): 288-97.
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the tax result implicit in each option, since they are the same as 
those followed in a “closed-fact” situation.6
A Tax-Planning Example
To illustrate the procedures that might be used in a tax-planning 
engagement, assume that during 1977 a client, a recently retired 
army general, purchased all 200 shares of outstanding stock in NNH 
Corporation for $200,000. NNH’s only asset at the time of this 
purchase consisted of seventy acres of unimproved (and unencum­
bered) land with a tax basis of $90,000 and a fair market value of 
$200,000. Assume further that NNH has no current or accumulated 
earnings and profits.
In 1980 the city council approved construction of a new downtown 
expressway that would pass directly alongside the NNH property. 
Consequently, the fair market value of that property increased to 
$300,000.
After discussions with several developers, the client decided to 
have NNH improve the property with streets, sewers, water mains, 
and so on, and to subdivide the property for sale to builders and 
prospective homeowners. The anticipated additional investment re­
quired is estimated to be $100,000; the client hopes that the additional 
improvements will increase the value of the land to $450,000 within 
the next twelve months.
Early in 1981 the client begins to discuss with his tax adviser the 
potential tax implications of his proposed business venture. Before 
leaving the adviser’s office, the client makes it clear that he intends 
to make this his last business venture. He wants to make as large a 
profit as possible from this land deal and then invest the proceeds in 
a retirement annuity that, along with his military retirement pay, 
will guarantee him and his wife a comfortable living for as long as 
they live. He asks the tax adviser to make recommendations con­
cerning the tax implications of his land development plans.
At this point the tax practitioner, using experience and creativity, 
must identify alternative courses of action and recommend the one 
that achieves the client’s predetermined objectives with the least
6 For additional general background information, see Ralph Steinman, Tax Study 1, 
Tax Guide fo r  Incorporating a Closely Held Business, rev. ed., and Stuart R. 
Josephs and J. Michael Pusey, Tax Study 2, Tax Planning Techniques fo r Individuals 
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1978 and 1980 
respectively).
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possible tax cost. Several approaches are available to the practitioner. 
One approach, for example, is simply to apply the client’s facts to the 
announced plans and to determine the implicit tax result. This 
approach, however, would really not be considered tax planning; 
although a tax adviser must often recommend against the plan 
originally proposed by a client, the adviser generally attempts to 
recommend one or more alternatives that can achieve the most 
important client objectives in a tax-preferred manner.
In order to keep this example simple, we have assumed that
1. The client is married and files a joint return each year.
2. The taxpayer claims two exemptions and has no excess itemized 
deductions.
3. The client receives exactly $20,000 of ordinary taxable income 
each year in addition to that specifically attributable to this land 
development project.
4. The client does not qualify for income averaging.
5. The client sells all of the lots in one year.
6. The client personally invests the additional $100,000 necessary 
to make the land improvements (with no interest cost assumed).
In an actual engagement, obviously, these constraints could only be 
determined through consultation with the client. In fact, many of the 
“constraints” assumed in this example would actually constitute 
important tax-planning alternatives. For example, the opportunity to 
spread the sale of lots over several years—either to qualify for capital 
gain treatment under the “safe harbor” rules of section 1237 or to 
obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates that necessarily 
accompany a lower annual (ordinary) income—is an obvious alter­
native to the solution suggested in this example. Another equally 
obvious alternative would be to “bunch” the ordinary income in a 
single year in order to take advantage of income averaging opportu­
nities available under sections 1301 through 1305. As explained 
above, we have made assumptions that disqualify alternatives in 
order to keep the example simple.7
Given these assumptions, it appears that two major issues confront 
the client. First, there is a prospect of double taxation because the 
land is currently held by a corporate entity, and the client wants to 
place all the proceeds from this venture in a private annuity after
7 We have also assumed that the normal corporate tax rates with the five-step 
progression effective for 1980 apply; i.e., 1st $25,000 = 17%; 2d $25,000 = 20%; 
3d $25,000 = 30%; 4th $25,000 = 40%; over $100,000 = 46%.
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completion of the project. Second, there is a chance that some of the 
gain on the sale of the land could be converted from ordinary income 
into capital gain. The tree diagram in figure 8.1 outlines eleven 
possible alternatives. The diagram helps to highlight the constraints 
under which these alternatives must be pursued. Other alternatives 
have been rejected on the premise that the client has specifically 
ruled out those possibilities. For example, one obvious alternative 
would have been for the client to sell his NNH stock for $300,000. 
The diagram assumes that the client wants to develop the property 
and sell the lots; that is, he has rejected the option of selling out and 
settling for a smaller profit.
Without detailing the procedures used to determine the tax result 
implicit in each of the eleven branches of this diagram, we shall 
simply note the general tax consequence inherent in that branch. In 
order to facilitate communication, each branch has been designated 
by a combination of letters and numbers. Thus, the branch appearing 
at the top of the diagram can be readily identified as option A(l)(a)(i), 
the second option from the top as option A(l)(a)(ii), and so forth.
Liquidation Under Section 331, After Developing the
Property but Before Sale o f Lots— Options A(l)(a)(i) and (ii) 
Although the land probably would not qualify as either a capital asset 
(section 1221) or as a section 1231 asset, the liquidation of the 
corporation and distribution of the property might be treated as full 
payment in exchange for the stock (section 331). If so, because the 
stock was held for more than one year, the gain would qualify as a 
long-term capital gain. Although the client originally did not intend 
to use the corporation with a view to collapsing it to convert ordinary
Personal Tax 
I f  sec. 341 is 
not invoked
$ 20,000 
150,000
(90,000)
$ 80,000
$ 29,398
Collapsibility
status
Ordinary taxable income 
Surrender of stock
(FMV $450,000 -  cost 
$200,000 — improvements 
$100,000)
Long-term capital gain 
deduction
Total taxable income 
Tax liability
I f  sec. 341 
is invoked
$ 20,000 
150,000
$170,000
$ 85,272
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income into capital gains, the IRS might attempt to invoke section 
341, which would convert the capital gain on liquidation into ordinary 
income. The two possible tax results can be computed as shown on 
p. 221.
Under this alternative, the subsequent sale of the lots would not 
create any additional tax liability, since the client’s new basis in the 
lots would be $450,000 (assuming the fair market value remained 
firm at $450,000). Also, under section 336 the corporation would not 
recognize gain as a result of the liquidation.
Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property but Before Sale o f Lots— Option A(1 )(b)
If the liquidation is executed under section 333, no gain will be 
recognized at the time of the liquidation and, according to section 
334(c), the basis in the developed land distributed would be $300,000, 
the same as the basis of the stock surrendered. (This again assumes 
that the client contributed the additional $100,000 to NNH to make 
the land improvements.) The character of the land to the taxpayer 
would be the same as that to the corporation before liquidation; that 
is, it would be neither a capital asset nor a section 1231 asset. No 
gain would be recognized to the corporation upon liquidation (section 
336). Thus, the tax liability would be as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Sale of lots (FMV $450,000 -  cost $200,000
— improvements $100,000) 150,000
Taxable income $170,000
Tax liability $ 85,272
Liquidation Under Section 331, After Developing the
Property and After Sale o f Lots— Option A(2)(a)
In  th e  ev en t th e  corporation  sells th e  developed  p ro p e rty  before a 
liquidation is effected under section 331, it will be required to report 
the income from the sale of the lots. Undoubtedly the income would 
be treated as ordinary income, since the property was considerably 
improved and section 1237, which potentially allows capital gain 
treatment on the sale of developed land, is not applicable to 
corporations. Subsequently, the distribution of the cash in liquidation
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to the sole shareholder would be treated as in full payment in 
exchange for the stock, and the client would thus realize capital gain 
treatment (section 331). The tax consequence would be determined 
as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land $450,000
Basis of land (cost $90,000 + improvements
$100,000) 190,000
Ordinary corporate income $260,000
Corporate tax liability $100,350
Personal Tax
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $100,350) $349,650
Basis in stock (cost $200,000 + improvements
$100,000) 300,000
Capital gain on liquidation 49,650
Ordinary taxable income 20,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (29,790)
Total taxable income $ 39,860
Individual tax liability $ 9,312
Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property and After Sale o f Lots— Option A(2)(b)
Because this alternative assumes a sale of all the property by the 
corporation prior to liquidation, the corporate tax liability will amount 
to $100,350, as in the previous option, leaving an after-tax distribution 
of $349,650.
Under the provisions of section 333(e)(1), the amount of the gain 
that is not in excess of the taxpayer’s ratable share of earnings and 
profits will be recognized and treated as a dividend. Thus, since the 
client in our example is a 100 percent shareholder, the ratable share 
of earnings and profits would be $159,650 ($450,000 minus $190,000 
(basis) minus $100,350 (corporate tax)), and the recognizable gain on 
the section 333 distribution would be $49,450 ($349,650 (cash re­
ceived) minus $300,000 (basis) minus $200 (dividend exclusion)), all 
of which would be treated as a dividend. Thus, in addition to a 
corporate tax of $100,350, the client will be liable for the following 
personal income tax.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Dividend income 49,450
Tax income $ 69,450
Tax liability $ 23,701
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
in a New Corporation— Option B(l)(a)(i)
Liquidating the corporation before land improvements have begun 
would increase the basis of the property to $300,000. Under a section 
331 liquidation, the client would be treated as having exchanged his 
stock (a capital asset) for the property distributed to him.
FMV of land received $300,000
Basis of stock surrendered 200,000
Gain recognized $100,000
Because the surrendered stock constitutes a section 1221 capital 
asset, the client would report a capital gain. Thus, the total personal 
income tax due on the transaction would be computed as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on surrender of stock 100,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (60,000)
Taxable income $ 60,000
Individual tax liability $ 18,698
A subsequent tax-free transfer, under section 351, to a new 
corporation, plus investment of an additional $100,000 for the land 
development, would increase the basis of the property to $400,000. 
The new corporation would then incur a corporate tax liability upon 
sale of the land for $450,000.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land $450,000
Basis of land ($300,000 + $100,000 investment) 400,000
Ordinary corporate taxable income $ 50,000
Corporate tax liability $ 9,250
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This alternative offers two major problems, however. First, once 
the corporation has disposed of the land, a second liquidation must 
occur, creating an additional tax.
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $9,250) $440,750
Basis in stock (basis from section 351 transfer
$300,000 + improvements $100,000) 400,000
Gain on corporate liquidation $ 40,750
Therefore, according to this alternative, if all transactions occur in 
the same tax year, the personal tax liability would increase, as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on first corporate liquidation 100,000
Capital gain on second corporate liquidation 40,750
Long-term capital gain deduction (84,450)
Taxable income $ 76,300
Individual tax liability $ 27,400
The second and more serious problem associated with this alter­
native is the risk associated with the liquidation-reincorporation 
process. It appears highly likely that the IRS could invoke the judicial 
doctrines of “business purpose” or “step transaction” and thereby 
ignore the first liquidation entirely. That action would create the 
same tax result described in option A(2)(a).
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
as a Sole Proprietor— Option B(l)(a)(ii)
The tax consequences as a result of the liquidation will, of course, 
produce the same result as in the previous alternative: The property 
basis will increase to $300,000, and the client will recognize a 
$100,000 long-term capital gain. The subsequent development costs 
will add an additional $100,000 to the $300,000 basis. The sale of the 
land for $450,000 will thus create a $50,000 recognizable gain that 
would probably constitute ordinary income. The client’s tax liability 
would be as follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Ordinary gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$400,000) 50,000
Gain on corporate liquidation 100,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (60,000)
Taxable income $110,000
Individual tax liability $ 46,718
Although this alternative appears to have a desirable tax result, it 
exposes the client to a substantial financial risk, since the land 
development would take place outside of a corporate entity. If a 
major, unforeseen liability should arise during the development 
process, all of the client’s assets would be available to settle creditors’ 
claims. This financial risk, and the cost of possible insurance to cover 
the risk, would have to be assessed carefully in making a selection. 
Because the illustration is already sufficiently complicated, and 
because the added complication would add little if anything to the 
point of the illustration, we have simply ignored this factor in the 
remainder of the illustration. Unfortunately, the practitioner cannot 
dispose of problems so easily.
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing
the Property and Then Accomplishing Development and
Sale Through a Broker—Option B(l)(b)
The tax consequences here are similar to those in the previous 
alternative. However, the critical question to be decided is whether 
development and sale by an independent real estate broker would 
cause the final gain on the sale of the property to be treated as a 
capital gain rather than as ordinary income. In addition, the broker’s 
fees would likely reduce the anticipated return from the development. 
In order to simplify the solution, we have ignored this probable 
additional cost for the purposes of the illustration. Accordingly, the 
tax computation could be made as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Gain on liquidation of corporation 100,000
Gain on sale of improved land 50,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (90,000)
Taxable income $ 80,000
Individual tax liability $ 29,398
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Whether the client would be able to sustain a claim for capital gain 
treatment on the sale of the property through an independent broker 
is questionable. There is some judicial authority to support such a 
position; however, the consensus of available judicial authority does 
not. Adoption of this course of action would appear to invite litigation. 
In addition, this alternative might once again include a substantial 
financial risk because it requires development of the land outside the 
corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
Through a New Corporation— Option B(2)(a)(i)
Under a section 333 liquidation, no gain would be recognized either 
to the corporation or to the client. The land distributed in the 
liquidation would assume the basis of the stock surrendered, in this 
instance $200,000. Subsequent transfer of the land to a new corpo­
ration for purposes of development would be tax free under section 
351. The basis of $200,000 plus $100,000 of additional investment to 
accomplish the development would increase the corporate basis in 
the property to $300,000. The sale of the land by the corporation 
would result in ordinary income as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sales price of land $450,000
Corporation’s basis in land 300,000
Ordinary corporate taxable income $150,000
Corporate tax liability $ 49,750
The subsequent liquidation of the new corporation would create 
the following gain.
Cash distributed (sales price $450,000 —
corporate tax $49,750) $400,250
Basis of stock surrendered 300,000
Gain on corporate liquidation $100,250
Thus, the client’s total personal tax liability would be computed as 
follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Gain on corporate liquidation 100,250
Long-term capital gain deduction (60,150)
Taxable income $ 60,100
Individual tax liability $ 18,747
As was true in option B(l)(a)(i), an adviser would again have to 
question how the IRS would view a liquidation followed by an 
immediate reincorporation and a subsequent liquidation with no 
obvious business purpose other than converting ordinary income into 
capital gain. This alternative, therefore, appears to be highly ques­
tionable and full of litigation potential.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development as a
Sole Proprietor—Option B(2)(a)(ii)
As mentioned in the explanation of the previous option, no taxable 
gain would occur with a section 333 liquidation. The client would 
surrender his stock and transfer his basis of $200,000 from the stock 
to the land received in distribution. The subsequent land improve­
ments would increase the basis of the land to $300,000. The sale of 
the land would undoubtedly result in ordinary income in the amount 
of $150,000 ($450,000 — $300,000). Thus, the client’s tax liability 
would be determined as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Ordinary income from sale of lots 150,000
Taxable income $170,000
Individual tax liability $ 85,272
This alternative  also involves th e  extra financial risk of developing  
the land outside the safety of a corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development Through 
an Independent Broker—Option B(2)(b)
As in the two previous alternatives, this option transfers the land 
from the corporation to the client through liquidation and transfers
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the $200,000 basis in the stock to the land. The additional development 
costs of $100,000 can again be added to the basis of the land. The 
same critical questions encountered under option B(l)(b) are crucial 
to the tax result in this alternative. If, as a result of sale through a 
broker, capital gain treatment can be justified, the following tax cost 
would be incurred.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$300,000) 150,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (90,000)
Taxable income $ 80,000
Individual tax liability $ 29,398
Summary
By adding the results of the foregoing computations to figure 8.2, we 
can readily observe some very interesting results. Three alternatives— 
A(l)(a)(ii), B(l)(b), and B(2)(b)—each produce an equally low tax 
liability ($29,398). However, each of these alternatives involves a 
rather high risk. If the alternatives are carried out as proposed, they 
are likely to be challenged by the IRS and, in at least two instances, 
may result in rather sizable deficiency assessments. That is, both 
option A(l)(a)(ii) and option B(2)(b), if challenged during an audit, 
could result in a deficiency assessment of $55,874 ($85,272 — $29,398). 
For instance, if option A(l)(a)(ii) were found to involve a collapsible 
corporation, the tax liability would amount to $85,272, not including 
possible penalties. Similarly, if capital gain treatment were to be 
denied on option B(2)(b), the revised tax liability would be $85,272, 
not including any penalties. Although option B(l)(b) appears to be 
much more appealing taxwise, it involves the added financial risk 
common to all noncorporate operations. In the latter alternative, 
even if challenged successfully, the deficiency assessment would 
amount to only $17,320 ($46,718 — $29,398), excluding penalties.
Another highly uncertain result is implicit in option B(l)(a)(i). If 
a revenue agent proposes to collapse the two liquidations into one 
and if we consider only the second liquidation as a valid one, the tax 
result would involve a liquidation after corporate development of the 
land with a potential tax liability of $109,662, or a deficiency 
assessment of $73,012 ($109,662 — $36,650), without penalties.
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Taking into consideration only the tax factors, alternatives B(l)(b) 
and B(1)(a)(ii) appear to be the most attractive options. Option B(1)(b), 
as already noted, projects a possible tax liability of $29,398, with a 
potential deficiency assessment of $17,320, for a likely tax cost of 
$46,718. Option B(l)(a)(ii), which requires immediate liquidation of 
the corporation and assumes the development and sale of the land 
by your client as a sole proprietor, offers the least litigation risk. The 
total tax would amount to $46,718, the same as the maximum 
projected under B(l)(b). Nevertheless, both these alternatives include 
the financial risk of operating without the liability protection of a 
corporation, and the latter option probably involves additional costs 
for the broker’s services. As noted earlier, in an actual planning 
engagement, both of these costs would have to be estimated and 
added to our illustration before a recommendation could be made to 
the client.8
Once all of the reasonable alternatives have been researched and 
their tax results determined, a tax adviser should recommend a course 
of action to the client. In some circumstances, the client may elect 
to ignore tax results and base a decision on other considerations. In 
the final analysis only the client can determine which alternative is 
best for him or her. The qualified tax adviser will, however, give the 
client all of the information needed to make an intelligent decision; 
in most instances, the adviser’s recommendation will be accepted by 
the client.
The foregoing example demonstrates a systematic approach to the 
research of alternative courses of action available to a taxpayer. This 
tax-planning process represents a serial rearrangement of facts over 
which a client can still exercise control. Such a systematic creation 
and evaluation of alternative strategies is the key to profitable tax 
planning.
Tax-Planning Communications
Practitioners should recognize distinct differences between commu­
nicating research conclusions in a tax compliance problem and making 
recommendations in a tax-planning engagement. In tax compliance 
work, the facts and the law pertinent to the solution are generally
8 In such an engagement, much of the computational work could be adapted to a 
computer program, which would include calculations for income averaging, the 
maximum tax on earned income, and so forth. Obviously computers can eliminate 
many hours of labor in planning engagements, often at minimal cost through time­
sharing arrangements.
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fixed. Therefore, once the appropriate statute and all related author­
ities have been identified and evaluated, the researcher generally 
can offer a conclusion to the client with reasonable certainty that it 
is “correct.”
Reaching an optimal conclusion in a tax-planning engagement is 
much less certain. The “facts” are merely preliminary proposals based 
on many estimates and assumptions. Furthermore, the enactment of 
a proposed plan is not fixed in time. It may occur next week, next 
month, or two years hence. Consequently, at the time the plan is 
finally executed, even the tax statutes upon which it is based may 
have changed, and the tax alternative originally recommended may 
no longer be the preferred one. Because of these uncertainties, the 
tax adviser should prepare for the client a written memorandum 
containing a statement of the assumptions and the recommended plan 
of action, qualified as follows:
1. A statement should be included emphasizing the fact that, 
unless the plan is actually implemented as originally assumed, 
the tax results may be substantially altered.
2. It should be stressed that the recommendations are based on 
current tax authority and that possible delays in implementation 
may change the result because of changes in the law during the 
interim period.
The foregoing recommendations generally concur with the opinion 
expressed in the AICPA Statement of Responsibilities in Tax Practice 
8, as quoted on pp. 163-164. Although the AICPA committee did 
not recommend routine use of such precautionary language, tax 
advisers should seriously consider the adoption of such standard 
disclaimer statements in most tax-planning engagements.
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17, 213-214
resolving questions for clients, 5, 57 
role of, in anticipating tax
problems, 31
role of, in tax questions, 11-13, 57 
(and) tax communications to client, 
see Tax communications
technical competence of, 54-58,
77-78
Tax communications 
drafting of, 5-6 
external, 161-172
client letters, 161-164, 233 
disclaimer statements, 163-164
internal, 158-160 
memos for file, 158-159 
research recorded in file, 160 
subject file, 160 
see also Research “closed-fact”
client file 
oral, 157, 159 
privileged, 163 
protest letters, 164-169 
recommendations to client,
231-232
requests for rulings and
determination letters, 169-172
writing of, to client, 157-158 
Tax disputes
settlement out of court, 16
Tax laws
applicability, 3 
general objective, 6
Tax liability, 14, 212
Tax opportunities, 8
Tax planning
aids in, see Publications 
before the facts, 17 
considerations, 212-214
statutory options, 213 
client constraints, 14, 213-214
courses of study in, 216 
creativity in, 214 
example of, 219-231 
procedures, example of, 219-231 
recommending to client, 231-232 
role of CPA firm in, 211 
(to) obtain objectives, 13-14
Tax questions
determination of, 4 
errors in, 54 
identification of, 53 
nature of, example, 61-79 
relationship to facts and law, 53
example, 61-79 
resolution of, 5, 61, 75-76 
statements of, 59-61
dangers in, 59-61 
Tax result, 11 
Tax services
Bureau of National Affairs, tax 
service, 119, 123
Commerce Clearing House, tax 
service, 117-118
Matthew Bender, tax service, 119 
Mertens, tax service, 118-119 
Prentice-Hall, tax service, 117-118 
Research Institute of America, tax
service, 119
Tax valuation, see Fair market value 
Taxpayer
compliance, 13, 211-212 
after-the-facts, 14
relationship with tax adviser, see 
Tax adviser
236
Technical information releases, 93
Testimony of impartial witnesses 
importance of, 50
Treasury regulations, 88-91, 135 
age of, 140-141 
publication of, 90
Tree diagrams
examples of, 218, 230 
preparation of, 18, 217-219
w
WESTLAW, 125, 129, 132
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